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THESIS

*Actual Entities:
A Study of A. N. Whitehead's Theory of Reality.*

(Abstract)

Alfred North Whitehead proposes to "frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element in our experience can be interpreted". (*Process and Reality*, p. 4)

These general ideas (*Categories*) are numerous, forty-five in all. However, there are two which "stand out with a certain extreme finality". (*Ibid.*, p. 33) These are the categories: 'actual entity' and 'eternal object'.

The category 'actual entity' is the term Whitehead uses to designate the final real things of which the universe is made. In his opinion, it is necessary to focus attention on the notions of 'creativity', 'many' and 'one', in order to understand the nature of actual entities. The category 'eternal object' is the term Whitehead employs to designate the realm of 'pure potentials'.

It is the purpose of this project to state and critically evaluate Whitehead's theory of actual entities. This also inevitably involves a discussion of eternal objects.

The implications of his consideration of 'creativity', 'one' and 'many' have been indicated by comparative reference to the work of other philosophers who have dealt with these topics. The weaknesses found in traditional formulations have been noted. An effort has been made to determine whether or not Whitehead has been able to offer a genuine solution for any of these problems, (for example, in the case of 'purpose', 'space and time', 'freedom', 'relations', 'value', 'identity and permanence').

The criterion which has been used in evaluating the work of Whitehead, and that of other thinkers whose philosophy he seeks to correct, is that set up by Whitehead himself. Whitehead has stated: "The starting point for thought is the analytic observation of components of 'experience'." (*Ibid.*, p. 6) "Metaphysical categories are not dogmatic statements of the obvious. They are tentative formulations of the ultimate generalities" discoverable in all actual experience. (*Ibid.*, p. 12) Time after time, in his writings and conversation, Whitehead repeats the claim that his philosophical categories are derived from an observation of facts and functions discoverable in the ordinary experience of unbiased 'common sense' individuals. Philosophical categories are statements (or descriptions) of the 'principles' (patterns) exemplified in all experience. Whitehead admits that it is easy to expose the defects of 'common sense' and 'ordinary experience'. The common sense of one generation is the 'discredited mythology' of a more enlightened age. Despite all this, there is a general and common agreement among all 'normal' individuals concerning certain facts, principles and types of experience. In our non-ultrametaphysical moments we all live in a common world, and agree in the use of a common universe of discourse.

Whitehead's 'philosophy' is taken to be that which is expressed in his four most recent books: *Science and the Modern World*, *Process and Reality*, *Adventures of Ideas*, *Nature and Life*. These, he considers to be the best expression of his metaphysical position.

It is evident from an examination of Whitehead's philosophy of organism that "his course of procedure is to give a comprehensive description of human experience and then to take this description as the key to the nature of reality." (C. W. Morris, *Six Theories of Mind*, p. 183) Whitehead explicitly acknowledges this fact by comparing his position with that formulated by Bradley. It will be remembered that Bradley held that 'feeling' is the basic activity of experience. His analysis of a moment of experience runs thus: "In my general feeling at any moment there is more than the objects before me, and no perception of objects will exhaust the sense of living emotion." (F. H. Bradley, *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 159) This experience is characterized as a "unity of many in one". Proceeding on the basis of Bradley's analysis, Whitehead substitutes different terms for those used by Bradley. He states: "I analyse a feeling (or prehension) into the 'datum', which is Bradley's 'object before me', into the 'subjective form' which is Bradley's 'living emotion', and into the 'subject' which is Bradley's 'me'." (*Adventures of Ideas*, p. 297) Having noted the fact that human beings are aware of 'as yet unrealized' possibilities, Whitehead formulates his category of 'eternal object'.

In the development of the thesis project, certain relevant matters have been dealt with: 1. An effort has been made to indicate types of experience which Whitehead analyzes in order to obtain the information which he uses in formulating his theory of reality. 2. In stating the implications of certain of Whitehead's theories, care has been taken to correct a number of recent misinterpretations. 3. An attempt has been made to indicate in what sense Whitehead may be called a 'panpsychist', and how he differs from most panpsychists. 4. Whitehead claims relationships with Platonism, and the positions of Bradley and James. An examination of this matter has been attempted. The conclusion is that such relationships are not very profound. 5. This thesis emphasizes the fact that Whitehead proposes to regard God as a genuine actual entity, not merely the name for the joint activities of many entities. 6. Reference has been made to the basic differences which distinguish Whitehead's "philosophy of organism" from the traditional "substance" theories of reality.

The critical part of the thesis develops the following topics.

The advisability of interpreting all real entities by means of categories applicable to human experience, has been questioned. Whitehead's position is

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thus exposed to some (not all) of the usual objections to panpsychism.

It has been pointed out that the "philosophy of organism" is unable (within the circle of its categories) to account for the emergence of novel organic characteristics. That is to say, in its present form Whitehead's philosophy does not admit the presence in an organism (society) of any qualities which can not be found in its component actual entities. This also involves the question as to whether Whitehead gives sufficient recognition to the element of identity which characterizes enduring societies, i.e., persons and things.

It has been pointed out that God cannot, consistently, be regarded as an 'ordinary' actual entity.

The validity of Whitehead's analysis of the process of perception has been criticised. Whitehead emphasizes the claim that we have no direct experience of the external world. Data derived from past bodily states are 'projected'.

On the basis of this examination and resultant criticism, the conclusion has been reached that, despite many valuable insights, Whitehead's system of general ideas is, in its entirety, neither coherent nor necessary. It has been further claimed that some elements in experience cannot be interpreted by this system of general ideas.

The 'thesis' to be defended is this: Whitehead, unlike many philosophers, formulates a metaphysics which does justice to a number of 'common sense' insights. He holds that there are many real entities, which are externally related (as well as internally), in a world in which change (process) actually occurs. God is not directly responsible for everything which takes place. However, on the basis of his own criterion, Whitehead's metaphysics is open to considerable criticism. His 'categories' do not seem to be applicable to (descriptive of) certain phases of experience. There are, in addition several internal inconsistencies.

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ACTUAL EMITIERS
A STUDY OF A. N. MILNE'S THEORY OF QUALITY

A thesis submitted in conformity
with the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the University of Toronto

by
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In recent years contemporary philosophers have been either appalled or delighted by the ~~size~~ range of A. N. Whitehead's Essay in Cosmology, Process and Reality. It proposes to "frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted." (1)

In this treatise, Whitehead sets out to delineate the nature of the "real" beings or things in the universe. In his opinion, "the ultimate notions involved in the meaning of the synonymous terms 'thing', 'being' (and) 'entity'" (Whitehead prefers the term 'entity') "are 'creativity', 'many' and 'one'." (2)

These concepts or rather, the general notions implied by them, have had a long and tortuous history. By their use Whitehead deliberately sets himself in the midst of a great tradition, - which is filled with ceaseless conflict, darkened by unsolved problems, illuminated by flashes of insight.

The origin or creation of persons and things has been accounted for in various ways. Gods or atoms have been invoked by pious or hard-headed philosophers. Also,

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 4
(All references in this paper are to the 1929 Edition, New York, unless otherwise specified)

(2) Ibid p. 71 Brackets mine.

the status of these atoms, things, persons has been the subject of much discussion. It has been claimed that: 1. atoms are the ultimate real entities, - persons and things are derived; 2. persons alone are real. Things and atoms are merely ideas in a person's mind. 3. There is one real being of which atoms, things and persons are mere superficial appearances, lacking genuine reality entirely; 4. There is one great reservoir of "being" from which stream forth persons, things and "ideas". They are however, not ultimate. Reality is one; 5. There is one supreme being who makes persons and things, conferring on them a lesser kind of reality (if any at all). 6. The persons and things of the world are only manifestations of the "one" real "form", "idea" or "essence". ---- All these matters have been discussed under the heading: "the one and the many." There is in addition the problem as to whether there is only one kind of entity, real or "apparent", - or many kinds.

It is the purpose of this project to state and critically evaluate Whitehead's theory of "actual entities."

The implications of his discussion of "creativity" and "the one and the many" have been indicated by means of a comparative reference to the work of other men, who have dealt with these topics. The weaknesses found in traditional formulations have been noted. An effort has

been made to determine whether or not Whitehead has been able to offer a genuine solution for any of these problems.

The criterion which has been used in evaluating the work of Whitehead, and that of other thinkers, whose philosophy he seeks to correct, is that set up by Whitehead himself.

Whitehead has stated, - the starting point of thought is the analytic observation of components of "experience. (i.e. the objects experienced and the act of experiencing). "Metaphysical Categories are not dogmatic statements of the obvious; they are tentative formulations of the ultimate generalities" (1) discoverable in all actual experience. -- Time after time, in his writings and in conversation, Whitehead reverts the claim that his philosophical categories are derived from an observation of facts and functions discoverable in the ordinary experience of unbiased "common sense" individuals. Philosophical categories are statements (or descriptions) of the "principles" (patterns) exemplified in all experience. (2)

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 12
Underlining mine.

(2) When Whitehead scoffs at "common sense" notions (Cf. A. N. Whitehead, Nature and Life, Chapter I), he is referring to the "pseudo" common sense of those who have been corrupted by the seductive influence of metaphysics.

Thus Whitehead's position;— his criticism of other thinkers and his constructive formulations, ---- is evaluated on the basis of ordinary common sense experience (1) and the knowledge derived from it.

The "thesis" which I would defend is this: Whitehead, unlike many philosophers, formulates a metaphysics which does justice to a number of common sense insights. (1) He does not deny the reality of many ordinary experiences. However, on the basis of his own criterion, his metaphysics is open to considerable criticism. Whitehead's "categories" do not seem to be applicable to (descriptive of) certain phases of experience. There are, in addition, a number of internal inconsistencies.

(1) It is of course easy to make fun of 'common sense' and "ordinary" experience. It is true that ultra-modernist nonsense has been so labelled. The common sense of one generation is the 'liberated mythology' of a more enlightened age. Despite all this there is a general and common agreement among all "normal" individuals concerning certain facts, principles and types of experience. In our non-ultra metaphysical moments we will live in a common world, and agree in the use of a common universe of discourse. Even the most hardened "Rationalist" admits this. Though in his opinion said experience lacks reality, he is willing to recognize it, as "experience".

(2) I.e. There are many real entities; which are externally related (as well as internally); in a world in which change (process) actually occurs. God is not directly responsible for everything which takes place.

In the pursuance of this project certain aims,
though important matters have been dealt with: 1. An
effort has been made to indicate types of experience
which Whitehead analyzes in order to obtain the
information which he uses in formulating his theory of
reality. (i.e. of actual entities) 2. In stating what
Whitehead means by certain of his theories, care has
been taken to correct a number of recent misinterpretations
(of what he means by certain passages in his writings).
3. An attempt has been made to indicate in what sense
Whitehead may be called a "panpsychist", and how he
differs from most panpsychists. 4. Whitehead claims
relationships with Platonism, and the positions of
Bradley and Jones. An examination of this matter has
been attempted.

Chapter I

Whitehead's Project and Method

"Philosophy, in one of its functions, is the critic of cosmologies. It is its function to harmonise, refashion, and justify divergent intuitions as to the nature of things. It has to insist on the scrutiny of the ultimate ideas, and on the retention of the whole of the evidence in shaping our cosmological scheme. Its business is to render explicit, and so far as may be efficient, a process which otherwise is unconsciously performed without rational test. (1)

"If this cosmology be deemed successful, it becomes natural to ask whether the type of thought involved be not a transformation of some main doctrines of Absolute Idealism onto a realistic basis." (2)

These quotations from Process and Reality and Science and the Modern World, indicate the general point of view which Whitehead proposes to use in meeting the problems of "creativity" and "the one and the many".

It is necessary to note the importance which Whitehead attributes to insights (i.e. hints as to the

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, ix-x
(11 references will be: The University Press,
Edition Cambridge 1932, unless otherwise specified)

(2) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, page viii

ultimate nature of all reality, which are derived from some particular experience. It is his opinion, that, without some illuminating flash of insight concerning the nature of things, metaphysics degenerates into the "rational" juggling of concepts. However, once the insights are given, a rational development of the implications of the "glowing" idea is most necessary. In addition, constructively speaking, rationalism takes the insight with some hand, washes its face, combs its hair, clothes it in the modern mode, - in short makes it presentable in the available contemporary "universe of discourse". The rationalist who refuses to respect insights is bowing down to the "golden calf" of his own technical excellence. The true rationalism must always transcend itself by recurrence to the concrete in search of inspiration. A self-satisfied rationalism is in effect a form of anti-rationalism. It makes an apostasy, built on a particular set of abstractions.* (1) Now, in brief, the "priests" of rationalism must realize the essential relationship with the "prophetic" voices. On the other hand insights must be made meaningful by their fellowship with the exact concepts of reason. Otherwise they are

(1) A. S. Whiteland, Science and the Modern World, p. 281 (London edition).

bound and fury signifying nothing.

Yet, despite Whitehead's stress on the limitations of rationalism, he has a profound faith in reason. -- "Faith in reason is, the trust that: (1) the ultimate nature of things lie together in a harmony which excludes mere arbitrariness" (1); (2) the mind of man can conceptually grasp, more or less adequately, the nature of reality.

Through-out all Whitehead's cosmological speculations there is manifest that admirable lack of dogmatism which so graced the work of Plato. Whitehead frequently reiterates the fact that: "the elucidation of immediate experience is the sole justification for any thought; and (that) the starting point for thought is the analytic observation of components of this experience." (2) "Metaphysical categories are not ~~descriptive statements~~ of the obvious; they are tentative formulations of the ultimate generalities (discoverable in all actual experience)" (3) There is an ultimate inescapable vagueness in all our most profound thinking. We experience things which we cannot adequately conceptualise.

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World p. 23

(2) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 6

(3) Ibid p. 12 Brackets mine, also in (1) and (2)

Whitehead believes that no traditional system of philosophy has been able to do justice to the rich complexity of reality; - though all have some elements of value. His courageous crossing of philosophical boundaries in the search for adequate 'descriptive generalities', is indicated in one of the quotations set at the beginning of this section. -- This (Whitehead's) cosmology is a "transformation of some main doctrines of Absolute Idealism onto a realistic basis." (1)

In Whitehead's opinion, previous philosophers have been unable to do justice to "process", "individuality" and "permanence". In order to correct the deficiencies of their positions, believing with due humility that such an undertaking is possible, he offers: "a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted." (2)

This stupendous scheme was formulated only after Whitehead had made a very careful study of the attempts of his predecessors. Indeed he regards his system as expressive of insights which other philosophers dimly envisaged but did not push to their logical conclusions. It is to be noted that in addition to his appreciation of

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. viii
(2) Ibid p. 4

the wisdom of the past, Whitcherd possesses a keen understanding of the theoretical background of mathematics and physical science.

From this complex blend of old and new is shaped the "Philosophy of Organism";- an attempt to: (A) state some of the basic doctrines of Absolute Idealism (of the Bradley type) in realistic terms, and (B) to rescue the type of thought expressed by Bergson, James and Dewey from the charge of anti-intellectualism.

Criticism of substance

In Whitcherd's opinion, the main emphasis in the philosophical tradition has been placed on the doctrine that the essential real entities in the universe are static and self-sufficient. This point of view received clear formulation in that phase of Plato's thought wherein he stresses the unchanging perfection of the realm of "ideas". The Aristotelian logic, with its related theory of "substance" added impetus to this tendency.-- The claim that the ultimate substances, passively receiving qualifications, are in no essential way related (theoretically) to other substances, produced, or was the product of, a logic which emphasized substantives and adjectives to the neglect of propositions and conjunctions. Descartes gave clear expression to the implied body-and dualism.

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Locke applied the notion specifically to the field of psychology. The "psychological metaphysicians" who followed him carried the fatal Cartesian dualism to its logical conclusion. Locke was content with a "representation" theory of perception. Berkeley reduced the world to a flux of sensations and God. Hume dispensed with God. Kant satisfied himself with a world moulded by the mind out of sensations ultimately derivative from the realm of "Ding-an-sich".---The work of these philosophers reveals the inescapable problems which confront those who take the doctrine of "substance" seriously. In short, this theory cannot do justice to our ordinary experience of real things, genuinely interconnected. Further, our store of mental experiences is not atomized, as was claimed, by the metaphysical psychologists of the 17th and 18th centuries.

Whitehead is particularly impressed by the deficiencies of this theory when it is applied rigorously in the field of physical science. He ten was responsible for the firm foundation which the theory of substance received in physics. He posited ultimate particles, each with an absolutely definite place in space and time---requiring (for the explanation of any of its essential characters) no reference to any other particles or any other regions of space and time. The lapse of time was

regarded as having no influence on the nature of these substances. (1)

In Whitehead's opinion it is evident that a philosopher, proceeding on the basis of Newtonian physics, is faced by insuperable difficulties in seeking to explain certain phases of ordinary experience: 1. If there is no inherent relation between particles of matter, induction is day-dreaming, the formulation of laws, idle fancy. 2. Life and meaning can find no place in a physical nature supposedly completely explained in terms of mass, motion and shape. 3. The self-endurance of any entity is an insolvable problem. Endurance can be explained only by continual Divine creation (since there is no necessary connection between the "being" of a particle at one moment and the being of the so-called "same" particle at the succeeding moment).

The Sources of Whitehead's Basic Insights

In the realm of physics, new developments have taken place which have shaken the traditional doctrine to the core. To these Whitehead turns for destructive criticism of the doctrine of "substance", and for suggestions as to how concepts must be remodelled so as to describe, adequately, the true nature of reality. Also, proceeding

(1) H. C. Lovejoy, The Revolt against Dualism p. 161
(critical discussion of "simple location")

to an examination of his own in clistic experience, Whitehead finds further data to aid him in this project. The philosophy of organism can only be understood by continually bearing in mind these two sources from which its basic concepts are derived.

Whitehead points out that his philosophy consists of an emphasis on ideas expressed by other thinkers, but not properly appreciated by them. Frequent reference is made to the great names of the philosophical tradition. It must be noted, however, that this does not mean that Whitehead is telling the same old story in barbaric terminology. This point will be clarified in later sections of the thesis.

It must be granted that the terminology is difficult. However, an examination of the experience (and things experienced)--from which it is derived--renders it clearly understandable. There is little justice in D. C. Foxley's charge: "He invents a new technical vocabulary, translates everything, from the subtlest refinements of logic and mathematical physics to the most esoteric aspects of religious experience, into terms of it, and then compresses his whole cosmology into one volume with a minimum of illustration and exemplification by way of translation." (1)

(1) Proceedings of the Trinitarian Society (1917-1921)

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Types of Experiencing and Objects Experienced, which
Provide Whitehead with Basic Insights as to the Nature
of All Actual Entities

Recent investigations of "matter" have indicated the untenability of traditional theories: 1. The organic behavior of matter has shown that parts are influenced by the whole in which they find themselves. "The electron blindly runs either within or without the body; but it runs within the body in accordance with its character within the body." (1) 2. Bacon's insight that "all bodies whatsoever, though they have no sense, yet they have perception" (2) is at last being appreciated. It is now asserted that the so-called material particles are influenced by and "concerned with" each other. This fact is made possible, in Whitehead's opinion, by the nature of "physical" entities. Thus, "the modern point of view is expressed in terms of energy, activity and the vibratory differentiations of space-time. Any local agitation shakes the whole universe. The distant effects are finite but they are there. The concept of matter presupposes single location. Each bit of matter was self-contained, localised in a region with a passive, static network of spatial relations, existing in a

(1) J. H. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World p. 9
(2) Ibid p. 52

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uniform relational system from infinity to infinity and from eternity to eternity. But in the modern concept the group of excitations which we term matter is fused into its environment. There is no possibility of a detached, self-contained local existence. The environment enters into the nature of each thing. Some elements in the nature of a complete set of excitations may remain stable as those excitations are propelled through a changing environment. But such stability is only the case in a general, average sort of way. This average fact is the reason why we find the same chair, the same rock, the same planet enduring for days, or for centuries, or for millions of years." (1) Thus for physics, a "thing" is not an inert "mass" (after all mass is not a constant attribute, but changes with velocity) occupying a certain definite space. "The thing is what it does" (2) - a stream of influence which permeates to the utmost recesses of space and time. It is evident that: (A) when we speak of a thing being specifically located at a certain place, we refer only to its local region; (B) the innumerable physical entities are in a sense superimposed. (3)

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Nature and Life p. 12-13

(2) A. N. Whitehead, The Adventure of Ideas p. 207

(3) Cf. D. O. Lovejoy, The Revolt against Dualism p. 107

Whithead regards certain psychological insights as being a fruitful source of data for the solution of the problem of cosmology. (1) The philosophy of organism starts with a "generalization of Locke's account of mental operations." (2) Despite his earlier "representative" theory of perception, Locke, in the later books of his Essay holds that all knowledge is "founded on" particular things. Locke "also holds that all qualities have in some sense a relational element in them -- that 'powers' are to be ascribed to particular existents

(1) It is to be noted that this is ~~not~~ in Whithead's Philosophy of Organism, tends to underestimate the extent to which Whithead finds the key to the nature of reality by examining psychic experience. She states: "I am continually conscious that the way in which his mind is working is essentially that of a ~~psychotic~~ technician." (Cf. ibid., p. viii) Expressive of this point of view is Miss Mait's denunciation of Prof. Lloyd Morgan (Cf. The Journal of Philosophical Studies July 1971) for not realizing that terms such as "subjective aim", "mental and physical pre-cession", "satisfaction" when applied to "sub-living organisms" (surely it is clear that Whithead considers all actual entities to be living). Nature and Life p. 25) are divested of all their usual psychological meaning. --- as a matter of fact, Whithead claims undisputedly that "feeling" in a genuine psychological sense is enjoyed by all subjects (actual entities). It is of course true that all actual entities are not conscious. But it is not necessary to be conscious (in Whithead's sense of the term) in order to have "psychic" experience, i.e. subjective form, subjective aim, conceptual prehensions etc.

(2) A. N. Whithead, Process and Reality, p. 29

whereby the constitutions of other particulars are conditioned." There is also Leibniz's notion of the passage of time, i.e. something is perpetually perishing. (1)

The philosophy of Kant contains the fundamental conception "of an act of experience as a constructive functioning". (2) This, in Whitehead's opinion is one of the most basic insights which a philosopher can enjoy.

In the writings of Berkeley (Alciphron- Fourth Dialogue) Whitehead finds a further illustration of a type of experience in which "simple location" is denied. Euphranor is pointing out to Alciphron that: "neither the castle, the planet, nor the cloud, which you see here, are those real ones which you suppose at a distance." Referring to this passage, Whitehead expounds it thus: "Note the idea of simple location has gone--- It is the perspective of the castle over there, from the standpoint of the unification (the percipient) here.---It is therefore, aspects of the castle, cloud and the planet which are grasped into unity (of the percipient occasion) here. You will remember that the idea of perspectiveness is quite familiar in philosophy. It was introduced by

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 22

(2) Ibid p. 236

Leibniz in the notion of "one's mirroring perspectives of the universe." (1) This Whitehead seems to think that the perceiving of a castle etc. constitutes the literal presence of the castle (i.e. an "aspect" of it) in a locus different from its common sense material position. By its relations to other entities, any object is now considered to be in ~~in~~ my loci. (2) There is a ~~second~~ different basis for the denial of "single location" in this ~~moment~~, than that employed in the physical analogy. Using the "physical analogy", single location is rejected because an object extends out ~~all~~ over the universe. In the case of this psychical analogy, the theory is denied because of the relationship of perceiver and object. (According to Whitehead the act of perception takes place because of the presence of an aspect "here" of an object "over there".)

In Bradley's analysis of an "occasional" (so-crt) of experience, Whitehead finds a suggestion which aids him in formulating his theory of the nature of an "actual entity". It also provides a clue for the solution of the problem of "relations".

Bradley, having decided that an "abstraction" or absolutely separate entity called a "relation" could not connect or relate equally separate "terms", reached the

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, p. 87
Underlining and brackets mine.

(2) Cf. A. O. Lovejoy, The Revolt against Dualism, p. 175-

conclusion that "relationship" implies an underlying unity and an inclusive whole. It will be remembered that Bradley held that "feeling" is the basic activity of experience. His analysis of a moment of experience runs thus: "In my general feeling at any moment there is more than the objects before me and no perception of objects will exhaust the sense of living emotion." (1) This experience is characterized as a "unity of many in one". Proceeding on the basis of Bradley's analysis, Whitehead substitutes different terms for those used by Bradley. He states: "I analyse a feeling (or perception) into the 'datum' which is Bradley's 'object before me', into the 'subjective form' which is Bradley's 'living emotion', and into the 'subject' which is Bradley's 'me'. (2) This procedure indicates the way in which Whitehead works out his doctrine of actual entities. Mr. W. G. Morris aptly expresses this fact: "Whitehead's course of procedure is to give a comprehensive description of human experience and then to take this description as the key to the nature of reality." (3) In other words all actual entities have the characteristics found by the analysis of an occasion of "psychical" experience.

(1) F. H. Bradley, Essays on Beauty and Reality p. 189
(Underlining mine)

(2) A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas p. 297
(Underlining mine)

(3) C. W. Morris, Six Theories of Mind p. 187

Returning now to a consideration of how Whitehead appeals to "feeling" to solve the problem of "relationship" we find himself passing to the effect that: "The primitive form of physical experience is ~~material~~ blind emotion- received as felt elsewhere in another occasion and conformally appropriated as a subjective passion.--- The primitive element is sympathy, that is, feeling the feelings in another and feeling conformally with another." (1)

In quoting, with approval from Descartes (2), Whitehead indicates that the object perceived is not present in the perceiver exactly as it is in the external world. Descartes expresses it thus: "Hence the idea of the sun will be the sun itself existing in the mind, not indeed formally, as it exists in the sky, but objectively, i.e. in the way in which objects are meant to exist in the mind."

"All explanations of the socio-ecological functioning of mankind include "feeling" as an essential factor in explanation." (3) On this basis Whitehead feels justified

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 246
This emphasis on the importance of feeling as the basic role of relationship results in a repudiation of the usual emphasis on clear sense as the fundamental element in perception. (Cf. Process and Reality p. 214)

(2) Works of Descartes "Reply to Objections against Meditations" Vol. II p. 10 Translation by Haldane and Ross

(3) A. N. Whitehead, Nature and Life p. 21
Underlining mine.

in discarding the dogma that life and mental functions are not properly a part of nature.

Another striking factor in experience is that of the 'lure of possibilities'. We long for an ideal state; we consider how a living room may be best arranged. These possibilities, not yet actual though nevertheless real, lure us on to activity. It is Whitehead's opinion that all actual entities must have an experience of this sort.

The type of analysis of human experience which serves Whitehead as a key to the nature of all actual entities is clearly exemplified in the following section in Nature and Life: "I find myself as essentially a unity of emotions, enjoyments, hopes, fears, regrets, valuations of alternatives, decisions, - all of them subjective reactions to the environment as active in my nature. My unity - which is Descartes' 'I am' - is my process of shaping this welter of material into a consistent pattern of feelings. The individual enjoyment is what I am in my rôle of a natural activity, as I share the activities of the environment into a new creation, which is myself at the moment; and yet, as being myself, it is a continuation of the antecedent world. If we stress the rôle of the environment, this

process is creation. If we stress the rôle of the immediate patterns of native enjoyment, this process is self-creation. If we stress the rôle of a conceptual anticipation of a future whose enjoyment is a necessity in the nature of the present, this process is the teleological aim of new ideal in the future. This aim, however, is not really beyond the creative process. For the aim of the future is an enjoyment in the present. It thus effectively conditions the immediate self-creation of the new creature.⁽¹⁾ (1)

A study of Whitehead's detailed and technical explanation of the nature of actual entities, and the process of their origination will indicate very clearly the value he places on the physical and psychological insights which have been noted in the preceding section.

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Nature and Life p. 62

Chapter II

Whitelock's Theory of the Nature of Reality

Actual Entities

"Actual entities are the final real things of which the world is made up." (1)-- "There is not one complete set of things which are actual occasions." (i.e. "actual entities") (2)--- "Any item of the universe, however preposterous is an abstract thought, or however remote as an actual entity, has its own gradation of relevance--- in the constitution of any one actual entity." (3)

Whitelock's doctrine of the nature of an "actual entity" can be best understood by recalling Bradley's analysis of a moment of experience; and Whitelock's analysis of "Myself". (4)

What Bradley calls a "moment of feeling", Whitelock terms an 'actual entity'. It is to be noted, that in Whitelock's opinion, the characteristics which are found in that moment of experience are also found in all actual entities. The moment of experience (feeling) was analysed (by Bradley) into "object before me", "me", and 'living emotion'. Whitelock's corresponding

(1) A. N. Whitelock, Process and Reality p. 27

(2) Ibid p. 521

(3) Ibid p. 224

(4) A. N. Whitelock, Nature and Life p. 45

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terminology is: "datum", "subject", "subjective form". Any actual entity, then, has these three distinguishable aspects. More accurately, an actual entity is a subject which feels certain data in a certain way (subjective form). These data are provided by other actual entities.

Each actual entity manifests a "vector character". It is the "enjoyment of emotion derived from the past and aimed at the future." (1) In other words an actual entity, or center of experience, not only feels other actual entities but it also is felt by other actual entities.

Whitehead states that "many" and "one" are among the ultimate notions involved in the meaning of terms 'thing', 'being', 'entity'. In this he is referring to the fact that the origination of a new entity is achieved by the coming together of the many entities in the universe in such a way as to form a new entity, which is called a unity or one. This new "one" of course takes its place among the other members of the group of "many" actual entities in the universe, and so plays its part in the origination of new entities ("one").

In all this discussion of actual entities, Whitehead apparently has in mind the experience of "myself" (a typical actual entity) which he describes as a unity of emotions, hopes, decisions, enjoyments---

subjective reactions to the environment as active in my nature. My unity---is my process of shaping this welter of material (1) into a consistent pattern of feelings. "The individual enjoyment is what I am in my role of a natural activity, as I shape the activities of the environment into a new creation, which is myself at this moment; and yet, as being myself, is a continuation of the antecedent world." (2) (The meaning of this will be clarified by subsequent discussion.)

The "process of concretion" by which the actual entities arise, by receiving data from other actual entities, and in their turn pass away (just as moments of psychic experience fade) and in doing so provide data for other newly arising actual entities---must now be considered in detail. One of the most important of the elements in the complex situation is the realm of "eternal objects".

Eternal Objects

Eternal objects are synonymously designated "pure potentials for the specific determination of fact; or forms of Definiteness". (3)--- "Any entity whose

(1) I.e. "sensa". It is to be noted that sense or data of any sort are regarded by Whitehead as members of the class 'feeling'. (See page 147-thesis)

(2) A. N. Whitehead, Nature and Life p. 43 Underlining

(3) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 78 line.

conceptual recognition does not involve a necessary reference to any definite actual entities of the temporal world, - is called an 'eternal object'." (1)

Whitehead points out that by eternal object he means something similar to Locke's "object of thinking", "ideas" such as those expressed by the words whiteness, hardness, sweetness, thinking, motion, sun, elephant, army, drunkenness etc. (2) Eternal objects are the intellectually apprehended "essences" which are "exemplified", "manifest", or "present" in concrete things, or persons. Because of this it has been claimed that Whitehead's doctrine of "eternal objects" is very similar to Plato's theory of "ideas". (3)

However, Whitehead stresses certain fundamental differences between his eternal objects and Plato's "ideas". (4) The Platonic theory of "ideas" is deficient, in Whitehead's opinion, in that: 1. the

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 70

(2) Ibid p. 82

(3) Cf. Miss D. M. Emmet, Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism p. 102-129

(4) The reference is to Plato's theory of "Ideas" as expressed in the "middle period" of his activity, - Phaedo, Phaedrus and Republic.

"ideas" are abstract, having no necessary relations to each other or to the external world. 5. They ~~endeavor~~ to set themselves up as sole reality. Concrete objects can only be classed as ~~imitations~~.

It is ~~Whithead's~~ concern to show that eternal objects have a "relational essence". The relationships of an eternal object "A" stand determinately in the essence of "A". They are internal relations. (1) In other words, if you try to consider an eternal object in absolute distinction from other eternal objects, you miss one of its characteristics, namely, that it is related to other eternal objects - i.e. by lines of implication. (This is the basis of the fact that in our experience when we see fire we expect to see smoke above it -- since the eternal object fire has in its relational essence "smoke".)

Whithead teaches that eternal objects, because of their presence in God's "primordial nature" (see discussion, page 51 Thesis) have a locus in actuality and a tendency to be realized. Thus he states that in the essence of any eternal object there is a 'precept' for relationship to actual entities. Yet any eternal object is indeterminate as to particular impression. (2)

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, p. 118

(2) Cf. Ibid p. 199

The relation between eternal objects and actual entities is designated by various terms. Eternal objects are said to: "have ingression into"; "be realized in" (1); "be exemplified in" (2) actual entities. In the case of all these usages the meaning is apparently the same.

Eternal objects are not all of the "simple" type mentioned in the "Locke" list. There are various degrees of complexity manifested by eternal objects; for example: "a definite finite relationship involving the definite eternal objects of a limited set of such objects is itself an eternal object." (i.e. a complex eternal object) (3)

It is to be noted that eternal objects, derived from a common group of "simple" eternal objects can be arranged in an "abstractive hierarchy", their place in the hierarchy being determined by grades of abstraction. (i.e. the number of alternatives excluded)

An apparent problem arises when we find Whitehead stating that "'sensa' constitute the lowest category of eternal objects." (4) E.g. "definite shade of green" (5) There are also references to the serious apprehension of eternal objects. All this seems directly contrary to

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 34

(2) Ibid p. 64

(3) A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World p. 206-

(4) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 174

(5) A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World p. 207

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the previous doctrine that eternal objects are intellectually apprehended - the objects of conceptual prehension.

This difficulty can be cleared up by noting that Whitehead has been a little confused in his use of language. What he really means to say is this: the eternal object, as such, is conceptually (intellectually) prehended. A particular exemplification of it is sensuously apprehended (prehended). This when Whitehead speaks of the sensuous apprehension of an eternal object he should have said, more accurately, sensuous apprehension of an exemplification. For example, we conceptually apprehend "triplicity". We sensuously apprehend, say, three mice. We conceptually apprehend "greenness"; we sensuously apprehend, not the eternal object "greenness", but its exemplification the patch of green, present before our eyes as a visual sensum.

It is of course true that it is only with great difficulty that we can think of eternal objects apart from some sort of exemplification in imagination. -- When we concentrate on an abstract thought, it is frequently accompanied by some image which exemplifies it.

In the preceding discussion of actual entities, three phases of the internal structure of those entities were noted: "subject", "dat", "subjective for". It is

now necessary to note further complexities. -- An actual entity is very complicated. In general, an adequate description of an actual entity must refer to its component "prehensions" (feelings).

Prehension

"prehension reproduces in itself the general characteristics of an actual entity". (1) Yet, while an actual entity ~~prohends~~ the whole world (in some sense), a prehension has reference to only a part of the world. More exactly, an actual entity requires a number of prehensions in order to react to the whole world.

The statement that "every prehension consists of three factors:- 'subject', 'object' and 'subjective form'" (2) would seem to indicate that a prehension is a lesser sort of actual entity. The initial quotation in this section would also seem to support such an interpretation. However, it is evident on closer examination that when Whitehead uses the term "prehension", he means specifically "feeling of". (3) In other words a prehension is not an entity, but a mode of activity which is constitutive of an entity. It is true that a

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 28

(2) Ibid p. 55

(3) Cf. Ibid p. 66

prehension consists of subject, data and subjective form but only in the sense that a prehension (feeling) of data by a feeler, can't take place unless there are data to be felt and a feeler to feel. The "subject" referred to in the case of any prehension is that of the actual entity which has, as one of its components, this particular prehension of some particular datum.

It is to be further noted that the subjective form (characteristic attitude) (1) of any prehension is determined by the subjective aim (or purpose) (2) of the actual entity in which the prehension takes place. Thus it is, that by a number of prehensions, each selecting a bit of relevant datum from the whole environment to be the object of its affections (or concern),--the new actual entity builds itself up (just as a moment of psychic experience adds to itself, content e.g. sense data, obtained from external sources) and constitutes itself a new entity ("one") among the previous "many".

Whitelock distinguishes various types of prehensions (prehendings): "prehensions of actual entities, namely prehensions whose data involve actual entities - are termed physical prehensions; and prehensions of eternal objects are termed conceptual prehensions." (3) All

(1) Cf. Thesis page 42

(2) Ibid page 48

(3) A. H. Whitelock, Process and Reality, Oxford, 1929.

prehension have subjective force; i.e., eternal objects may be responded to by an attitude of longing, or disgust and rejection. In the process of "including" physical data similar feeling-attitudes (and of course others) are generated. (1)

There are also 'hybrid physical prehensions': "A physical feeling is here defined to be the feeling of (i.e. a response to) another actuality. If the other actuality to objectified by (the data of) its conceptual feelings, the physical feeling of the subject in question is termed 'hybrid'." (2) In her discussion of hybrid physical prehensions, Miss Everett states the theory correctly, is unfortunate in the example which she uses. It is stated correctly, that a hybrid physical feeling is "the feeling of an eternal object felt by another actual entity." (3) The example is: "If I feel the tree as green, I am feeling the tree as prehending conceptually the eternal object green." In this, Miss Everett has overlooked the distinction between the conceptual prehension of an eternal object and the exemplification of an eternal object. Strictly speaking, if the tree had only a conceptual prehension

(1) Cf. A. S. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 49-50

(2) Ibid. p. 747, Lecture nine

(3) Miss D. D. Everett, Whitehead's Philosophy of Greenism, p. 148

of "greeners", it could not be actually green in color. The tree would not be green until it had exemplified the conceptually prehended eternal object "greeness". As such the eternal object is not colored, i.e. it has not the sort of quality which is sensuously apprehended.

An adequate example of a hybrid prehension is the one mentioned by Miss B. Y. Scott: "in feeling eternal objects we are having hybrid physical feelings of God." (1) Another very interesting illustration (also suggested by Whitehead) is the situation which arises in conversation when ideas (eternal objects) conceptually prehended by (ego) "A" are prehended by actual entity (perceiving ego) "B". Apparently, on occasion, this process takes place with little or no direct physical mediation. This is one of the events in ordinary experience which make "mental telepathy" (freed from humbug) appear very plausible to many who have vividly experienced it in mild or more profound form.

A further distinction between prehensions is made thus: - a positive prehension is one in which data are accepted into the being of a new entity. A negative prehension is one in which the proposed data are eliminated from feeling. (It is to be noted that data

(1) Miss B. Y. Scott, Whitehead's Philosophy of Process.

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thus dealt with must be eternal objects since, by definition, all actual entities are positively prehended.) However, the subjective form, with which data are felt "as excluded", gives its contribution to the nature of the entity. Even in the case of data that excluded from feeling there is a bond of relationship, in that, the data in question are "held as imperative", i.e. they are not completely banished from consideration. A positive choice of certain patterns of activity eliminates other possible patterns, yet there is always a vague sense of the existence of the excluded possibilities. This is the type of experience Whitehead is trying to describe in his theory of negative prehensions.

Actual entities, or more specifically, their feelings or prehensions manifest a "vector" character. "They feel what is there and transform it into what is here." (1) Not only is this vector characteristic illustrated by the relations of an actual entity to other actualities present or past. Any actual entity desires to (and does) make a contribution to the life of actual entities which will arise in the future.

Whitehead's theory of "positive prehension" is based on a description of "conjunction with nature". He

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 152

had in mind the sort of thing referred to in Bergman's theory, as the "brooding presence" of a mount in--the experience in which a person seems to feel at one with nature.---The way in which an emotional tone of "anger" carries on from one occasion of experience to another, is likewise referred to by Whitehead as illustrating theprehension of one actual entity by a newly arising actual entity.---The spread and mutual interpenetration of the ultimate electronic entities, also illustrates this prehensive process. (1)

A key to the understanding of Whitehead's doctrine of "conceptual prehension" is provided by our "openness of possibilities." (2)

It was noted previously, that while all actual entities are positively prehended;-- only a selected group of the eternal objects is so dealt with,-- the remainder being "excluded" by negative prehension. At first sight it may appear that there is a problem here,-- namely, how is it possible to "feel" an eternal object and then reject it? Does not the mere fact of feeling the eternal object make it a part of the new entity?

An objection of this sort overlooks a further

(1) Cf. Lewis page 10

(2) Ibid page 15

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complexity of the productive process, in terms of which the apparent difficulty is set.--There is a distinction between "initial data"- the world as it presents itself, and "objective data"- the content selected for use in the origination of a new actual entity. (1) Thus it is that the mere fact of feeling data (initial data) does not thereby constitute them components of the finally determinate actual entities.

In illustrating the sort of experience he has in mind when referring to his doctrine of negative prehension, Whitehead mentions that of an artist. A painter, as he proceeds to plan his work, thinks of various possibilities (initial data). Having done so he selects some and rejects others, holding before him (conceptually), that selected for to guide him in his work (objective data). However, the rejected possibilities remain in the background of the artist's experience. He is aware of their presence in a dim, confused sort of way. Thus Whitehead states: "A negative prehension holds its datum as inoperative in the productive consciousness of prehension constituting the unity of the subject." (2) This makes more

(1) Cf. A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 237-8
(2) Ibid p. 55 Underlining mine.

understandable Whitehead's claim that the sort of exclusion achieved by a negative preclusion constitutes a bond of unity.

There is a further point to be made with reference to negative preclusions.---Though every eternal object is preordered, either positively or negatively, yet an eternal object cannot be completely positively preordered by most actual entities (in that God is the only one who is able to accomplish the task) for they (i.e. most actual entities) do not apprehend many of the implications of any eternal object. (i.e. the relational essence)

In the case of simple conceptual preclusions, there is no distinction between initial and objective data.

It is to be particularly noted that each actual entity has both physical and conceptual feelings (prehensions). In this way, Whitehead avoids the dualism of matter and mind. One of his statements of this position indicates the influence of panism: "In each prehension there is a twofold aspect of the creative urge.---- These objects ^{will} be called the physical and mental poles. No actual entity is devoid of either pole." (1)

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 166
Underlining mine.

The nature and function of Data in the process of Physical creation

In describing the origination of an actual entity by some of processes of other actual entities, Whitehead uses the terms "data" and "objectification". The meaning of the former term should be fairly clear from the preceding discussion.--- Other actual entities provide material or "data" for inclusion in the new actual entities which are continually arising. (It is to be noted that the term "data" is also applied to the eternal objects which are used in the self-creative process of an actual entity.)--- "The functioning of one actual entity (through the medium of data) in the self-creation of another actual entity is the "objectification" of the former for the latter actual entity.--- 'Objectification' refers to the particular mode in which the potentiality of one actual entity is realized in another actual entity." (1) * Further, it

(1) A. I. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 58; 74
Underlining and brackets mine.

* However, it is to be noted that the term "objectification" is also used in a much narrower sense: 'The prehension of one actual entity by another entity is the complete transaction, analysable into: (1) the objectification of the former entity as one of the data for the latter; and (2) the fully clothed feeling whereby the datum is absorbed into the subjective satisfaction.'

Ibid (1) p. 82 Brackets mine.

is to be noted that the process by which an eternal object functions in the self-creative growth of an actual entity, is not called 'objectification', but rather 'ingression'. --- with reference to the actualities of this process (of ingressions), it is apparent that before there is a genuine ingressions of an eternal object, there must first be a conceptual prehension of the eternal object, as datum, --- which is then exemplified or ingresses. For example, if I cut three pieces of bread, the eternal object 'triplicity' has ingressed in the three pieces of bread. But before this took place there must have been the envisionment of that possibility and the decision to cut that many pieces. (conceptual prehension and subjective will)

The types of experience which provided Whitehead with hints as to the nature of the physical prehensive process have been already noted (the enjoyment of the brooding presence of nature; the transfer of a feeling-tone of anger; the spread of an electrical discharge). The nature of the prehensive process is further clarified by a consideration of Whitehead's exact and technical statement of the relation of 'Mist' to source,

* Continue from page 59. True objectification seems to be the process by which actual entities make it available for inclusion into new actual entities; it is not as such, the process by which 'the potentiality of one actual entity is realized in another actual entity'. A. R. Whitehead, process and reality p. 64
Underlining mine.

and the nature of the process of objectification.

Hitchcock tells that "object" consists of phases of actual entities, --- "which actually is produced by means of some element of its own definiteness." (1) "Never-
less, consent in the objectified entity removes the
role of being how the particular entity is related in
the experience of the (new) object." (2) * He refers
more specifically to "emotional form" transmitted from
moment to moment," (3) and speaks of a subjective form
being continuous throughout the successive occasions of
experience." (4)

Here again, it must be noted that Hitchcock is
proposing to describe the nature of all actual entities
in terms of the experience of a sort of the human sort -
the only sort of actual entity which Hitchcock claims
to know accurately and fairly completely.

(1) A. N. Hitchcock, process and reality, p. 152

(2) Ibid. p. 97 Brackets mine.

* "The primitive form of physical experience is occasion-blind emotion - received as felt elsewhere in another
occasion, and conformably accompanied by a subjective
passion." process and reality, p. 144

(3) Ibid. p. 174

(4) A. N. Whitehead, adventures of ideas, p. 156

There are certain passages in Whitehead's writings which suggest a different theory of objectification andprehension. It is suggested that the data are not concrete components of the prehended actual entities but rather, eternal objects.----It is true that in some cases the data may be eternal objects (as in the case of hybrid physical prehensions). The question under consideration is whether or not data are always eternal objects.

Whitehead states, for example: "An eternal object, when it has ingressus through its function of objectifying the actual world, so as to present the datum for prehension, is functioning 'datively!'" (1) "The eternal objects function by introducing the multiplicity of actual entities as constitutive of the actual entity in question." (2) Such passages as these have led critics to hold that the only bond between successive actual entities is the eternal object which they have in common; i.e. the new actual entity has as datum only an eternal object, which objectifies the actual world.

This view is apparently supported by references to the relational functioning of eternal objects, on which

(1) J. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 249
 (2) Ibid p. 95

the solidarity of the universe is based. (1) "There is one eternal object with two-way functioning, namely, as partial determinant of the objective data, and as partial determinant of the subjective form. In this two-way rôle, the eternal object is functioning relationally between the initial data on one hand and the concrecent subject on the other." (2)

However, in considering such statements, it must be remembered that in all instances Whitehead is apparently discussing the transfer of feelings. It is therefore, not to be thought that the eternal objects are the most important elements in the process, or the only content of the bridge between actual entities. By virtue of the process of prehension, i.e. a genuine transfer of feelings, the same eternal object appears in two successive actual entities. The real connection between actual entities in most cases, is not due primarily to the fact of the presence of the same eternal object in the two actual entities, but rather to the transfer of feelings or content in which the eternal object is exemplified. In short, - the eternal object "determines" the actual entity (or more precisely of it) not by any overwhelming might or right, but because

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 249

(2) *Ibid* p. 704

the actual entity decided to be determined by that eternal object (i.e. in the sense that it- the actual entity- exemplifies that eternal object).

Miss Emret is of the opinion that Whitehead cannot legitimately discuss the objectification of actual entities in terms of the transfer of feelings. She holds this view, because, by previous definition: "It is only objects and not events which can 'be again'." (1) In answer to this objection it is to be noted that one feeling (content or act) is not an entire event. Therefore, in saying that a feeling is transferred from a now dead actual entity to a novel actual entity, Whitehead is not being inconsistent. That is to say, he is not claiming that a past actual entity endures, as such. Moreover, Whitehead believes that the validity of his position can be substantiated by reference to a certain sort of experience. He holds that on occasion, it is discovered that a feeling which once formed part of a now dead and gone experience (actual entity) may at the present moment, in all its living immediacy, be a component of a new actual entity. (An example which he offers is that of the transfer of a feeling of anger from a past to a present occasion of experience-actual entity).

(1) Miss D. M. Emret, Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism
p. 159

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turning to the type ofprehension which is characterized by a genuine transfer of feelings (physicalprehension); it is to be noted that there is not an (A) exact or (B) complete transfer of content from the old to the new actual entity. (1) "The 'cause' (old actual entity) ~~passes on~~ its feeling to be reproduced by the new subject as its own---but the reenaction is not perfect." (1) Certain inhibitions, additions, weakenings or intensifications may appear due to the history of its production. (B) Only some feelings are transferred in the process ofprehension. Other feelings in the original actual entities are dismissed, eliminated from the new actual entity. (2) "There are factors in the environment which are eliminated from any function as explicit facts in the new creation. The running stream purifies itself." (3)

An examination of moral and aesthetic experiences provides Whitehead with evidence of the essential place of this process of selection and rejection in the life of an actual entity.

It has been seen that a novel actual entity derives data from other actual entities by physicalprehension, and envisages possibilities by conceptualprehension.

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 62
C. M. C. Inc.

(2) Cf. Ibid p. 321

(3) A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas p. 150-1

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(This is indeed a pair of "real" and "ideal" ("pure") potentiality). One further fact must be noted. In the case of a physical procreation by actual entity "A" of actual entity "B", - data for procreation into "B" are only available after the internal existence of the actual entity "A" "has evaporated, - worn out and annihilated." (1) "The superject (data, also called "the satisfaction" of the actual entity) is not of the substance of the subject." (2) This further emphasizes the fact that the process by which an actual entity is objectified for procreation into another actual entity, entails continual elimination and loss. "Actual entities 'necessarily perish' subjectively, but are immortal objectively." (3)

It must also be remembered that the process of objectification is not due entirely to the activity of the newly arising actual entity. The actual entities which provide data have a drive or urge to make contributions to new actual entities. In a sense the data are not passively available. It is part of their nature that they enter into new actual entities - just as it is part of the nature of the "feeling element" in

(1) L. M. Milne, Space and Reality p. 226
(2) cited by L. M. Milne in conversation.
(3) L. M. Milne, Space and Reality p. 44

experience to carry on into the next moment of experience. The particular set of feelings is, of course, determined ultimately by the intention (subjective aim) of the subject experiencing.

In view of the preceding discussion of the nature of prehension, documentable by an even more exhaustive reference to Whitehead's work, it seems strange to find Dr. Charles Hartshorne faced by a grave problem. "Since it cannot be the eternal objects, nor the events as constituted by them, which internally involve other actual entities, therefore, the solidarity of the world, with its corollary, the denial of simple location, can only mean that the bare space-time locus of each event involves reference to the loci of other events. Qualitatively, events remain outside each other. I confess to a virtual certainty that this is not Whitehead's meaning." (1)

Surely it is evident, as far as Whitehead is concerned, that events internally involve each other by a process of transfer of feeling. Whitehead's views concerning the solidarity of the world are aptly summarized thus: "the process, or concrecence, of any one actual entity involves the other actual entities

(1) Charles Hartshorne, "On Some Criticisms of Whitehead's Philosophy", The Philosophical Review, July 1931, p. 36

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among its components. In this way the obvious solidarity of the world receives its explanation." (1)

Finally, it cannot be sufficiently emphasized that in this system of thought, "any item of the universe, however preposterous as an abstract thought, or however remote as an actual entity, has its own gradation of relevance, as apprehended, in the constitution of any one actual entity." (2)

The Subjective Form

"The 'subjective form' is ~~how~~ ^{that} a subject apprehends that datum." (3) "There are many species of subjective forms, such as emotions, valuations, purposes, aversions (and) aversions (see Process and Reality p. 500) consciousness etc." (4) Horror, disgust, indignation and enjoyment of a joke are other subjective forms. Like all other components of an actual entity, the subjective form is "selected from the multiplicity of pure potentiality" and does its share in providing definiteness. That is to say, the actual subjective form is first envisaged as an abstract possibility, and then realized in the life of a new actual entity.

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 10

(2) Ibid p. 124 Underlining mine.

(3) Ibid p. 55

(4) Ibid p. 55 Brackets mine.

Consciousness

It is to be noted that Whitehead uses the term "consciousness" in a rather specialized sense, far narrower than the usual meaning of "awareness".

Whitehead might be expected to claim that any conceptual prehension has "consciousness" as a characteristic of its subjective form. Such, however, is not the case. In his opinion, "conceptual feelings, apart from complex integration with physical feelings are devoid of consciousness in their subjective forms." (1) Whitehead's position is further clarified in the following quotation: "Consciousness requires more than the mere entertainment of a theory (complex eternal object or proposition). It is the feeling of the contrast of theory, as mere theory, with fact, as mere fact." (2) That is to say, for example there is not mere physical prehension of data given (any more than mere conceptual prehension of an eternal object); there must be the feeling of these data being confronted by a conceptual prehension, such that the data are recognized as exemplifying a certain eternal object. (This general situation would be an example of Otherreal Obligation: "The Category of Conceptual Valuation". (3)

(1) A. N. Whitehead in conversation.

(2) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 106
Macmillan and brackets mine.

(3) Cf. Ibid p. 39

The nature of this "contrast" must be considered in more detail. Whitehead states that: "consciousness is the feeling of negation." (1) This type of feeling in its barest form is illustrated by the perception of a stone as grey. That is to say, the fact (stone) is contrasted with the theory (this is grey). In such an experience there is implied the notion, this stone is grey and nothing else. The feeling of contrast, which is the basis of consciousness, reaches its full development when a negative prehension is involved, as for example in "perceiving this stone as not grey. The grey then has ingestion in its full character of a conceptual novelty, illustrating an alternative." (2) In Whitehead's opinion "the negative perception is the triumph of consciousness. It finally rises to the peak of free imagination, in which the conceptual novelties search through a universe in which they are not datively exemplified." (3) Such experience as this is the basis of art, and all other creative and spontaneous activities. (4)

It is to be noted that apparently Whitehead does not always emphasize the necessity of having conceptual

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 245

(2) Ibid p. 245 Underlining mine.

(3) Ibid p. 245

(4) Cf. A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas p. 247

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and physical feelings before consciousness appears. For example: "all forms of consciousness arise from acts of integration of propositional feelings with other feelings, either physical feelings or conceptual feelings." (1) Thus it might seem that when a proposition is integrated with a conceptual feeling, there is no physical feeling in the situation. However, Whitehead is free from inconsistency since a proposition is "the entity forming the datum of a complex feeling derived from the integration of a physical feeling with a conceptual feeling." (2)

All conceptual prehensions have as their subjective form, "valuation". For example, in the final stage of a complex conceptual feeling, the subject is faced with various data which must be arranged in order of importance with reference to its subjective aim (intention). In terms of this standard, each eternal object is felt as important or as relatively unimportant. This process is termed valuation. In the case of a simple conceptual prehension, the one eternal object is regarded as desirable (and responded to with the subjective form of "acceptance").

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 391

(2) Ibid p. 391 Underlining mine.

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It is to be noted that there are many factors in a complex subjective form: 1. There is the qualitative patterning; in which the various elements in the "subject" are arranged. 2. The various quantitative intensities of these elements form a pattern. 3. The entire subjective form may manifest several qualities such as joy, distaste, aversion. It is also true that parts of the subjective form, say at different times manifest different qualities. An examination of an enjoyment of music will reveal these factors. A note has a certain patterned relationship to its overtones, each of which has its individual intensities- hence a pattern of intensities. In addition the tone may provoke various feelings, and the overtones may give rise to feelings which the note as such does not conjure up. (1)

In so far as enrichment of subjective form is achieved by a proper balance of qualitative pattern and intensity through contrast (affected by the positive conceptual apprehensions of relevant alternatives), an actual entity will enjoy an increased richness of life. In this way the "ultimate creative purpose" of the universe is adequately exemplified.

(1) Cf. J. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 357

Apparently, at least, Whitehead uses the term "subjective form" in a wider sense than that considered in the preceding section (i.e. how a subject prehends a datum). In Adventures of Ideas there is reference to the fact that "the qualitative content of the object prehended enters into the qualities exemplified in the subjective form of that prehension... --the subjective form conforms to the objective data." (1)

It is quite true (on the basis of the previous expositio[n]) that there may be continuity of subjective form from one occasion to another; but does it follow necessarily, that the other qualitative contents of previous actual entities are also part, not of the subject, but, of the subjective form of the new actual entity? What conforms to the objective data is not the subjective form but the subject. This seeming confusion is somewhat mitigated by observing that apparently Whitehead is using the term subjective form in a different sense from that usually employed. "The subjective form is the immediate subject in that state of subjective feeling (of a datum)." (1)

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, p. 228
Underlining mine.

(2) Ibid p. 227 Underlining and brackets mine.

The Subjective Aim

One of the most essential elements in an actual entity, as in a human person, is its purpose, or subjective aim. In Whitehead's opinion, it is not an external fixed end, used by a creator as a pattern to guide him in the construction of an actual entity. The subjective aim is rather a teleology inherent in each actual entity. It is, in effect, an ideal self which when envisaged: "defines what 'self' shall rise from the datum; and the ideal is also an element in the self which thus arises." (1) In short, there is a subjective aim operative in an actual entity because the subject has a conceptual prehension of a definite proposition (or a complex eternal object). This proposition is prehended with the subjective form of "purpose to realise it in that process of self-creation." (2) More specifically, it is to be noted that, whatever particular subjective aim an entity may have, every entity has as its aim the "ideal of itself as individual satisfaction and as transcient creator." (i.e. a center of novel experience not absolutely determined by the past; making its contribution to never actual entities) (3)

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 128

(2) Ibid p. 37 Underlining mine.

(3) Ibid p. 170

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The subjective aim does not remain unchanged during the "epoch" required for the completion of an actual entity. This subjective aim, in the successive modifications, retains the unifying factor, "(1)." Whitehead indicates as an illustration of what he means, the experience of an architect in producing a plan, but in mind a basic plan, the minute details of which are modified in the process.

The subjective aim is determined by the available data, in the sense that only certain types of aims are normally applicable to certain types of data.

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 542
Underlining mine.

God

The fact that Whitehead justifies the discussion of God (apart from a few scattered paragraphs) to the last short section of Process and Reality, is no indication of the importance of this actual entity in his cosmological scheme. God, one actual entity among others, ("God is an actual entity, and so is the most trivial puff of existence in far-off empty space.") (1) serves as "the foundation of order", "the goal toward novelty" and makes possible a solution of the basic moral and aesthetic problems.

Like any other actual entity, God has conceptual and physical roles. These are also referred to as the primordial and consequent natures of God. ("God is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles. He is their chief exemplification.") (2) "The 'primordial nature' of God is the concrecence of a unity of conceptual feelings, including among their data all eternal objects." (3) "The 'consequent nature' of God is the physical realization by God of the actualities of the evolving universe." (4) God also

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 80
(2) Ibid p. 121
(3) Ibid p. 124 Underlining mine.
(4) Ibid p. 124

has a "superject" nature in that he provides tools to be used in the self-creative process of other actual entities.

The Primordial Nature of God

Whitelock has seen fit to discuss the "processes" of God separately. By a distinction of reason, God is first considered in the abstraction of a primordial actuality. (1)

In their process of self-creation (2), actual entities require the lure of possibility, to stimulate their activities and at the same time offer a pattern for the guidance of their on-going process of development. It has been previously noted that eternal

(1) It is unfortunate, but on occasion Whitelock almost suggests that these 'factors in God', "deficient in actuality" are as a matter of fact actualities in their own right. --thus Whitelock refers to "non-temporal actualities", "conceptual actuality" (Cf. Process and Reality p. 522) and even "primordial actuality" (Ibid p. 64). This use of language seems strange when it is born in mind that an actuality (actual entity) must have both physical (temporal) and conceptual (non-temporal) poles.

(2) Cf. Thesis p. 102

objects fulfill this function. However, unless eternal objects are organized and interrelated, they will provide little practical guidance. For example, the eternal objects "fire" and "heat" are far more effective in the experience of a person (actual entity), if they are conceptually perceived as related, than if they are perceived as components of a mere indiscriminate, haphazard mass of eternal objects.

In order to account for the mutual implications and patterns of relations of eternal objects, Whitehead feels that it is necessary to refer to an agent which is responsible for this arrangement. Thus in answer to the question, "In what sense can unrelated abstract forms be relevant" --he states: "All real togetherness is togetherness in the formal constitution of an actuality." (1) (This is, of course, a variation of the ontological principle). (2)

In accounting for the establishment of an order of relevance among eternal objects, Whitehead describes it, more technically, thus: the various conceptual relations which make up God's primordial nature are controlled by their several objective forms so that the eternal objects are organized to be "relevant" here

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality. p. 48

(2) Cf. Ibid. p. 25

of feeling severally appropriate for all realizable basic conditions." (1) In this way is manifest God's subjective in "the creation of intensities." (2)

In this exposition, Whitehead is, as usual, drawing on human experience for his model. It is as though a person, faced by a number of alternative possibilities, reacted to them individually, with a certain feeling, i.e. subjective form of acceptance or rejection, so that, by this process they were thence forth graded in order of relative importance. In this way patterns of mutual interrelationship were set up (this is what Whitehead terms "valuation"). This "chart" of the patterned relationships of eternal objects is to be regarded as part of the available equipment for the self-creation of any person. (actual entity)

A careful consideration of this general situation, reveals the fact that all so-called conceptual apprehensions of eternal objects, are in reality derived from, or based on, hybrid physical apprehensions of God. This is evident from the fact that since the eternal objects are present as a part of God's primordial nature, they can only be made available by a hybrid

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 154

(2) *Ibid* p. 161

physical extension of God's primordial nature. (1)

Thus God's primordial nature fulfills two functions: 1. It provides for the relevance of eternal objects to each other (i.e. the patterned relationships which they manifest) and also 2. God makes these eternal objects, in their mutual relationships, available for the use of novel actual entities. They are made available because God's primordial nature, in which they are contained, is objectified in the newly arising actual entities. "Apart from God, eternal objects unrealized in the actual world would be relatively non-existent for the concreteness in question." (2)

In addition to this, there is another phase of God's primordial nature which requires consideration. He has a desire that this work of his be used by other actual entities. There is a "yearning after concrete fact-no particular facts, but after some actuality." (3)

Implications of the Primordial Nature of God

This view of God (as primordial) has certain very important philosophical implications: . God (like every other actual entity) conditions creativity. That is to say, God provides data for the self-creativity of actual

(1) Cf. A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p.347; 382

(2) Ibid p. 46

(3) Ibid p. 50

entities. "It (an actual entity) derives from God in basic conceptual aim ----- with indeterminations awaiting its own decisions. This subjective aim, in its successive modifications, remains the unifying factor governing the successive phases of interplay between physical and conceptual feelings." (1)

It is very easy to misunderstand the import of the preceding statement and find an apparent inconsistency in Hitchcock's position. If the activities of an actual entity "are merely the outcome of the subjective aim, which is initially derived from God, it is difficult to see where the original decision of the actual entity, as self-creating, lies." (2)

Such a criticism overlooks the fact that while God provides a possible pattern (eternal object) which may serve (when realized) as a subjective aim; each actual entity is entirely responsible for the possible subjective aim which it actualizes in its life. "Thus an originality in the temporal world is conditional, though not determined by an initial subjective aim supplied by the ground of all order and of all originality." (3)

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 34.

(2) D. C. Foxley, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society

(3) *Ibid* (1) p. 164

Whitehead's position with reference to this point is clarified by noting his discussion of God's purpose (in so far as it can be considered with reference to his primordial nature). God's purpose or one phase of it (subjective aim) is the seeking of intensities in actual entities. (1) This apparently paradoxical statement can be understood when it is recalled that God's primordial nature is incomplete (being only conceptual). There is an urge to attain completeness. This can only be attained by God's physical prehensions of data provided by other actual entities. The richer the life (intensity) of actual entities, the richer the data available for inclusion in God's consequent nature. Thus, in a sense the purpose of God is the attainment of value (self-creative activity) in the temporal world (2); yet all this is only "an intermediate stage toward the fulfilment of his own being". (3) However, it must be again emphasized that God does not legislate any particular actual entity into being, nor is he concerned with particulars as such---"He (God), in his primordial nature, is unmoved by love for this particular, or that particular; for in this foundational process of creativity, there are no preconstituted

(1) Cf. Process and Reality, A. N. Whitehead p. 161

(2) Cf. Ibid p. 160

(3) Ibid (1)

particular. In the foundation of being, God is indifferent alike to preservation and to novelty." (1) In this sense there is a certain inconstancy in God's nature. (2) God is the creator of each temporal actual entity only in the sense that he provides the initial subjective aim. The ultimate creativity is not to be ascribed to God's volition. Creativity is manifest in all actual entities, including God. (3)

With reference to this general metaphysical situation, it is interesting to find other critics, (instead of trying to claim that God is ultimately responsible for all creative activity and novelty) denouncing Whitehead for separating God entirely from the creative process. Thus E. N. Hall (4) states: "This particular actuality is not only outside the creative process, comprising all other actualities; it is also entirely independent of the latter." This statement, purporting to be a logical interpretation of the short phrase, God's primordial nature "is not directly related to the given course of history" (5) is evidently based on a total disregard of the fundamental postulates of his system, noted above. It is in

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 160
 Brackets and underlining mine.

(2) Cf. Ibid p. 373

(3) Cf. Ibid p. 343 also Cf. Thesis p. 74

(4) E. N. Hall, p. 39 in Journal of Philosophy, 1960

(5) Ibid (1) p. 70

addition a profound misunderstanding of the phrase
which he has quoted. Indeed its meaning is clearly
indicated in the following paragraph. Whitehead writes:
"An eternal object is always a potentially for actual
entities; but in itself, as conceptually felt, it is
neutral as to the fact of its physical inversion in
any particular actual entity of the temporal world." (1)
Thus God (or his component eternal objects) is not
directly (necessarily) related to the given (specific)
course of history. To claim that Whitehead regards
God as an "entity independent of the creative process
comprising all other actual entities" (2) is quite
inexcusable in view of Whitehead's repeated explicit
denials of this interpretation. For example, God is
"with all creation" (3) ----"But of course, there is
no meaning to 'creativity' apart from its 'creatures',
and no meaning to 'God' apart from the creativity and
the 'temporal creatures', and no meaning to the
temporal creatures apart from 'creativity' and 'God'." (4)

It is evident that from an examination of the
status of God in the self-creative process of actual
entities, he, by his conceptual preconceptions, cannot

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 70
Underlining mine.

(2) op. cit. p. 57 (4)

(3) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 521

(4) Ibid p. 344

have what is called complete knowledge. (1) While it is true that God consciously prehends all possibilities and their consequences, he cannot tell, in any particular instance, what possibility will be realized. However, when a "decision" has been made by an actual entity, God knows completely its consequences in so far as abstract relationships of possibilities are concerned. Yet, again, it must be noted that he cannot know whether or not these implied consequences actually will take place.

Whitehead states: "Every eternal object has entered into the conceptual feelings of God." (2) Certain critics find a woeful riddle in his thought at this point. E. W. Hall (3) believes that Whitehead cannot decide whether or not eternal objects are phases of God or have independent status. Miss Stubbings claims that "Whitehead makes the multiplicity of

(1) It is of course true that God creates (i.e. is responsible for) the relationships between eternal objects. That is to say, the relational essences of eternal objects are determined by God's conceptual envisagement. F. P. Stallknecht finds it difficult to understand how this creative act can legitimately be called "eternal". (Cf. Studies in the Philosophy of Creation p. 176) Perhaps the use of the term "eternal" is a little strange. What Whitehead apparently means is that God's changeless act of conceptual evolution, of all eternal objects, is one of the enduring (in this sense changeless) factors in the universe.

(2) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 387

(3) E. W. Hall, "Of What Are Whitehead's Eternal Objects" Journal of Philosophy 1950

potentials, actual by placing it in a non-temporal actuality." (1) He apparently overlooks the fact that an actual entity may conceptually preclude a "possibility" (eternal object) without thereby making it an actuality. (e.g. A person may think of "wisdom" without thereby becoming wise). With reference to the status of eternal objects, Whitehead specifically states: "He (God) does not create eternal objects; for his nature requires them in the same degree that they require him." (2) This does not mean that eternal objects can dwell apart in absolute abstraction from actual entities. Such a situation would reduce them to a condition "indistinguishable from nonentity". In other words the eternal objects are real potentialities, and required by God's nature; yet it is necessary that they at all times take their place as essential components in the self-creative process as actual entities. This does not imply, as Hall suggests that "they are simply aspects of actual entities with no status of their own, or by themselves." (3)

It is true that eternal objects are not actualities and therefore are not real things; but they have the status of real possibilities, an essential feature in

(1) Miss Stebbings, "Review of Process and Reality" Kind 1931

(2) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 298
brackets and underlining mine.

(3) E. W. Hall, "Of What Use Are Whitehead's Eternal Objects?" Journal of Philosophy 1932 p. 57

the collection of components which constitutes the nature of an actual entity. Hall's statement that eternal objects have no states by themselves is correct, in the sense indicated (i.e. eternal objects are by nature components in the life of actual entities) but this does not mean that they are merely aspects (subiectives) of actual occasions. They are distinct co-occurrents of actual occasions. Any actual occasion is a grouping together of such components (and others).

In justice to Hall (1) it must be noted that he points out that Whitehead does offer, else, a negative answer to the question: "Are not eternal objects simply aspects of actualities with no states of their own." Yet Hall misunderstands the question he uses for this purpose. He refers to "the many, which are the universe disjunctively, (which) become the one actual occasion." (2) He thinks that the "disjunctive multiplicity" refers to eternal objects, which subsist. Actually, in Whitehead's opinion, disjunctive multiplicity, in this case, is a characteristic of actual entities.

Two other related questions arise: (A) May call

(1) Op.Cit.

(2) J. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 71

the actual entity, having the type of conceptual pole inflicted, God? (1) Now do you know that such an entity, having a priorial nature (conceptual pole) of such a sort, exists?

It is to be recalled that Hitchcock is claiming to describe or interpret factors and entities which are experienced. In his opinion, the behavior of observed actual entities can only be explained or interpreted in a certain way. They must be referred to in terms of the categories or principles discovered to be operative, or derived by (descriptive) generalization.

According to the "ontological principle": "every-thing must be somewhere."—accordingly, the general potentiality of the universe must be somewhere." (1) (i.e. in some actual entity). Thus the actual entity, God, exists to provide in his priorial nature (conceptual pole), a locus for eternal objects, so that they may have proximate relevance to actual entities. That is to say, there must be a God to account for the experiential proximate relevance (i.e. patterns of contacts and relations of eternal objects) of eternal objects, which guides the development of

(1) A. N. Hitchcock, Process and Reality p. 75

actual entities. Apart from this agent, which produces relevance, there would be no lines of patterned interconnection. No "principles of connection" would be available as patterns to guide the comprehension of actual entities. Also, as we noted above, because the eternal objects are present in the experience of one actuality, God, - they are thereby available for objectification in other actual entities. Whitehead's forcing argument for the existence of God can be summarized by a simple statement of his own: "the general character of things requires that there be such an entity." (1)

Whitehead also offers a more direct proof of the existence of the primal nature of God. He claims that we have direct feeling (prehension) of the "timeless source of all order". This feeling "requires the 'subjective form' of refreshment and companionship at which religions aim." (2) Therefore, this entity, which (in its conceptual pole) is the timeless source of all order, is called God.

It is to be noted that (the primal nature of) God is presupposed in the formulation of the category of Conceptual Revision, although Whitehead does not specifically say so when the principle is first introduced.

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World p. 216

(2) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 7

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The "secondary origination of conventional feelings" (1) of ante diverse from initial conventional data, can only be explained by the presence of these relevant eternal objects in some actuality, - i.e. God. In Whitehead's opinion they cannot just "spring" about in the universe and "fluke in" from nowhere for no reason. The fact that eternal objects are organized in degrees of relevance, also points to an actual entity which acts as "organizer".

The Consequent Nature of God

Whitehead's discussion of the consequent nature of God is most woefully condensed, being confined, for all practical purposes to the last ten pages of Process and Reality. The task of interpretation is not rendered any easier by the glorious literature which is packed into this short space. The usage of conventional religious terms is not an unmixed blessing. Yet, through it all, there shines a basic insight which perhaps could not have been expressed more adequately.

Whitehead's consideration of the consequent nature of God grows out of: 1. a logical development of his system which holds that God, being an actual entity, like any other actual entity must have not only a

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 80

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conceptual pole (God as primordial) but also a physical pole (God's consequent nature); there is also the need to do justice the basic intuition of religion, that there must be a process in which novelty does not entail loss. As Whitehead sees it: "The ultimate evil in the temporal world is deeper than any specific evil. It lies in the fact that the past fails, that time is a 'perpetual perishing'. Objectification involves elimination. The present fact has not the past fact with it in its full intimacy." (1)

Whitehead feels that the basic intuition of religion can not be dismissed. It cannot be that the glowing values of the present pass away into nothingness and are lost forever. Whitehead offers "nothing in the nature of a proof". Yet, in the light of his system, he believes that at least a probable solution is possible; one which can be considered as a coming "elucidation of some hitherto exceptional elements in our conscious experience-----religious and moral intuition." (2)

Against this background of thought, Whitehead formulates his theory of the consequent nature of God. As was noted previously, God's consequent nature "is

(1) J. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 117

(2) Ibid p. 521

the physical prehension by God of the actualities of the evolving universe. (1) These physical prehensions are directed by the all-inclusive conceptual aim of his primordial nature. That is to say, the internal process of God's self-creation is guided by an insight which is based on the complete envisagement of all eternal objects and their interrelationships.

In view of these specific statements and the general tenor of his work, it is strange to find eminent commentators misinterpreting this phase of Whitehead's philosophy. For instance, as D. G. Moxley has pointed out (2), Miss D. M. Immet considers the consequent nature of God to be, not the physical prehensions of many actual entities by one actual entity, but merely, the progressive realization of the realm of possibilities in the temporal world. (3) "The incoming of the order of eternal objects, which constitutes the primordial ^tnature of God into the temporal course of events is called the Consequent Nature of God." (4) She apparently overlooks the fact that Whitehead has introduced the consequent nature of God to overcome the evil which rises from the fact, that although the eternal objects contained in God's

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 174

(2) D. G. Moxley, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1974-75

(3) Miss D. M. Immet, Whitehead's Philosophy of Creation p. 259

(4) Ibid p. 259

concrete substances are used by actual entities as patterns to be realized in their subjective aim, yet these actual entities are still mutually obstructive. God's consequent nature is required to effect the change from "disjointed multiplicity, with its diversities in opposition, (the actual entities composing the world) into concrete unity, with its diversities in contrast." (i.e. the "perfected" actual entity God) (1) Thus the mere use of God's primordial nature is not enough to solve the problem of evil.--This is not what Whitehead means by God's consequent nature.--- God is an actual entity. His consequent nature is constituted by the physical precessions of the actual world, which it "saves". (2) In Justice in Nine Names, it must be noted that she occasionally refers to God's consequent nature as though she regarded it as the pole of an actual entity (not merely the ingressions of eternal objects into the temporal world.) For example: "He (God) holds the actual entities of the rest as objectively immortal in the immediacy of His own nature, so that as in memory the present actual occasion knows itself as arising from its past occasion, the quality

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 528
Routledge.

(2) Cf. Thesis p. 58-59

of which it holds a contributor to its own nature." (1)

Dr. Charles Hartshorne also seems to "nod" when dealing with God's consequent nature. In summarizing points of interest in Whitehead's system of thought, he refers to the "differentiation between the primordial nature and the endless series of consequent natures of God." (2) He omits to note that Whitehead nowhere expressly formulates the doctrine that God's consequent nature is anything other than physical prehensions (of other actual entities) by an actual entity which does not cease but continues forever. If God were a "society" (3), each member of which exemplified the primordial nature and then "passed on", providing data for another such actual entity-- this whole series being called "God as consequent"----the most essential characteristics of God's consequent nature would be lost (i.e. the retention of immediacy and creative advance). This is evident from the fact that the process of objectification within the social series, necessitates elimination and loss of mutual immediacy of the component elements. Despite the difficulties presented by an actual entity which

(1) Miss D. M. Emmet, Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism p. 263

(2) C. Hartshorne, "On Some Criticisms of Whitehead's Philosophy" Philosophical Review July, 1935 p. 243

(3) Cf. Thesis p. 168

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continues to exist, this kind proves it to a "God society" in which mutual influence or co-operation is lost.

God's "consequent nature" is not complete. As the term implies, it "is consequent upon the creative advance of the world." (1) Yet there is a "completion" of the consequent nature in another sense, namely, that of "union of immediacy". The meaning of this phrase must be carefully considered.

In the experience of the ordinary actual entity, the past is not present in full immediacy. "The process of time walls the past below distinctive feelings----the past is present under an obstruction." (2) Only in the special present is there vivid immediacy. This is due to the fact that ordinary actual entities rise and pass away---droplets of experience---creatures of a short epochal duration. They come to the selves and pass off the scene, leaving some fragment of data for the self-creation of a new actual entity. In this sense the temporal process is a "perpetual perishing". (3)

In striking contrast is the nature of another sort of actual entity called God. By his statement,

(1) A. I. Mitchell, Process and Reality p. 321

(2) Ibid p. 517

(3) Ibid (1) p. 317

that in God's consequent nature there is everlastingness (1), a retention of actual immediacy, witnessed further that God is an entity of such a sort that in never perishes; his content now because the transitory parts, abstracted from his being are received into a new actual entity from his now concluded life. In God's nature, the precious present is never ending. His contents set in their glow of immediacy. God grows by taking in new content but the old content retains its vividness and lustre. In this sense, then, God grows but does not perish. The contents of his nature form not, as such, lost, by being objectified in some other actual entity, at the desire of God. In this way Hitchcock offers theoretical support for the insight of religion, that

(1) Referring to 'everlastingness' in her discussion of God's consequent nature, this is not exactly a mis-interpretation which should be corrected. Usually, (see exception noted on page 67) this aspect regards God's consequent nature as the 'impression' of these possibilities (eternal objects) into the world of becoming." (D. J. et, Philosophical Fellowship of Princeton p. 54; bracket mine) She claims that God's consequent nature (interpreted in this sense) is able "to do full justice to the reality of the things 'which are temporal'." This is so. In so far as they actualize eternal objects, at the same time they partake of their nature of everlastingness.

An examination of what Hitchcock means by the consequent nature of God has indicated the fallacy of this interpretation. (Cf. Thesis p. 66) This attempt to account for the "everlastingness" of actual entities is equally fallacious. Actual entities, by nature, rise and pass away. They cannot save themselves by "participating" in eternal objects. The only everlasting entity is the

time disappears and we get into the eternal process of life.

It is evident that God cannot be cognized as temporal (1) --for in the temporal process the past fades; it is no longer vividly before the focus of an actual entity's attention. God retains his past in living immediacy.

There is room for misinterpretation concerning the process whereby data are absorbed into the growing entity God (i.e. into his concurrent nature). In E. W. Hail's opinion, Whitchurch holds that Hall's conscious are conserved (in God) in their very immediacy of occurrence.⁽²⁾ (3) This interpretation is based on the premise that God's concurrent nature combines creative activity and the retention of material immediacy. (4) However, in this case at least, as Hall indirectly admits, Whitchurch is discerning, not the immediacy of other actual entities as such, but the

Continuation of (1) page 70: universe is God. The only real immortality actual entities enjoy is in God's nature. God everlastingly retains those phases of now vanished actual entities which he considers worthy of "salvation".

(1) Cf. J. J. Whitchurch, Reason and Reality p. 71

(2) E. W. Hall, "Of What are the Material Eternal Entities" Journal of Philosophy 1932 p. 62

(3) Cf. Ibid (1) p. 71

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infinity of God's creation, for which infinite numbers provide God. (1)

In the last section of Process and Reality, Whitehead is considering the "final opposites", among which are "God" and the "World". Whitehead points out that these "opposed elements stand . . . in mutual reciprocal act." (2) The universe, upon analysis, reveals these two factors, both essential elements in the creative process, both making a contribution to each other's natures.

The essential element in God's nature is the "transient unity" of vision (the concrete reflection of external objects), seeking physical multiplicity. The essential element in the world (of actual entities) is the volatile multiplicity of finite actual entities seeking a perfected unity. These two elements in the universe grow, since they are "creatures". (3)

(1) It is true that other statements made by Whitehead seem to bear out more strongly, the point which Bell has raised. For example: "The concrete nature of God is composed of a multiplicity of elements with individual self-realization. It is just as much a multiplicity as it is a unity." (Process and Reality, p. 57).

(2) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 529.

(3) Or, more concretely, in the case of the "world" composed of creature.

and infinite "potentiaity". In the process of growth, the
 principal unity of potentialities (eternal object) i.e. God requires a multiplicity of data from the
 external world. (In this sense only God is "many"). This "multiplicity" God "absorbs into his own unity". (1) Thus God's consequent nature arises. In the case of the "World" (that is to say, the many actual entities in their physical finitude), the principal multiplicity of volatile entities "receives (on the basis of a unifying subjective - is derived from God) a consequent unity." That is to say, a new actual entity emerges. This new actual entity becomes "one" among the "non-" other actual entities. This is apparently what Whitehead means when he says that it is absorbed into the multiplicty of the material character. (2) On the strength of this sort of exposition Whitehead claims: "It is as true to say that God is one and the World many, as that the World is one and God many." (3) This tortuous analysis has been undertaken to show that Whitehead's "literate" claim, that "the consequent nature of God is composed of a multiplicty of elements with individual self-realisation" (4) is an

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 529

(2) Cf. Ibid p. 530

(3) Ibid p. 528

(4) Ibid p. 531

overstatement of the interrelations of God and the actual entities comprising the world. The fact of this interrelationship should have been expressed in the more exact terms of previous sections of Process and Reality.

While in a certain sense it is true to say that "the consequent nature of God is composed of a multiplicity of elements.----It is just as much a multiplicity as it is a unity." (1) This idea might have been more accurately stated thus: God's consequent nature is "the physical prehension of actualities----of the evolving universe." (2) "Each novel actuality in the temporal world contributes such (not all) elements as it can" (3) to the unity of God's being. That is to say, many entities make a contribution to the new actual entity God. God has many prehensions (i.e. prehensions). He is in this sense "many". Yet surely God is more of a unity than a multiplicity, since he is one entity feeling other entities in various ways-- a unity of many feelings.

Relevance to Religious Insights

In the universe of discourse used by religion, certain terms are applied to God. He is called:

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 151
 (2) Ibid p. 151
 (3) Ibid p. 154 ↓ ↓

"patient"; "the great companion", who "loves". He is referred to as "exercising a tender care". Religious leaders speak of the "kindness of God". Whitehead believes that you are of those terms in legitimate and proceeds to employ them.

It is evident that in taking these terms seriously, Whitehead is regarding his book on God as well founded religious notions. There are very common strains of thought which visualize God in the image of an imperial ruler, in the image of a personification of moral energy, in the image of an absolute philosophical principle." (1) These procedures Whitehead rejects. He turns his attention to the salvation embodied in the Galilean origin of Christianity.---"It does not minimize the malice of Saur, or the pitiless herald, or the impious never. It dwells upon the tender elements in the world, which slowly and in quietude operate by love." (2)

Guided by the subjective view provided by his principal nature, God prehends every actuality for what it can be in a perfect system---"its suffering, its sorrow, its failure, its triumph, its imbecility

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 180

(2) Ibid. p. 180

of joy-woven by righteous of feeling into the harmony of the universal feeling." (1) "No element in fact is irreconcilable: thus the struggle with evil is a process of building up a mode of mitigation by the provision of intermediate elements introducing a complex structure of harmony." (2) It is to be noted that this "synthetic" harmonization in God's nature is not to be equated with the superficially similar doctrine of Absolute Idealism. In God's concrete nature all distinctions are retained. Good and evil are not transmuted into colorless perfection. In God, good and evil elements are seen in their proper status, given their "position" by reference to the scale of values provided by God's evaluative process.

It is to be noted that all elements, made available by actual elements, are not retained (in God's consequent nature) unchanged. There is a process of transformation (as to degree of importance); and elimination. "The revolts of destructive evil, purely self-revolting, are dissolved into their triviality of purely individual facts." (3) (i.e. "transferred" or "transmuted") --- "Each novel actuality in the temporal world contributes such

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 125

(2) Ibid p. 17

(3) Ibid p. 125

elements as it comes to a realization in God." (1) (not all elements are present in God) Thus, in terms of the familiar doctrine of objectification,--while there is no elimination within God's nature as such,--there is of course elimination of some of the data available for inclusion in God's nature.

Against the background of the preceding discussion, it is possible to grasp Whitehead's meaning when he states: God exercises a tender care "that nothing be lost-----that can be saved." (2) Thus God "saves" the world, having judged it worthy of inclusion in the everlasting immediacy of his own life.

It is very important to note the exact nature of this "salvation": an actual entity creates itself. It dies, and in "passing on" provides data. Some of these data areprehended by God and retained in his "life". Other data are lost forever. This then is the salvation which God confers on actual entities. Thus he exercises his tender "aesthetic" care --saving those data which, in his life, will be "free from inhibitions of intensity by reason of discordance." (3)

The "patience" of God is exemplified in the fact

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 124
Underlining mine.

(2) Ibid p. 525 " "

(3) Ibid p. 135

that, as it were, God visits, and picks up the pieces', as they fall from the dead actual entities. These pieces (data) are fitted together (as fast as they are available) in the "perfected system" of the supreme ever enduring actual entity (God). God cannot force any actual entity to proceed in any specific fashion. Each actual entity is ultimately "cause sui". This however, does not mean that God can only wait (exercise patience) for actual entities to provide data for inclusion in his nature. God also provides int.

Thus God, like any other actual entity, can exercise efficient causation by providing data for inclusion in new actual entities. This however, is not the final causation. Nor does the fact that God provides the patterns for the actual subjective side of any actual entity, constitute God the ultimate creator of all actual entities (1). God's greatest power lies in the fact that his primordial nature acts as a stimulus to the internal activity of actual entities. As Whitehead expresses it, God leads "it (the world) by his vision of truth, beauty and goodness." (2)

Like all actual entities, God desires to make a

(1) Cf. Thesis p. 102

(2) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 126
Routledge & Kegan Paul

contribution to the life of other actual entities. This desire, on the part of God, to add to the intensity of other actual entities is called the "love" of God.

Since God shares the experiences of other actual entities, and contributes to theirs, he is designated as the "great companion ----- the fellow sufferer who understands." (1)

Comparison of Primordial and Consequent Nature of God

Various attempts have been made to distinguish, aptly, the two poles of God's nature. A. D. Ritchie (2) points out that God is not only the "score" of the orchestra (God as primordial); but also the "conductor" (God as consequent). Whitehead, himself refers to God's "primordial nature" as, "free, complete, eternal" (since no data come in from outside to be added to his conceptual pole-- all eternal objects being already present). God as primordial is "primordial" since it is from God's conceptual envisagement of eternal objects, that the actual entities, rising in the world, get their lure, or urge, to grow. From the eternal objects conceptually prehended by God, other actual entities derive patterns which are actualized by them in their

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 532

(2) A. D. Ritchie, "Review of Process and Reality"
Philosophy 1931

subjective form. (Conceptual envisagement of eternal objects is "primordial" in God's nature in the sense that this is his most distinctive phase. (1))

God's primordial nature is "eternally deficient" because actuality requires a physical pole if it is to be complete. God's primordial nature is "unconscious" because consciousness requires the confronting of fact with alternatives (conceptual data). God, as primordial, is concerned only with eternal objects. Apart from his consequent nature, God has no physical feelings of facts. Without such feelings consciousness cannot arise. (2)

Whitehead's claim that God's conceptual pole, is as such, unconscious has exposed him to considerable criticism. One of the most fair and constructive is that offered by H. P. Stalknecht: "The primordial nature of God cannot be "unconscious" prehension of possibility in general, because it involves a special type of valuation which is necessarily conscious. For God, evaluation amounts to a comparison of the form contemplated with himself, for God is his own archetype of perfection. Now, when we see that a comparison and contrast of the object evaluated with himself, is

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 23 & 529
Cf. [↑]

(2) Cf. Ibid p. 524

essential to God's appraisal of any object, we realize that such action is for God the very quintessence of consciousness, a creative recognition of self and not self. --- Whitehead has not expressed this doctrine explicitly. Still, reflection upon his ideal of aesthetic intensification should make clear that the doctrine is consistent with his system.⁽¹⁾ (1)

This argument, in strict ~~at~~ correction, is based on a misunderstanding of Whitehead's conception of God's evaluation of eternal objects. God does not have before him, as an ideal, "himself", which serves as the pattern, in accordance with which he appraises the relative worth and status of all eternal objects. In the first place, God's primordial nature is constituted by his conceptual prehensions of all eternal objects. It does not exist prior to these acts of prehension. Secondly, the relationships of all eternal objects are not determined in accordance with some previous pattern, a complex eternal object. These relationships are established by the fact that God prehends the eternal objects concerned with various types of subjective form, i.e. degrees of relative acceptance and rejection. This

(1) H. P. Stallknecht, Studies in the Philosophy of Creation p. 177
Underlining mine.

inclusion in God's prior or isol experiences provides the patterned relevance which all eternal objects have. (1)

Stallmecht's attempt at reconstruction is also inconsistent with Whitehead's actual position in that, in the evaluative process, there is no provision made for physical feelings. (Yet these physical feelings, as has been noted, are essential for the existence of consciousness.)

God's "consequent nature" is "determined" (i.e. receives data from other actual entities). In this sense it is "consequent" (i.e. dependent on the growth of other actual entities which provide data for it) and "incomplete" (continually grows by using these available data in its reconstruction). God's consequent nature is "everlasting" in the sense that materiality of content is retained in his life. The "past" within his nature never fades. The statement that God as consequent is "fully actual" is not exactly correct. What Whitehead apparently means is that, because God, the actual entity, has a physical pole (consequent nature), he is fully actual. (Not that the physical pole, as such is fully actual - since actualities must have both poles.) This

(1) Cf. Thesis p. 51

Some general criticism applies to the statement: "The consequent nature of God is conscious." In reality, God is conscious when he has both physical and mental roles, so that fact, present by physical prehension, can be confronted by alternatives (conceptual prehensions). In short, the mere fact of a physical role as such, does not render God conscious.

On a basis of a careful examination of the writings under discussion, one can find little justification for Miss Stebbing's righteous indignation, voiced in these pathetic words: "Prof. Whitehead's indefensible use of language becomes nothing short of scandalous when he speaks of God. He says that God is a term used for creativity, Aristotelian matter and modern stuff." (1) As a matter of fact, Whitehead says no such thing. Apparently Miss Stebbing has been misled by the opening phrase of Process and Reality, Part I, Chapter 2, (2) paragraph two. Here it is stated that "creativity" is another rendering of the Aristotelian 'matter' and of the modern 'neutral stuff'." The use of the phrase "another rendering", following a paragraph in which the consequent nature of God was being discussed

(1) Miss L. S. Stebbing, "Review of Process and Reality"
Mind, 1920

(2) Underlining mine.

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might have led Miss Stobbing to think that God was still being discussed (i.e. in terms of creativity etc.).

Evaluation of Whitehead's Concept of God

On the basis of consistency, and the avoidance of some of the traditional problems, there is much to be said for Whitehead's concept of God: 1. Within certain limits (1), God is not an exception to the metaphysical principles which are applicable to the rest of the universe. He is describable in the same general terms as all other actual entities. He is not reduced to a "confession of ignorance" nor a distant "first cause" whose existence we are aware of but whose ways are not our ways. 2. Whitehead is not faced by the problem of explaining how a static, "real" God has any causal connection, or connection of any kind, with an "unreal" changing world. In his opinion God needs the world as much as the world needs God. God is merely one actual entity in self-creative interaction with other actual entities. 3. Whitehead's stress on the historical aspect of God (his growth), and his genuine intercourse with other self-creative creatures, saves Whitehead from the fallacies of Absolute Idealism, though his reference to the aesthetic nature of God's consequent experience might suggest a similarity. It is true that his

(1) Cf. Thesis p. 98

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"subjective aim pretends every actuality for what it can be in such a perfected system." (1) This, however, does not deny that suffering or pain are any less real. "God pretends pain or evil with the subjective form of tragedy. God is noble in that he endures the evil experiences, present in his nature, bravely." (2) It is to be noted that just because God experiences the "evil" of others, in a genuine fashion, this does not imply that his nature, as such, is evil. "God has in his nature the knowledge of evil, of pain, and of degradation, but it is there as overcome with what is good. Every fact is what it is, a fact of pleasure, of joy, of pain, or of suffering. ----Its very evil becomes a stepping-stone in the all-embracing ideals of God." (3) Thus Whitehead refuses to follow the English absolutists who lose "good" and "evil" in the "perfection" of the absolute. The reference to "being overcome with what is good" looks suspiciously like idealism. On closer examination it is seen that Whitehead is only claiming that those facts of evil are seen in their proper perspective, not as the ultimate facts, but as the "real", painful, goods

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 52.

(2) A. N. Whitehead in conversation.

(3) A. N. Whitehead, Collision in the Universe, p. 150
(Columbia, New York, 1936)
Underlining mine.

which spur one on to higher levels of achievement. That is to say, particulars are not to be considered apart from their place in the totality of real things. Thus while Absolute Idealism regards "particular things" as ultimately "appearances", as such, eternally present in the envisagement of the Absolute; Whitehead considers them to be real components which emerge in time and are appropriated, as novel elements, into the growing life of God's consequent nature. It is to be noted that God's consequent nature is not prior in temporal existence or in reality, to (some) other actual entities. (1)

Comparison of Whitehead's Position with that of Bradley

At this point it is well to note the drastic differentiations which distinguish Whitehead's position from that of Bradley. This is particularly important in view of Whitehead's statement: "though throughout the main body of the work I am in sharp disagreement with Bradley, the final outcome is after all not so

(1) It is of course prior to those actual entities which have not yet completely emerged. But the very being of God's consequent nature depends on the self-creation of some actual entities, in the past, which have provided data for God's physicalprehension.

greatly different." (1) In fact their differentiations are so marked that one wonders at the last phrase in the quotation.

Bradley bases his philosophy on the "rationally approved" principle that the "real" must be self-consistent and all-inclusive. As a result of observation he reached the conclusion that "experience" is the same as reality. "To be real is to be indissoluble, one thing with ~~conscious~~ ^{conscious}. It is to be something which comes as a feature and aspect within one whole ~~feeling~~ ^{feeling}; something which except as an integral element in such sensations has no meaning at all." (2)

It is to be further noted that: "If, seeking reality, we go to experience, we certainly do not find a subject or an object, or indeed anything whatever standing separate and on its own bottom. What we discover, rather, is a whole in which distinctions are made, but in which divisions do not exist." (3)

Thus, on the basis of a direct examination of immediate experience, Bradley is led to conclude that there is no ultimate plurality of reals. Reality is one. This position is further substantiated, in

(1) A. J. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. vii

(2) F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, p. 145-6

(3) *Ibid* p. 459

Bradley's opinion, by the realization that what is real must be all-inclusive, and self-consistent. If there were a plurality of reals (as-odd), the mere fact of plurality would invalidate the claim that any one (or all) of these particulars is real. This follows from the principle that a part, since it is not the whole (all-inclusive) cannot be real. Also, if there were a plurality of reals, they would be related to each other in various ways. But, in Bradley's opinion, no reality can be found in a situation characterized by the "iron infamy" of "relation-hip". (1)

On the basis of such procedure as this, the common sense world of autonomous, separate, persons and things which we find about us, is distilled by the subtle alchemy of Bradley's thought into a timeless unity of feeling. Our "common sense" world is branded as mere "appearance". For in reality, according to Bradley, time (change) is an illusion. It implies incompleteness. Reality must be complete. We refer to distinct selves. In reality "we can hardly say that the Absolute consists of finite things, when the things, as such, are there transmuted and have lost their individual natures." (2)

(1) Cf. F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality p. 217

(2) *Ibid* p. 469

It is true that Whisherd derives from Bradley a hint as to how the internal unity of an actual entity may be explained, i.e. as an inclusive whole of feeling. Here, however, all similarity stops. Bradley has only one whole of experience, tirelessly dissolving all apparent particular into its "real" unity. Whisherd holds that there is an infinite multiplicity of centers of feeling, each autonomous and genuinely distinct. They "feel" other centers of life which are equally autonomous.

There is a place for "timeless unity" in Whisherd's cosmology. God's consequent nature, though it grows, is timeless in the sense that none of its component contents fade. It differs from Bradley's Absolute in that it (God's consequent nature) holds within its life, phases of other actual entities, only after these actual entities have, as such, passed out of existence. God's consequent nature does not deny the reality of evolving actual entities. Indeed, God's consequent nature could not exist without the data provided by other actual entities.

It is to be noted that because God is timeless, it does not necessarily follow that the reality of time must be denied. The self-creative process of

ordinary actual entities is genuinely temporal, i.e. actual entities rise and then pass away. There is perpetual perishing. The agents in this process are genuinely outcome-ous. Indeed God will in these generate centers of life in their self-creative struggle, by suggesting plans of action and providing aid for physical prehensions.

With reference to Bradley's trust in a logical criterion, Whitehead would probably make the rejoinder (which is applicable to any rationalistic system which either forces experience into its moulds or derives its reality): "The only logical conclusion to be drawn, when a contradiction issues from a train of reasoning, is that at least one of the premises involved in the inference is false." (1) Thus, in regard to Bradley, the fact that a situation involves contradictory elements (in the eyes of a rationalist) does not thereby baptise it with the bitter waters of dis- "appearance".

Bradley's observation of his immediate experience was decidedly myopic. He saw a unity of feeling, with merely apparent diversities. He made the mistake of

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 12

supposing there could be only one such unity, disregarding the incapable experience we have of others. That mistake Whitchead corrects, together with the false implications which Bradley drew from an inaccurate analysis. In opposition to Bradley, Whitchead (1) points out that "relations" relate.

By his doctrine of "cause sui" (with reference to the creation of temporal actual entities) Whitchead places himself in complete and utter opposition to all forms of non-temporal, "particular denying" Absolutism. This denunciation is applicable to the "Great Self", on all inclusive "experience" or the logical essence "Being" from which lesser essences are deductively derived (but no particulars are genuinely accounted for).

Whitchead's doctrine of actual entities makes possible an explanation of the "individuality" of entities in the physical and psychical realms. This was a very difficult problem on the basis of Lucretius' theory of atoms, Descartes' undifferentiated extensive continuum, and the created "beings" which were subjects of the divine providence. In the case of Aristotle, reference was made to some factor (form i.e. individual

(1) A. K. Whitchead, Adventures of Ideas p. 201

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essence or "matter", as the critics may decide) which is supposed to differentiate one entity from another. However, there was no reference to the individual selective self-creativity which (however inapt it may seem when given wider application) does enable Whitehead to do justice to the individuality of human persons.

By this emphasis on the reality of actual entities (not eternal objects in abstraction from living entities) Whitehead supports our deepest insights against those, who like Leibniz and Spinoza reduce reality to logical essence.

The feeble Plotinian attempt to merge and fuse the many things and persons of our ordinary experience, into the life of the one being - just as the light of a multitude of candles is fused into one great light - is confronted by the genuine separateness (independence) of actual entities and the real externality of relations.(1) His theory of the self-creativity of distinct actual entities stands in striking contrast to the Bergsonian reference to the "many" as droplets falling (for no good reason) from the cartesian fountain of "life".

(1) Cf. Thesis, p. 133

Berkeley's God, ultimately, "holds" all so-called finite selves in his own ideas. Whitehead retains within his nature, however of other actual entities, only after they have passed on. It has been noted, their independent being is not denied by their inclusion in God. The inner life of actual entities having faded out (in a normal fashion), some remnants are saved, in the experience of God.

The Function of God in Creation

The function of God in the process of creation is to be particularly noted. He is not relegated to a place of unimportance by the "downward dash" of Lucretius' atoms. He is not the "Unmoved Mover" of Aristotle, or the "Supreme Artisan" of Plato. He is not the "Ultimate Essence" from which all other essences (but no particulars) are deducible. (Aristot.) God is not a mere flux of "Vital Process" from which things and persons appear for no reason and by no agency. (Bergson and Plotinus) God does not create the world by generating sense impressions. (Berkeley) He does not usurp the prerogatives of Bradley's Absolute, and deny all genuine reality to the world of "appearance"; nor does God create matter, and then by an "immanent" or "external" teleology build a world and "keep it going". (Descartes and Aquinas) Finally,

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Whitchead's view of God differs from Leibniz's in that Whitchead's 'monads' (actual entities) create themselves by interaction with the external world (they have windows). Also, God is not the ultimate source and establisher of the sort of interactions which take place between components of the universe. God's primordial nature provides for the possibility of many 'orders'; but the actualities of the world and God, as fully actual, determine what the actual order of the universe will be. In this way the problem of divine immanence is solved in a way which was impossible for most philosophers of religion. As has been evident from the previous exposition, in Whitchead's opinion, - God's primordial nature is present to all actual entities as a source of patterns of activity. God's consequent nature is intimately related to the world in that he is concerned to save all that is of worth, as actual entities perish. Further, it is God's function to provide data for use by self-creative actual entities.

God is one self-creative agent among other self-creative agents. Creation is continually going on. It is absurd to speak of the first day, or days, of creation.

In opposition to Lucretius' claim that a "middle"

of atoms can produce the entire universe, and if there be Gods they are absent or non-interferers, - Whitehead finds that God performs an essential, though not all important function in the universe. However, this status is not guaranteed by making him an "Unmoved Mover", so taken up with a consideration of thinking that he can have no concern with the common sense world. Nor is the fact of essential relationship, which Whitehead stresses, to be explained in terms of the analogy of an artist shaping his somewhat plastic material. The relation between God and other entities is delineated in terms of mutual interaction. With reference to human beings, at least, this is a more accurate description of what seems to happen, than the doctrines of Aquinas and Augustine. They traced everything to the providence of God and gave no initiative to human beings. God creates and conserves. Since God is alone responsible for the existence and activity of all persons and things, they are thereby relegated to a position of little or no importance or reality.

While Whitehead may apparently go to extreme lengths in stressing the inner life of all actual entities, he is at least concerned to allow inter-

connection between things, persons and things, and between persons and persons; this was more than Descartes with his theory of "substance" logically could do. Also, Descartes' stress on the inclusiveness of space and the unreality of any differentiation of it, is corrected by Whitehead's "interactionism".

The absurdity of Newton's "watchmaker God" coming in occasionally to clean and repair (1), is replaced by Whitehead's more accurate emphasis on the initiative and ceaseless function of God in the creative process. (2) (Newton's attempt to account for a closer relationship by regarding the world as God's sensorium, while perhaps more plausible, does not seem very probable).

For the great churchmen, God is the supreme, even the only "being". For Whitehead, God is only one among many self-created entities which have become actual by a process of mutual interaction. In the opinion of Augustine and Aquinas, God is changeless, perfect, all-wise, and omnipotent, with no shadow of evil in his experience. Whitehead, as has been noted, refuses to attribute any of these characteristics to God, when regarded as fully actual. (3)

(1) H. Roffding, History of Modern Philosophy Vol. I
Cf. p. 412

(2) Cf. Thesis p. 110

(3) Cf. Thesis p. 51- ; p. 64-

Whitehead's emphasis on God's subjective aim and on the place of "aim" in the creative process of all actual entities sees nearer the truth (if one were not to posit "aim" in certain of the lowest forms of existence) than the suggestion of Tertius and Plotinus that there is no plan manifest in the creative process.

In Whitehead's thinking, Berkeley's denial of the so-called material world is rejected, not by proving the existence of matter, in the sense in which Berkeley denied it. Rather, Whitehead discovers low grade psychic entities (actual entities) where Berkeley could only find the "ideas" of high grade psychic entities (human selves). Whitehead, though his position may be open to objection, at least tries to account for the experienced autonomy of the external world without denying it by a reduction to content in the mind of God.

With reference to Leibniz's position, it is to be noted that Whitehead avoids many of his mistakes. Since actual entities are not substances, Whitehead is not faced by the problem of "created substances". Relations between substances are provided for without bringing in God, in such a way that the monads apparently lose all individuality. Leibniz had tried to escape from the perplexity of a complete yet

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striving world, - a world who denied his creative power to other worlds. In the opinion of Hinchliffe, all entities are striving, incoherently. The fact that God as primordial (i.e. in so far as God plans) is not interested in particular things, as "individuals", constitutes a further denial of the doctrine of Pre-established Harmony and individual Providence.

How God Differs from Other Actual Entities

Because of certain functions which God alone performs (which have been noted) he necessarily differs from other actual entities. Some of the most striking of these differences must now be considered:

(A) Ordinary actual entities cannot manifest both "creativity" and the retention of "mutual immediacy". God must be differently constituted so as to (or since he does) perform this feat. In his nature the past never fades. God's physical role is non-temporal. The physical prehensions of all ordinary actual entities are temporal in the sense that they endure only for an epoch, then perish and lose their immediacy. In the never ending experience of God, there is no loss of content, once it is accepted.

(B) It is to be noted that while the subjective aim of an ordinary actual entity undergoes change (1);

(1) Cf. Thesis p. 48

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God's subjective is, i.e. his eternal enjoyment of eternal objects and his interest in the maximum richness of life for all actual entities, remains unchanged.

(C) There is another fundamental problem: "an actual entity has 'perished' when it is complete," (1) (it extends over a limited epochal duration of time) God has "the property of combining creative advance with the retention of mutual immediacy," (2) and is thus never complete. Hence he never perishes. It seems rather difficult to apply the notion of "actual entity" to things which differ so fundamentally.

(D) There is a further problem: although God is supposed to provide data for objectification into other actual entities, yet he never perishes; therefore, according to the usual doctrine of objectification, he can never provide data for other actual entities. This is evident from the fact that data are only available after the internal existence of the actual entity has evaporated. (3)

(E) Whitehead, himself, points out that "God differs from other actual entities in the fact that

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 186

(2) Ibid p. 524

(3) Cf. Ibid p. 556

Hume's principle, of the derivative character of conceptual feelings, does not hold for him.⁽¹⁾ That is to say, God's primary nature is composed of all eternal objects; they are everlastingly present. He does not have to "wrote about" seeking more eternal objects, as is the case with ordinary actual entities.

(2) It is to be noted, that while God's primary nature remains unchanged, his conceptual nature grows with the advance of the world. As D. C. Lorley points out, this concept is reminiscent of the regulative notion of "substance". (2)

These then are some of the considerations which lead one to believe that the actual entity, God, differs radically from other "ordinary" actual entities, in certain essential characteristics.

However, in justice to Whitehead (granting his assumptions) these differences can still be expressed in terms of our own experience (i.e. the experience of an actual entity), though such experiences are denied to us. For example, our knowledge of our species present, gives us an idea of what an eternal species present would be like, i.e. the continual retention of

(1) A. R. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 174

(2) Op. Cit. p. 55 (2)

mediacy and creative advance.

Finally, in all this discussion of God, as in any consideration, one cannot expect absolute clarity of thought. Clarity is attained only by elimination of what is more profound and fundamental. Whitehead prefers the Platonic attitude, which recognises the limitations of the intellect, - to the clear vacuous certainty attained by the rationalism of medieval scholasticism.

Chapter IV

Some Implications of Whitehead's
Theory of Reality

There are in certain implications of Whitehead's cosmology which require discussion at somewhat greater length than was possible in the preceding sections.

Actual Entities Are Self-Creative

It must be emphasized that Whitehead's exposition of the nature of an actual entity, stresses the fact that all actual entities are self-created. In formulating this doctrine, Whitehead is apparently thinking of the way in which a self, in a moment of experience, builds up the content of its experience (in this sense itself) by responding in certain ways to the data which it allows to enter the focus of its attention. (1) Whatever the basis of this doctrine, Whitehead specifically states that every actual entity is "causa sui". By this he means that "the process of concrecence is its own reason for the decision in respect to the qualitative clothing of feelings." (2) New actual entities select as data-phrases of other actual entities

(1) Cf. A. N. Whitehead, Nature and Life p. 48
(2) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 175

and eternal objects, - as they see fit. In this sense novel actual entities are "externally free". However, any actual entity is "internally determined" by the subjective form which it has decided to adopt, (i.e. it is a freely selected determination).

A further point with reference to this "self-creating subject" character of actual entities must now be considered. In most philosophical discussions, which use the term, the "subject" is given the place of prior importance. It is assumed that the "subject" has feelings of various sorts (subjective forms) and feels various things (data). This "substance-attribute" form of thought is one of the metaphysical blunders which Whitehead denounces. (1) Consequently we find him stating his position in constant opposition to the traditional "substance" theories. "The philosophies of substance presuppose a subject which then encounters a datum, and then reacts to the datum. The philosophy of organism presupposes a datum which is met with feelings, and progressively attains the unity of a subject." (2) This same idea is expressed in terms of feeling: "The feeler is the unit; except from its own feelings; and feelings are the details of the

(1) Cf. A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p.viii
 (2) Ibid p. 234

process intermediary between this unity and its many data." (1) It is to be noted that there is apparently no initial center of feeling to start with. As above "the feeler is the unity emergent from its own feelings." (2) In any case it is clearly evident that Whitehead would heartily agree with the Realists who repudiate the Kantian doctrine which holds that the objective world is "a theoretical construct from purely subjective experience." (3)

Whitehead's discussion of the nature of actual entities presents a further contrast with other theories of the nature of reality. It has been claimed that the ultimate reality (or realities) is timeless or temporal. Rarely or never has it been claimed that a real entity is both temporal and non-temporal. "Every actual entity is 'in time' so far as its physical prehensions are temporal; that is to say, they arise and pass away) and is 'out of time' so far as its mental prehensions are concerned," (4) (i.e. the data of the mental prehensions are eternal objects).

Novelty

A recent evaluation of Whitehead's philosophy calls

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 176
Underlining mine.

(2) Ibid p. 176

(3) Ibid p. viii

(4) Ibid p. 280 bracketed.

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attention to what, on the face of it, ~~seems~~ to be a rather strong criticism, with reference to the problem of "novelty" (1): "there are no new eternal objects, and if all eternal objects, in their multiple relationships are completely visualized in the primordial nature of God,--how can there be genuine novelty? There is a further problem: might there not be an exact reproduction of a complex fact (past event) in the future? Realizing that Whitehead does not intend to espouse such a position, Everett asks if the problems noted above, can be avoided, if his premises are accepted.

It is to be noted that, even if one grants that there is a complete general determination of relationship between eternal objects, this does not imply that novelty is impossible. In fact such a determinate relationship is a pre-requisite, if mere undifferentiated chaos is to be avoided. After all, eternal objects do not impose their forms of definiteness arbitrarily on developing actual entities. Ultimate authority and autonomy is vested in the actual entity; but it is a necessary "condition" for orderly development (concrecence), that if one possibility is

(1) Cf. Miss B. M. Everett, Whitehead's Philosophy of Causation, Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy, p. 116.

actualized (one form of definiteness assumed by an actual entity), that other possibilities will be opened up as relevant or excluded as incompatible. Since each actual entity (or group of actual entities) is in a sense absolutely unique, it is quite impossible that any historic situation could be exactly reproduced. Each actual entity is influenced by its environment. In a hundred years (let us say) the environment has changed. An actual entity in 1957 cannot possibly reproduce the exact character of an actual entity of 1857.

The Paradoxical Nature of Actual Entities

There is the paradox that actual entities are the only real things in the universe; yet an actual entity "is always in the process of becoming and perishing and never really is." (1) In other words, an actual entity is either constituting itself by taking in data, and is thus not yet a complete or determined actual entity;--or having reached its final and complete form it immediately dies (i.e. the glow of its subjective immediacy ceases) and hence of it passes into a new occasion of experience. For example, my present moment of experience is not yet complete;

(1) A. J. Chisholm, Process and Reality, p. 116

get as I write about it, it passes on into a new experience, and is present, not in all its vivid immediacy but with some factors eliminated. In this sense an actual entity is not an enduring entity. It is either coming or going.

It has been evident, from Whitehead's exposition of the development of an actual entity, that it requires a duration or epoch to effect its concreteness. The self-erection of an actual entity is not instantaneous.

The Relation of the Future to the Present

Whitehead believes that the "Philosophy of Organism" must have a specific doctrine which deals with the relation of the present immediate fact to the future. (1) This is succinctly stated in Adventures of Ideas (2): "It is now possible to determine the sense in which the future is immanent in the present. The future is immanent in the present by reason of the fact that the present bears in its own essence the relationships which it will have to the future. It thereby includes in its essence the necessities to which the future must conform. The future is there in the present, as a general fact belonging to the nature of things. It

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas p. 250
 (2) Ibid p. 250-1

is also there with such general determination as it lies in the nature of the particular present to impose on the particular future which must succeed it. All this belongs to the essence of the present, and constitutes the future, as thus determined, an object for prehension in the subjective immediacy of the present. In this way each present occasion reveals the general metaphysical character of the Universe, and thereby itprehends its own share in that character. Thus the future is to the present as an object for a subject. It has an objective existence in the present. But the objective existence of the future in the present differs from the objective existence of the past in the present. The various particular occasions of the past are in existence, and are severally functioning as objects for prehension in the present. This individual objective existence of the actual occasions of the past, each functioning in each present occasion, constitutes the causal relationship which is efficient causation. But there are no actual occasions in the future, already constituted. Thus there are no actual occasions in the future, to exercise efficient causation in the present. What is objective in the present is the necessity of a future of actual

occasions, and the necessity that these future occasions conform to the conditions inherent in the nature of the present occasion. The future belongs to the causes of present fact, and the actuality other than the actuality of present fact. But its particular relationships to present fact are already realized in the nature of present fact." (1)

The Use of Terms and Extent of Knowledge

For ordinary purposes, the terms: "actual entity", "event" and "occasion" are regarded as synonymous. However, the term "occasion" is never applied to God. In later writings Whitehead tends to use the term "event" for a "series" or group of actual entities. (2)

Whitehead believes that a finite human intellect cannot expect to have complete knowledge of any actual entity, because of the intricate interconnections of each actual entity. These interconnections constitute facts which must be known if a full knowledge of the nature and function of any actual entity is to be attained. It is to be noted that this doctrine does not mean that in order to know a thing, we must know all about its most tremendous effects and implications.

(1) Conclusion of (2) page 107, Thesis

(2) Cf. A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 112-4; 175

There is such a thing as finite truth.

Creativity

The exact implication of Whitehead's use of the concept "creativity" has been the subject of much discussion. Whitehead's doctrine at this point may, for the purpose of this thesis, be expounded by means of a critical evaluation of the recent exposition presented by D. Bidney. (1) In Bidney's opinion, Whitehead "believes that some such entity as process, change, or becoming is the ultimate reality which serves as the bond of relation between the various events or occasions which come in time from the cosmic process." (2) This interpretation seems to be based chiefly on a passage in Science and the Modern World: "In the analogy with Spinoza, his one substance is for me the one underlying activity of realization individualizing itself in an interlocked plurality of nodes. Thus, concrete fact is process. Its primary analysis is into underlying activity of prehension, and into realizedprehensive events." (3) Bidney also refers to the statement in Process and Reality: "The philosophy of organism is closely allied to Spinoza's

(1) D. Bidney, "The Problem of Substance in Spinoza and Whitehead", Philosophical Review, November 1956

(2) Ibid. p. 583

(3) A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World p. 87

scope of thought. But it differs by the abandonment of the subject-predicate form of thought-----morphological description is replaced by description of dynamic process." (1)

It is true that an combination of the two processes which Huxley mentions, might be expected to lead one to suppose that Whitehead was espousing a Spinozistic monism. However, reference to many other statements, chiefly in Process and Reality and Lectures on Ideas, as well as an examination of the general tendency of his work- seems to indicate the fallaciousness of this interpretation.

In Process and Reality, Whitehead, discussing the "Category of the Ultimate", refers to "creativity" as "the universal of universals characterizing ultimate matter of fact." (2) Thus in broadly Platonic language, "creativity" is an "idea" (essence or form) which is exemplified (present) in matters of fact (i.e. particular actual entities). Conversely, the creative process, merely one actual entity appropriates data provided by other actual entities, and so constitutes itself, is an exemplification of the "idea"- "creativity".

(1) J. B. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 10

(2) Ibid p. 31

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that creativity (process, passage or activity) is not "one fundamental substrate of which all things are nodes" (1), (2), is indicated by reference to Adventures of Ideas: "Each event, viewed in its separate individuality, is a passage between two ideal termini, namely, its components in their ideal distinctive diversity passing into their true components in their dynamic togetherness -----there is nothing in the universe other than instances of this passage (i.e. actual entities) and components of these instances." (3) In short, there is no creativity apart from actual entities. Creativity is a process of interaction (passage) between and constitutive of actual entities. "The creativity is not an external agency with its own ulterior purposes. All actual entities share with God this characteristic of self-creation." (4)

(1) Cf. Sidney op. cit. (p. 110 (1)) p. 503

(2) It is interesting to find other philosophers within the same sort of context. For example: ... Taylor, Commentary on Plato's Timaeus. Miss. D. met et al: "Creativity is if I may say so, for divine creativity" which is an urge "towards the individualization of itself into many actualities, which are called 'creatures' and towards the growing together of these creatures into new unities. (...); at, Hitler's Philosophy of Creation p. 73. Underlining mine.) H.P. St. Halleck seems to hold a similar notion: "In Lotistic creativity, which is for Hitler the substantial stuff of things, eternal objects are united and particular things, creatures, e.g. (H.P. St. Halleck, Studies in the Philosophy of Creation p. 150. Underlining mine.)

(3) p. 503 Brackets and underlining mine.

(4) J. H. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 79

Indeed, this fact is indicated in one of the quotations on which Bidney places much weight. Spinoza's 'modes' now become the other potencies-----only in effect does not lead us to any higher mode of reality." (1) This statement stands in glaring contrast to Bidney's interpretation of Whitehead's position: "We believe that there is such entity as 'process', change or becoming is the ultimate reality." (2) As a matter of fact, Bidney in expounding Whitehead's position, cannot legitimately apply the term "entity" to "process". "The general activity is not an entity in the sense in which occasions and eternal objects are entities." (3) "Apart from the experience of subjects (actual entities) there is nothing, nothing, bare nothingness." (4)

It is further clear that Whitehead does not intend to posit some underlying substratum to account for "the bond of relation between various events." (5) He states: "the process, or co-existence, of the one actual entity involves the other actual entities among its components. In this way the obvious solidarity of the world receives its explanation." (6)

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 10
Underlining mine.

(2) Cf. Bidney op. cit. (p. 110 (1))

(3) A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World p. 110

(4) Ibid (1) p. 254
Brackets mine.

(5) Ibid (2)

(6) Ibid (1)

It may be said with reference to this attempted correction of Kidney's interpretation of Whitehead's position; granted that there are passages in his (Whitehead's) works which support the view that "creativity" is not an entity or an ultimate substrate, how can one deal with the passages which Kidney has quoted? There are, for example, the following: "In the analogy with Spinoza, this one substance is for me the one underlying activity of realisation, individualising itself in an interlocked plurality of modes. ... Each event is an individual matter of fact issuing from an individualisation of the substrate activity." (1) There is also the statement: "The philosophy of organism is closely allied to Spinoza's scheme of thought." (2)

Indeed, it seems that if these are to be taken literally, and as quoted, they imply that "creativity" is to be regarded as an "ultimate substrate". It would appear, then, that Whitehead thinks of "creativity" in two distinct and contrary senses. However, I believe that this conclusion can be denied on the basis of a more careful examination of the passages in question.

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World p. 87-8
 (2) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 11

In Process and Reality the problem of creativity is discussed in a more thoroughgoing fashion, than in Science and the Modern World. I shall refer to the passage quoted from the former, first. Whitehead is discussing the "incoherence" which certain philosophies manifest. That of Descartes, who posits two (perhaps three) substances when by definition there can be only one, is cited as an example. Whitehead notes, with approval, Spinoza's reference to One Substance only. Like Spinoza, Whitehead posits only one sort of metaphysical entity: but this is as far as the similarity goes. The one real substance, of Spinoza, is replaced, in the thought of Whitehead, by many, real, dynamic actual entities (each of which exemplifies the universal of universals, "creativity"). "The 'nodes' now become the sheer actualities---analysis of them does not lead us to the discovery of any higher grade of reality." (1)

With this, and the preceding discussion in mind, I think that it is possible to grasp the meaning of the debatable passage in Science and the Modern World. For Spinoza, the ultimate real is the one Substance, God.

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 10

For Whitehead, the ultimate real things are actual entities. When Whitehead speaks of "each event as an individual matter of fact arising from an individualisation of the substrate activity" (1) (creativity) and states that creativity is a "character which underlies all occasion" (2), he apparently means that the universal (essence, principle) "creativity" is exemplified (manifest, present) in particular actual entities (i.e. in the process whereby actual entities are objectified in each other, in the act of self-creation).

Another apparently troublesome phrase---referring to all actual entities as "the ultimate creatures derivative from the creative process" (3), on examination is seen to imply Whitehead's basic doctrine that actual entities are "causa sui". That is to say, the creative process referred to is the process by which an actual entity creates itself.

Unfortunately Bidney (4) and Miss Everett seem to think that "creativity---produces is a primordial fact an ordering of possibilities." (5) In justice to Miss Everett it must be noted that she is not entirely satisfied with this explanation. She wonders if the

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World p.87

(2) Ibid p. 220

(3) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 124
Underlining mine.

(4) Op. cit. (p.110 (1))

(5) Miss D. B. Everett, Whitehead's Philosophy of Creation p. 252; 116 Underlining mine.

distinction between creativity and its creatures may not be a logical one. She considers the possibility that "creativity and the Principial Nature of God are complementary sides of the same thing." (1) However, in any case, Miss ~~Emmett~~ apparently misses the point that "creativity" as such, is not a distinct entity, but rather is a characteristic (eternal object) exemplified in all actual entities. Apart from actual entities there is no actual creativity. Actual entities are creatures of creativity only in the sense that they create themselves by self-creative action.

This discussion should serve to clarify the problems presented to D. C. Moxley (2) by the relationship of "creativity" to God. Moxley says: how can Whitehead consistently say that: (A) "creativity" is a universal (eternal object); (B) apart from God any eternal object is "indistinguishable from non-entity"; yet (C) God is a creature of creativity. These apparent paradoxes can be solved by bearing in mind the fact that the term "creativity" is applied to "creativity as essence" (in this sense creativity is the universal of universals) and to "creativity" as exemplified in

(1) Miss D. M. Emmet, Whitehead's Philosophy of Creativity

(2) D. C. Moxley, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
1974-1975 p. 168

the self-creative process of an actual entity. The phrase which refers to God as a "creature of creativity" is using the term "creativity" in this second sense. That is to say, God is the "creature" or outcome of his own self-directed process of self-creation.

We find Stallknecht wrestling with the same problem. He states: "God is not creativity. He is the unity of uncreated value, inherent in creativity." (1) Strictly speaking, Whitehead seems to say that God is as much "creativity" as any other actual entity. In other words, in his self-creative activity God exemplifies the eternal object "creativity" as much as any other actual entity. Also, it should be realized that God cannot be adequately designated as "a unity of uncreated value". Such a view of God disregards his consequent nature entirely.

Moxley calls attention to the problems created by Whitehead's comparison of "creativity" and Aristotelian matter. (2) ("Creativity is another rendering of Aristotelian matter." (3)) That creativity is not to be thought of as a passively receptive substratum, is explicitly indicated by Whitehead: "It (creativity)

(1) H. P. Stallknecht, Studies in the Philosophy of Creation I. 130

(2) Cf. Moxley, op. cit. (p. 117 (1)) p. 169

(3) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 46

is divested of the notion of passive receptivity, either of 'form', or of external relations." (1) The only point they have in common is the general characteristic that each is without character of its own in the concrete sense. In other words, as an essence or eternal object, "creativity" has a distinct meaning; but this essence has, of course, no particular concrete character until it is actualized in some actual entity or other. In this sense it is "without a character of its own".

A further confusion is likely to arise unless one notes carefully, another slightly different usage of the term "creativity". Whithead sometimes refers to "God and the actual world jointly constituting the character of creativity for the initial phase of the novel concrescence." (2) By "character of creativity", in this case, Whithead apparently means that God and the actual world provide the data which are used in the concrete process of self-creativity by which a new actual entity arises. In a short discussion of creativity in Adventures of Ideas, he states: 'this factor of activity (the actual world relative to that 'new' occasion) is what I have called 'creativity'." (3)

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 46
Underlining mine.

(2) Ibid p. 374 Underlining mine.

(3) A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas p. 230
Underlining mine.

Here again, dis used in the creative process are called "creativity".

The problems relating to the temporal origin of the universe and the relative importance of the various beings and things which appear in it, have provided the basis for much cosmological discussion. Whitehead's approach is refreshingly sound. Fusing his position on an appeal to the experience of men, and refusing to indulge in flights of fancy, beyond the limits of experience, Whitehead states that there is no sense in talking about the temporal beginning of the universe. He believes that metaphysicians should concentrate on the entities, factors and processes at present operative in the world and forget events which by their nature are beyond our possible experience and understanding. As he aptly expresses it: "There was no 'first day' (1) of creation." The self-creative process of actual entities is now going on, and will probably continue to do so in the future.

In Whitehead's opinion, as far as we know,--the metaphysical situation has always been as it is now: actual entities, including God (with both primordial and consequent natures) and eternal objects, interacting

(1) A. N. Whitehead in conversation.

creatively in the process thereby new actual entities arise through their own self-creation.

The fact that God's consequent nature is mentioned last in Process and Reality, does not mean that for a long time God's primordial nature was deprived of his consequent nature and that it only arose after actual entities created themselves. All these factors are not temporal emergents but distinguishable phases which are ever present.

Whitehead also handles the problem of the priority of "being" or "things" or "persons" in a unique way. Instead of following the common custom of regarding God as pre-eminently real, and all other actual entities (things or persons) as the creation of his will or intellect, enjoying lesser reality, if any at all, - Whitehead frequently stresses the fact that God and the other actual entities are mutually complementary. Without each other, they are not themselves; nor (as has been noted) does God confer reality on any actual entity. Each actual entity is its own self-creative agent. God provides data for any actual entity and any actual entity provides data for God. God's only claim to primacy lies in his function of providing for the relevance of eternal objects. Thus God is brought to

the same level, as far as actuality or reality is concerned, as any other actual entity. Whitehead thus denies the claim of Augustine and claims that the more important is the more real or actual.

This discussion also throws light on another problem raised in a recent criticism by Bidney. It is the question as to the relation between "potentially" and "actuality". In Bidney's opinion, Whitehead, like Bergson and Alexander, starts with an "ultimate substrate (which) is indeterminate potentiality or feeling lacking any natural powers and characteristics," (1) and is faced with the problem of accounting for the origin of change and the differentiation into finite modes. The utter fallacy of this interpretation will be evident by reference to the preceding paragraph. It is based on Bidney's mistaken notion that "creativity" is a substrate from which temporally emerge, - God's primordial nature, other actual entities and finally God's consequent nature.

In addition, Whitehead's emphasis on the 'ontological principle' shows most unmistakably that there is no potentiality apart from actuality. "Every condition is

(1) Cf. Bidney op.cit. (p. 110 (1)) p. 587

which the process of becoming conforms in any particular instance, has reason either in the character of some actual entity in the actual world of that concrecence, or in the character of the subject which is in process of concrecence." (1)

For Whitehead, "potentiaility" is not an "indeterminate flux of feeling". It is both: "(a) the 'general' potentiaility, which is the bundle of possibilities, mutually consistent or alternative, provided by the multiplicity of eternal objects, and (b) the 'real' potentiaility which is conditioned by the data provided by the actual world." (2)

Purpose Design

With reference to the presence of "purpose" or "design" in the universe, Whitehead states that it is the supreme task of the creative process (as it manifests itself in actual entities) to transform "disjointed multiplicity, with its diversities in opposition, into concrecent unity, with its diversities in contrast." (3) There is a similar reference to "the complete adjustment of the immediacy of joy and suffering" (4) as being the final end of creation. The same point is made by Whitehead in discussing the subjective

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 76

(2) Ibid p. 102 Underlining mine.

(3) Ibid p. 528

(4) Ibid p. 130

air of God. It is of course evident that God himself has no absolute power to bring this purpose to final realization, except in his own experience. Outside of God's im-mediate life, the battle rages. The warring factions of actual entities fight on. There is no peace for an actual entity until the fight is over, peace in the everlasting experience of God. Once again it must be noted that each actual entity is its own final cause. "The 'subjective aim' at 'satisfaction' constitutes the final cause, or lure, whereby there is determinate concrescence." (1)

It is therefore evident that Whitehead's philosophy does not support the traditional postulate that there is an ultimate structure or order manifest in all experience, which is the result of God's per-creative agency in promoting an all-inclusive and final end. The so-called "laws of nature" are descriptions of the dominant characteristics of dominant societies of actual entities. "The laws only come into being by reason of the analogous characters of the members of the society (group)." (2) It is to be further noted that 'a system of 'laws'-----gradually rises into

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 184

(2) Ibid p. 179 "Project One."

dominance; it has its stage of endurance, and passes out of existence with the decay of the society from which it originates." (1) "The present type of order in the world has arisen from an unimaginable past, and it will find its grave in an unimaginable future." (2) Whitehead, it is evident, has no notion of a divine providence, nor does his stress on conceptual prehensions in all actual entities make for "conscious control" of the activities of physical nature. "Blind physical purposes reign. It is now obvious that blind prehensions, physical and mental, are the ultimate bricks of the physical universe." (3)

Space and Time

Whitehead's theory of space and time is similar to that held by many modern thinkers who are interested in denying the "absolute" space and time of the Newtonian Physics. As Miss D. E. Scott expresses it: "We can look on space and time, not as a frame work (or locus) within which events take place, but as uniform relations displayed by concrete events in their 'passage'". (4) This change of view is based on (among others) the insight that the distinction between the occupied and unoccupied parts of a "field" is false.

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 139

(2) A. N. Whitehead, Religion in the Making, p. 160

(3) *Ibid* (1) p. 470

(4) Miss D. E. Scott, Whitehead's Philosophy of Creation, p. 203 brackets mine.

In order to understand Whitehead's theory of "time" one must recall his doctrine of the "concrecence" of an actual entity. In this process, the actual entity prehends data from God's consequent nature and from other actual entities of the actual world. This actual world is a provider of so-called "real" potentialities. It is also referred to as the "extensive continuum" which is atomized by the emergence of a new actuality. The process of concretion by which an actual entity creates itself, exemplifies what Whitehead calls "epochal" time. That is to say, within the duration or epoch required for the growth of an actual entity, there are no hard and fast distinctions between supposedly absolutely discrete moments of time, as in the usual theory of "physical" time. "The actual entity is the enjoyment of a certain quantum of physical time. But the genetic process is not the temporal succession; such a view is exactly what is denied by the epochal theory of time. Each phase in the genetic process presupposes the entire quantum."(1) Thus, while an actual entity may prehend a temporal succession of events which are apparently absolutely

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 224

discrete (for Whitehead the absolute separateness of moments of physical time is only an abstraction, achieved by no-ordinal analysis) it does so, not as discrete elements, but in the mode of a genuine and ultimate interconnectedness within its own life. In the ~~same~~ sense an actual entity spreads out over an extensive spatial region. This region provides 'the determinate basis which the concreteness presupposes,' (1) (i.e. from which it derives its "real" potentiality.)

As was noted above, Whitehead refers to the "atomization of the extensive continuum" by new actual entities, "thereby make (ing) real what was hitherto merely potential." (2) By this he apparently means that the "potentiality" (real) constituted by the forms of actual entities (which is the extensive continuum) is used by the novel actual entity, which by its appearance as a new unit, thereby, in a sense, atomizes the extensive continuum.

Freedom

One of the most unjustified criticisms of Whitehead's cosmology is that advanced by H. B. Moore, who claims that since the universe is ~~an~~ organic, therefore, there is

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 474
 (2) Ibid p. 112, bracket mine.

no room for contingency.* In the previous discussion of actual entities, it was noted that the basic characteristic of an actual entity is that it is " causa sui". The process of causation is its own reason. "It is firmly responsible for the decision by which any lure for feeling is admitted to efficiency." (1) An entity, actual or possible, can force itself into the experience of an actual entity. There are efficient and final causes at work in the world but these efficient and final causes are found not in one supreme actual entity (God) but in all actual entities. Thus each actual entity is autonomous in that it is free to select from the data provided, in whatever possible way it sees fit. It is to be realized, of course, that an actual entity cannot "conjure up" data which are not available. In the sense that an actual entity can only use data available and resort to it in certain determined possible ways (though there is a wide range of choice)--it is limited and conditioned by that data. "There is no such fact as absolute freedom; every actual entity possesses only such freedom, as is inherent in the primary principle 'given' by its own point of relativity to its actual universe." (1) All

* Cf. L. N. Moore, "Mr. Whitehead's Philosophy" *Philosophical Review* 1921, p. 165
 (1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 156
 (2) *Ibid* p. 102

this must be born in mind when one reads Whitehead's statement: "The freedom inherent in the universe is constituted by this element of self-causation (of actual entities)." (1)

With reference to this general problem, it is necessary to consider Whitehead's provocative theory of the "complete contemporaneity freedom" of actual entities. The situation in which complete contemporaneity freedom is manifested, arises when two (or more) entities are not in a direct relation of efficient causation (i.e. do not immediately physically prehend each other). To some critics this seems impossible because of Whitehead's avowal that all actual entities prehend each other. Yet, on the basis of Whitehead's metaphysics, this doctrine is perfectly reasonable, when it is remembered that if actual entity "A" is to be objectified in actual entity "B", actual entity "B" must be "past" with reference to actual entity "A", - past and gone, otherwise no data would be available for a physical relation. It is therefore impossible, on the basis of Whitehead's system, for two actual entities which are contemporaneous, i.e. each in the process of self-creation, to provide data for each other.

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 155
Underlining and brackets mine.

The general sort of criticism which is usually advanced against Whitehead's position at this point, has been noted: "The uncultivated inclusiveness of prehension (always excepting universals in relation to particulars, and earlier in relation to later events in time) is required by his system as a whole." (1) That is to say, contemporaries cannot be excluded from the bonds of directprehension.

Hartshorne further holds that "external relations" (in the sense of contemporary freedom-designed to retain the autonomy of actual entities) between co-existent monads would destroy their individuality and bring upon us "Bradley's vicious regress of relations between things and their relations." (2)

In opposition to this objection, it is to be noted that actual entities are not enduring monads. They "never really are"; for at any moment an actual entity is either creating itself or passing away. They don't "sit about" in completed perfection. The very nature of Whitehead's system, as has been noted, requires that contemporary actual entities do not have direct causal relations, indeed they cannot. This does

(1) C. Hartshorne, "On Some Criticisms of Whitehead's Philosophy" Philosophical Review July, 1935 p. 374

(2) Ibid p. 384

not mean that actual entities are crossed to the "bridge;" refutation. Each actual entity is related to its past and makes a contribution to the future. In this sense the unity or wholeness of the universe is maintained. Indeed as Whitehead points out: "Indirectly, via the influence of the past and the influence of the future, (even) the (contemporary) occasions are connected." (1)

This discussion provides an answer to the problem raised by C. W. Morris. (2) He states: "It would appear, then, that-----some actual entities and some eternal objects are not prehended by any particular actual entity." It is true that so-called "contemporary actual entities, cannot and do not directly prehend each other, because in literal truth they are not yet actual entities in the full sense of the term. Since they have not reached the superject stage, they cannot provide data. Yet in a genuine sense all actual entities do make a contribution to each other, as they pass on. Morris seems to claim that because "giverness" (objectification) implies elimination and exclusion, therefore not all actual entities are related to each

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas p. 172
Projects nine.

(2) C. W. Morris, Six Theories of Mind p. 188

other. He overlooks the fact that what is eliminated is some non-essential phase from the new subject's point of view of every actual entity in the world, in a process whereby allowing for "degrees of relevance ----- every actual entity is present in every other actual entity."

(1)

The quotation (referred to by Morris): "that is 'given' might not have been 'given'; and that what is not 'given' might have been 'given'" (2) refers not to the objectification of actual entities but to eternal objects. It is simply a restatement of the familiar doctrine that any eternal object is "neutral as to the fact of its physical ingressions in any particular actual entity of the temporal world." (3) (as to the nature of the bond provided by a negative prehension, which in the eyes of many critics is a complete lack of connection, see previous discussion of negative prehensions (4))

Finally, it is to be noted that in Whitehead's philosophy, the freedom of "contemporary" or any other actual entities does not depend on whether or not data come from a certain source, but the inalienable freedom

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 79

(2) Ibid p. 70

(3) Ibid p. 70

(4) Cf. Thesis p. 28-32

of each actual entity is constituted, ultimately, by its internal power of self-creativity. Its power to choose its own subjective aim and actualize it.

Internal and External Relations

Concerning "relations" Whitehead states: "It is evident that if the solidarity of the physical world is to be relevant to the description of its individual actualities, it can only be by reason of the fundamental internality of the relationships in question. On the other hand, if the individual discreteness of the actualities is to have its weight, there must be an aspect in these relationships from which they can be conceived as external, that is, as bonds between divided things." (1)

All actualities are positively prehended, directly or indirectly, by various different processes of objectification (i.e. the data prehended are different). All eternal objects are either positively or negatively prehended (in either case there is a genuine contribution to the new actual entity). It would seem, therefore, that all actual entities have internal relations to all other actual entities. However, as has been reiterated, an actual entity is

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 470-1

not entirely determined or constituted by these internal relationships. The essential self-hood of any actual entity lies in the fact that it is an autonomous center of life. It feels all these other actual entities, as it sees fit, in a unique and individual fashion (within certain wide possibilities of experience). In this sense any actual entity is genuinely "other" as far as every other actual entity is concerned; other in the sense of an independent center of life, which communicates from outside.

Whitehead is able to formulate this theory of internal and external relations because he refuses to accept the usual alternatives. It is customary to say, with Bradley or Hegel, that if relations are internal, if finite things are genuinely related to each other, this can only be explained in terms of their inclusion in a whole (as phases of one "experience" or the logical species of so-called "concrete" universals) in such a way that their essential individuality is lost. Failing this, finite persons or things are regarded as hopelessly sundered from each other, without the slightest possibility of interconnection.

As long as the category of "substance" was accepted, explicitly or implicitly, this was a genuine

difficulty. A substance, by definition being self-sufficient, could not interact with anything else. Whitehead's denial of substance, and his description of an actual entity as constituting itself by its relations with other actual entities (while retaining an autonomous center of life) provide for an internally related plurality of reals.

Relations

There is no "problem" of relations for Whitehead. The pseudo-problem so aptly stated by Bradley, was based on a false analysis of experience and a clever exercise in logic chopping. (1) It is an empirically observable fact that autonomous actual entities are mutually inter-related. Relations relate. There is no need to (a) bring in an absolute thinker, before whose timeless gaze all things are present as a related system of content; (b) equally unnecessary is a reference to a unity of "experience" with apparent differences. Whitehead's justification of pluralism and his repudiation of monism, in various forms has been discussed at length. (2)

It is very interesting to note that Whitehead provides a theory of "internal relations" which is more thoroughgoing than that presented by most

(1) Cf. Thesis p. 86

(2) Ibid p. 86-93; 102-106; 133-139; 110-123

idealistic philosophers.

The idealistic doctrine of internal relations may be stated: "Everything is present to everything else, in one vast instantaneous co-implicated completeness.--- Nothing can in any sense, functional or substantial, be really absent from anything else, all things inter-penetrate and telescope together in the great total complex." (1) The whole in which the parts are co-present may be the timeless experience of the "great thinker", "the unity of feeling" ("experience"), "the ultimate logical essence" from which lower (in the hierarchy) essences are deducible, yet always logically present as implied. In all these cases, since genuine particularity is denied, and the sole ultimate reality of the "one" is stressed, the only way in which particulars could be related is as elements in the inclusive whole. Since each particular is what it is because of the Absolute, it naturally, cannot be what it is without a necessary relationship and reference to all the other "particulars" (so-called), of similar "apparent" status, which are phases of the Absolute. In this sense then, any particular is internally

(1) William James, A Pluralistic Universe p. 32

related to any other particular. It is to be noted that the particulars in question have no "say" in the matter. They are in no way, as such, responsible for their so-called internal (or more exactly, imposed and necessary placement in degrees of adjacency to other particulars) relationships.

In Whitehead's philosophy the situation is different. In so far as there is an internal relationship, it is due to the mutual interaction of the particulars concerned. It is a genuine internal relationship; not an imposed arrangement of puppet content in one Absolute experience. Thus Whitehead is able to do justice to the types of "internal relations" designated: "a relation essential to its terms"; "some kind of genuine unity between its terms". His position also explains how "relations can be grounded in the nature of the terms" and how "relations make a difference in the terms".

Even in the case of philosophers who are willing to give a place to "external relations" (1), the fact of internal relations is not explained primarily by reference to the mutual interaction of actual entities.

(1) W. E. Hocking, Types of Philosophy p. 368

Interest is centered on the supposed presence of an "enveloping field" (the Absolute again) or the fact that one term logically involves another. (Here is the old fallacy of confusing logical essence with actual existence.)

The familiar form of the doctrine of internal relations, used by idealists who are epistemologically inclined, is free, in one sense, from the foregoing criticism. One term is active, i.e. the subject is responsible for the appearance of the object (esse est percipi). However, it is evident that this is not a genuine internal relationship between two terms. Within the frame work of the suppositions involved, the being of the object depends on the act of the perceiving subject. In short, the relationship is asymmetrical. The object is not active in the process. It is not a real entity in active inter-relationship with another real entity.

It might be objected, in opposition to Whitehead, that if the "terms" happen to be logical essences, they can be externally related (by logical implication) without all the paraphernalia of living centers of self-creative process, mutually interacting. While this is true (since logical essences are not actual entities)

Whitehead would point out that ultimately the fact that eternal objects are linked, internally by logical implication (relational existence), is due to the activity of God's primordial nature. He arranges the otherwise unsorted mass of pure potentialities.

Organism

Whitehead's philosophy is termed the "philosophy of organism". It is both interesting and important to discover exactly what he means by "organism". Whitehead summarizes his use of the term thus: "The community of actual things is an organism; but it is not a static organism. It is an incompleteness in process of production. Thus the expansion of the universe in respect to actual things is the first meaning of 'process'; and the universe in any stage of its expansion is the first meaning of 'organism'. In this sense, an organism is a nexus.-----Secondly, each actual entity is itself only describable as an organic process. It repeats in microcosm what the universe is in macrocosm. It is a process proceeding from phase to phase, each phase being the real basis from which its successor proceeds towards the completion of the thing in question."

(1) In brief, the term "organism" is applied both to an

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 327
Underlining mine.

actual entity, and the inter-related group of actual entities which form a nexus.

Value (positive)

Concerning the nature of "value", Whitehead states: "'Value' is the word I use for the intrinsic reality of an event -----Realisation therefore is in itself the attainment of value -----Value is the outcome of limitation." (1) Whitehead hastens to indicate that all this is true only if reference is also made to a "standard of value". (One of the chief arguments for the existence of God's primordial nature was that a standard of value must be provided.) More particularly, Whitehead is saying that value is actualised in the experience of an actual entity when it guides its experiences in accordance with a certain sort of subjective aim, derived from God. In a valuable life (of an actual entity), certain characteristics are evident: (A) There is an enjoyment of the past, though the actual entity must not find its final satisfaction there, otherwise it will become inert. (B) The actual entity must enjoy its full character, which is its own immediate self-creation reaching out to one of the

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World p. 116

conditioning factors of the future. Thus, in so far as an actual entity exercises its function as an autonomous being actualizing its preheaded subjective aim, eliminating all things irrelevant to the realization of that experience enlarging aim, and thus providing rich new data for other actual entities,---to this extent an actual entity is valuable.

It is evident that by "value" Whitehead means, more exactly, positive value. Also, apparently the terms "value" and "good" are to be used synonymously. Thus: "Its (an actual entities') good resides in the realization of a strength of many feelings fortifying each other as they meet in the novel unity (entity)." (1)

Evil

In the preceding discussion of God's consequent nature it was noted that evil "lies in the fact that the past fades, that time is a 'perpetual perishing'." (2) This situation goes back ultimately to the fact that the "characters of things are mutually obstructive. Thus the depths of life require a process of selection." (and elimination) (3) Each actual entity strives to realize its unique satisfaction. This produces that

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas p. 355
Brackets and underlining mine.

(2) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 517

(3) Ibid p. 517 Brackets mine.

discordance between actual entities (and in actual entities) which is responsible for evil. The fact of evil is due to the autonomy of actual entities. It is a necessary component of the metaphysical situation. Even in the experience of God, as was noted, evil remains as a recognizable element. It does not lose its character of brute fact in some aesthetic harmony, - beyond good and evil.

Identity and Permanence

Considerable discussion has arisen concerning Whitehead's treatment of the problems of: "identity", "permanence", "abstraction" and "potentially". An apparent vacillation has been discovered, and emphasized by several critics. (1) For example, Hall points out that in Whitehead's earlier writings, Concept of Nature and Principles of Natural Knowledge, the enduring permanent things were eternal objects. Events perish and are devoid of potentiality. Eternal objects only are potentialities. The exclusive universality and abstractness of eternal objects is also evident. In later books (e.g. Process and Reality), his critics claim, Whitehead discusses the "identity"

(1) Cf. E. W. Hall, Journal of Philosophy 1930
 Cf. Miss Stebbings, Mind 1930
 Cf. Miss D. H. Emmet, Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism
 p. 128

and "permanence", of a personal society, in terms of the objectification of data from one actual entity to another.* A sort of "universality" is provided by a more or less permanent background (of societies) for the activities of a new actual entity. Every actual entity is now designated as a "potential" for some other actual entity. Data are regarded as "abstractions" (from the complete being of the actual entity of which they are a part).

As a result of this survey, Hall states: since "all characteristics supposedly peculiar to eternal objects are shared by actual entities, why not dispense with eternal objects altogether?" (1) The absurdity of such a suggestion should be rather obvious. It is not simply a fact to be recognized and accepted, that the "identity" manifest by an eternal object is a different sort of "identity" than that manifest (or exemplified) by a "personal" society of actual entities. (2) It is not simply the case that the "essence" (eternal object) "identity" is exemplified in two different types of entity, -i.e. eternal objects and societies of actual

* In addition to this, "permanence", in another sense, is provided for in that some phase (data, feeling) of a past actual entity, is preserved, with undiminished lustre in the experience of a novel actual entity.

(1) E. W. Hall, "Of What Use Are Whitehead's Eternal Objects?" Journal of Philosophy 1930
p. 36

(2) Or data transferred from one actual entity to another.

entities. It is then ridiculous to say, that because societies of actual entities exemplify "identity", therefore, eternal objects are not required as exemplifications of it. In actual experience it is found that both eternal objects and actual entities, manifest the essence "identity".

Philosophy of Organism and "Substance" Theories Contrasted

In several scattered passages, Whitehead very aptly summarizes the points of difference between his philosophy of organism and the traditional doctrine of "substance". "The organic philosophy interprets experience as meaning the 'self-enjoyment of being one among many, and of being one arising out of the composition of the many'. Descartes interprets experiences as meaning the self-enjoyment, by an individual substance, of its qualification by ideas." (1) "The operations of an organism are directed towards the organism as a 'superject', and not directed from the organism as a 'subject'." (2) In short, "The unchanging subject of change is completely abandoned." (3) "The ancient doctrine that 'no one crosses the same river twice' is extended. No thinker thinks twice,----no subject experiences twice." (4)

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 220

(2) Ibid p. 228

(3) Ibid p. 43

(4) Ibid p. 43

This point of view is of course concomitant with recent trends in physics, in which static stuff is replaced by fluent energy. Yet, "such energy has its structure of action and flow, and is inconceivable apart from such structure." (1)

The positive side of Whitehead's position is expounded in the "subjectivistic principle" which states that "the whole universe consists of elements disclosed in the analysis of the experience of subjects." (2) "Apart from the experiences of subjects there is nothing, nothing, nothing, bare nothingness." (3) Whitehead hastens to point out that his stress on "subjectivism" does not expose him to the usual objections. His theory avoids the "solipsism of the present moment", by stressing the fact that an ego (actual entity) feels the body as functioning. It also feels the world, as past. (4)

In opposition to Hume's atomism of impressions, Whitehead claims that we have a direct intuition of "inheritance" from the past (memory). Hence, we have a direct intuition of "causation". (5) Both Hume and

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 471
Underlining mine.

(2) Ibid p. 252

(3) Ibid p. 254

(4) Ibid p. 125

(5) It is to be noted that this is not "causation" in the old sense of a mysterious interaction between "distinct" substances which by definition, could not possibly interact.

Descartes are involved in the "fallacy of simple location". Individual independence of successive temporal locations, makes it necessary to bring in an external "deus ex machina" to explain endurance and repetition, or else it is left as an unsolved mystery. (1) In Whitehead's opinion, "The actual entity, in virtue of being what it is, is also where it is. It is somewhere because it is some actual thing with its correlated actual world. This is the direct denial of the Cartesian doctrine -- 'an existent thing which requires nothing but itself in order to exist'. It is also inconsistent with Aristotle's phrase, 'neither asserted of a subject, nor present in a subject'." (2)

This "reformed subjectivism" corrects the two great mistakes of the "substance" philosophy: "One is the concept of vacuous actuality, void of subjective experience; and the other is the concept of quality inherent in substance." (3) (In their proper character, as high abstractions, both of these notions are of the utmost pragmatic use.)

(1) Cf. A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 207

(2) Ibid p. 93

(3) Ibid p. 253

Feelings ----- Whitehead A Panpsychist

In the interests of clarity, an apparent dual (1) use, by Whitehead, of the term "feeling" must now be noted. In Whitehead's doctrine of "positive" prehensions, the terms "prehension" and "feeling" are seemingly synonymous. "Each actual entity is conceived as an act of experience arising out of data. It is a process of 'feeling' (prehending) the many data, so as to absorb them into the unity of one individual 'satisfaction'." (2)

However, the term "feeling" is also used in the substantive sense, and applied to the datum which is "absorbed into the subjective satisfaction." (3) Thus Whitehead states: "The objective datum is another feeling entertained by the latter actual entity." (4) Indeed the whole discussion of positive prehension is based on a continued reference to the transfer of feelings or "throbs of emotional energy". (5) In short,

(1) Cf. Thesis p. 177 for a triple use of the term "feeling". On closer examination however, it will be seen that they can be reduced to two: 1. data or 2. prehensive process. (i.e. the (a) act as such or the (b) quality (subjective form) manifested)

(2) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 65
Brackets and underlining mine.

(3) Ibid p. 82

(4) Ibid p. 361 Underlining mine.

(5) Ibid p. 178

here is the familiar distinction between act and content (object). An actual entity feels (act) a feeling (content), but what is felt (the feeling) is not necessarily an act (though it may be). For example, there is a difference between the feeling (that which is felt) anger, and the act of feeling it.

The exact metaphysical nature of all data apprehended--ultimately of all things in the world--must now be noted. It is Whitehead's opinion that "sensa" must be designated as "feelings" (i.e. that which is apprehended as concrete content, of whatever sort, is always called a feeling). Sensa are qualifications of affective tone. "Sensa are the definiteness of emotion: they are emotional forms." (1)

In the case of smell, for example: "Our developed consciousness fastens on the sensum as datum: our basic animal experience entertains it as a type of subjective feeling. The experience starts as that smelly feeling, and is developed by mentality into the feeling of that smell." (2) A similar expression of the same general idea is the following: the red patch we see in the external world, is veridically there,

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 174
 (2) A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas p. 315

only if it qualifies the affective tones of the actualities which in fact make up that region. (1)

It is evident that Whitehead is prepared to describe the "external world of things", in terms analogous to those used in describing our own inmost, so-called, psychic experience. His justification for this procedure can be outlined in this fashion: "An occasion of experience which includes a human mentality is an extreme instance, at one end of the scale, of those happenings which constitute nature.-----Any doctrine which refuses (as Whitehead does) to place human experience outside nature, must find in descriptions of human experience factors which also enter into the descriptions of less specialized natural occurrences." (2)

More specifically, Whitehead argues that since the experience of our own mind (ego) occasions is the only direct experience of an actual entity we have, - therefore we must base all descriptions of actual entities on the assumption that all actual entities are of the same sort. This procedure is not, however, arbitrary by any means. We are aware of our bodily occasions

(1) Cf. A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas p. 315

(2) Ibid p. 237 Brackets mine.

quite directly. These are only a little less clearly prehended than our preceding ego occasions. Like them they appear as "emotional" and in fact generally similar in every way. While we prehend the external world rather indirectly, yet here also we can trust the experience we have of it, mediated through the body. In any case, since the body is one object among other "natural" objects and we are acquainted with the body, we therefore know about the nature of other physical objects. This, in brief outline, is the basis of Whitehead's argument that all things in the universe can ultimately be described in terms of actual entities. These actual entities are feelers (self-created by their own feelings of data) feeling (act) in a certain way feelings (particular content- e.g. sense data such as: spatial shapes, patches of color, smells, anger tone or eternal objects).

In this sense then, Whitehead is a "panpsychist". Each actual entity has (or is, its) feelings of other actual entities and of possibilities (eternal objects). By far the greatest number of these actual entities do not have the highest forms of "mind"-consciousness or high-class self-hood.

The Relation of Whitehead to James

In the course of the foregoing exposition of Whitehead's position, comparisons and contrasts with the thought of other philosophers have been indicated. At this point, it might be well to summarize some of the most important implications of Whitehead's cosmological speculations, by reference to one of the "aims" which he expresses in the Preface of Process and Reality. Herein he acknowledges his indebtedness to Bergson, James and Dewey, and states that he proposes to "rescue their type of thought from the charge of anti-intellectualism, which -----has been associated with it." (1)

The similarity between Whitehead and these men is evident. In Whitehead's philosophy there is emphasis on "creativity" (process), "plurality of reals" and the refusal to bow to the dictates of "rationalism". That he is able to retain his trust in the intellect, and the reality of its objects, and at the same time make "creativity" one of the ultimate categories, is one of the most striking achievements of A. N. Whitehead.

William James is typical of the others in his criticism of the "intellect". Indeed he is frequently

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. vii
Underlining mine.

fairer. For example there are his eulogistic statements that: (A) "both theoretically and practically, the power of framing abstract concepts is one of the sublimest of the human prerogatives" (1) and (B) they give increased vision and power in concrete human strife.

However, James hastens to indicate the almost habitual transition from useful instrument to metaphysical monstrosity. Concepts are treated as a "superior type of being, bright, changeless, true, divine and utterly opposed in nature to the turbid, restless, lower world." (2) Worse still, concepts are used as the vile instruments by which the autocratic intellect dictates what properties a concrete object (supposedly) can or cannot possess. Concepts become the "procrustean beds" into which things must fit. Thus it becomes customary to deny to any object, qualities which cannot be logically deduced from the concept, of it. Thus it is claimed, if you say that a thing is distinct or independent, you are thereby barred from attributing interconnection or relationship to it. This follows because by definition "independence" does not include the notion of "connection". The

(1) William James, A Pluralistic Universe p. 217

(2) Ibid p. 218

intellect further excludes itself by holding that if a certain concept is applicable to an object, no others are applicable. An exponent of this extreme sort of intellectualism, who said: "A is a horseman", would, logically, refuse to admit that A could ever walk, i.e.: "A is a pedestrian." (1)

James' basic criticism of concepts (echoing Bergson) is that "concepts are all discontinuous and fixed." From this position many difficulties arise. The only way in which we can conceptually grasp "life" is arbitrarily to assume that it is broken up into static distinct parts. Having done this, it is evident that the intellect cannot do justice to the "flow" of our immediate experience. Since moments of time are infinitely divisible, by the intellect, no moment of time can ever pass. Similarly motion from one point to another is proved impossible by the intellect, since any distance is infinitely divisible.

These then, so its critics claim, are some of the most glaring deficiencies of the "intellect". On this basis Bergson denies to our concepts any ability to reveal the nature of reality. James, more fairly, admitted that concepts may give knowledge about things,

(1) William James, A Pluralistic Universe p. 254

but we can only genuinely know reality by sympathetic acquaintance with it. "The only way to apprehend a reality's thickness is either to experience it directly by being a part of reality oneself, or evoke it in imagination by sympathetically divining someone else's inner life." (1)

The fact that Whitehead sets out to offer a "coherent, logical, necessary, system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted" (2) indicates that he has more respect for the intellect than James could muster. This does not mean that Whitehead is suffering any delusions. As vigorously as James, he points out the deceptive nature of words and concepts. He denounces those who once thought that "by determining the meaning of words they could become acquainted with the facts." (3) Yet, there is the basic belief that man is justified in trying to formulate 'first principles'. Concepts are applicable to observed components of experience. Metaphysics is not a mirage but 'a description of the generalities which apply to all the details of practice.' (4)

It is of course true that Whitehead agrees with

(1) William James, A Pluralistic Universe p. 257
 (2) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 4
 (3) Ibid p. 18
 (4) Ibid p. 19

James, that the best way to know other things (actual entities) is to have a "sympathetic acquaintance" with them. (i.e. physical prehension). Knowledge by concepts only "touches the surface". However, Whitehead advances far beyond James in the value he places on conceptual knowledge. Concepts provide a genuine awareness of the nature of reality, i.e. actual entities are objectified by eternal objects (concepts). A conceptual prehension may not be a complete prehension of a real thing (actual entity) but it is a genuine prehension of some phase of a real thing.

Whitehead's discussion of the "relational essence" of eternal objects, indicates his refusal to accept James' theory of the exclusiveness of concepts. In a genuine sense, Whitehead claims, eternal objects imply each other in varying degrees of relevance. Further, Whitehead's theory of the relation of eternal objects to actual entities shows how a "rationalist" (i.e. one who values concepts as such) can avoid the mistake of trying to force reality into conceptual "moulds". Each actual entity, as will be recalled, determines what concept (eternal object) shall be exemplified in its concrete life. No concept as such, determines what the actual entity shall be.

The essential place of concepts (eternal objects) in the life of an actual entity is indicated by the doctrine of conceptual prehensions. Concepts are not metaphysical monstrosities to be avoided, but essential elements in the normal experience of a real "thing".

In all this, Whitehead claims to be reporting the experience of ordinary men. On this basis he outlines the function of the intellect and its concepts. James points to misuses of the intellect (and its concepts). Having done so he tends to condemn it. Whitehead provides a more balanced perspective, more true to the observed facts. When a person uses a concept, he does not ordinarily intend to cut the living "flow" of experience into parts. Rather, he describes the living flow of concrete experience by means of this static "logical" concept. There is no death-dealing potency in the concept. As static, it enables us to discuss, intellectually, entities which are not static. That is a fact of our normal unmetaphysical experience.

Despite his evident debt to James, there are other phases of the thought of the great pragmatist, which Whitehead cannot accept. In his opinion, James does not sufficiently account for the "individuality" of things and persons. Persons are supposedly generated

by the compounding of elements (of consciousness). One looks in vain for any emerging "individual" center of actuality - a self-existing actual entity. This disregard for the individuality of actual entities is even more strikingly manifest in James' discussion of "things" in the physical world. For Whitehead, they are societies of actual entities. These actual entities are autonomous centers of life, contributing their data to other actual entities. They are real matters of fact, active in the life of an observer or user, through the medium of contributions made to the inner life of the observer. In James' scheme of things, the situation is startlingly different. "We ~~curve~~¹ out constellations" (1) to suit our human purposes (by naming them!). "We break the flux of reality into things, at our will". (2)²---For Pragmatism, reality is still in the making, and awaits part of its completion for the future." While it is possible to claim that the mind adds something to a total situation by naming a constellation of stars, it is difficult to justify the extreme claim that "we break the flux of sensible reality, into things, at our will." As a matter of fact, the real things we experience in the world do not submit to this cavalier treatment.

(1) William James, Pragmatism, p. 253
 (2) Ibid p. 254

It is true that the world is still in the making. Certain features of the future depend on our activity. But many other features will be, quite apart from anything we can do. These general insights are honored in Whitehead's philosophy and disregarded in that of James.

As has been noted, Whitehead like James, rejects the Absolute. However, this position in Whitehead's case was based neither on a series of arguments to show essential weakness in the concept itself (as in A Pluralistic Universe p. 126; 192; 296) nor in an appeal supported by a reference to the individuals' need for freedom and religious and moral values. Whitehead accepts a pluralistic world view, ultimately, because he finds the universe to be pluralistic.

Plato and Whitehead

In her interesting book, Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism, Miss D. Emmet devotes considerable space to developing the thesis that there are striking similarities in the thought of Plato and Whitehead. It is at least possible that she has been too enthusiastic in advancing this theory.

Generally speaking, both are interested in a search for "the forms in the facts". Both believe that

"things which are temporal arise by their participation in the things which are eternal" (1)* There are further apparent similarities: (1) there are the two well-known passages in Plato's Sophist, in which the "stranger" suggests that 'anything which possesses any sort of power to affect another or to be affected by another, has real existence.' (2) and the oft quoted question, "Can we ever be made to believe that motion and life and soul and mind are not present with absolute being?" (3) These, Miss Irmet claims, are very like Whitehead's statements concerning his actual entities. (4) (B) E. L. Taylor points out that Whitehead's view of 'the becoming of temporal actualities through the ingressions of forms is to be connected with the view in Philebus (5), of temporal actualities as *yevēgeis eis oīsīav*, i.e. processes

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 65

* In order to make this similarity more plausible, the later Plato, of the Philebus and the Sophist, is here considered; the Plato who has left behind him the "real" transcendent "ideas" of the Republic and the Phaedrus. He has formulated a theory which ascribed reality to numbers of the "mixed class"; saw no problem in the relation of "ideas" to things; and regarded all ideas as mutually implying each other. This is the Plato of the period before the reduction of ideas to numbers.

(2) Plato, The Sophist 247c

(3) Ibid 249a

(4) Cf. Miss D. M. Irmet, Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism p. 135

(5) Plato, The Philebus 25-26

of development, or approximation toward a right proportion." (1)

On close examination, such Platonic ~~passages~~ as these really seem to be rather poor grounds on which to posit fundamental similarities between Plato and Whitehead. In the Iphilebus discussion, Plato is apparently concerned with the ordering or use of things already in existence, in order to produce a certain condition in the universe or a person's body. As far as one can judge, he was not concerned with the creation of the ultimate realities of the universe. Yet, after all Whitehead's theory of actual entities was formulated to deal with that problem.

The sections from the Sophist undoubtedly seem more like Whitehead's work. However, a few scattered phrases like these, without critical exposition and support, distinctive because of the infrequency of their appearance, lead one to wonder if they can be taken as the epitome of Plato's final position. While these ~~passages~~ may suggest Whitehead's doctrine of actual entities, they certainly, in no sense, show any evidence of regarding all real entities as 'feelers

(1) Cf. Miss D. M. Inmet, Whitehead's Philosophy of Causality, p. 226

feeling feelings'. Plato's chief concern in dealing with concrete particular (in the period under discussion) seemed to be: to deny that they were mere imitations of ideas, and to show that 'ideas' were really manifest or present in them, and that particular things were real. That seemed to be as far as he cared to go. At any rate when Plato came to define the ultimate components of physical things (in the Timaeus) he referred to geometrical forms being imposed on 'empty space', (or something similar to what that term implies to us) by an artisan creator. There is no reference to self-creative centers of feeling or life. Plato's doctrine of the soul, as a divine product enjoying rebirths, is also very different from Whitehead's analysis of "myself" at a moment of self-creative experience. Thus, despite the apparent similarities in the passages quoted from Plato, the differences which distinguish Whitehead's work from that of Plato are far more fundamental. It is true that Miss Immet does not intend to identify Whitehead with Plato: 'I wish to show how certain general ideas suggested by Plato are worked out in a new form by Whitehead.' (1) However she does tend to overphasize the

(1) Miss D. M. Immet, Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism
p. 104

the very general similarities which do exist.

This interpretation of Miss Bennett's procedure is further substantiated by an examination of her comparison of Plato's and Whitehead's theories of God.

According to Miss Bennett, they have this in common, that: 'the reason there should be a 'process of becoming' at all is to be looked for in the 'goodness of God'.' (1) Yet, there is this fundamental difference, that while Plato conceives God as an artisan, building through intermediaries, a "good world", as much like himself, as is possible; Whitehead's God is only effective as a lure, by reason of the 'good' (i.e. adequate) organisation of eternal objects, which provide patterns (and other data if the consequent nature is considered) to guide the self-creative action of actual entities.

Miss Bennett professes to find a striking analogy between Whitehead's theory of the determination of creativity 'through participation in the forms' (eternal objects) and Plato's doctrine of the 'persuasion of $\alpha vay\kappa n$ by $\nu o\delta s$ '. (2) It has been noted, her interpretation of the nature of 'creativity' (which inaccurately she here identifies with $\alpha vay\kappa n$)

(1) Miss D. M. Bennett, Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism

p. 222

(2) Cf. *Ibid* p. 230

is entirely fallacious. The creative process of any actual entity which guides its developing life by reference to eternal objects envisaged in God's primordial nature, is in no way analogous, as far as the created particulars are concerned, to the production of art objects by a great artist. In the opinion of Plato, God imparts "form" (idea patterns) to a recalcitrant "matter" (material) as best he can. According to Whitehead, self-creative actual entities prehend such forms as they care to use in their own self-creative process. There is no formless stuff stubbornly resisting use in the creative process.

There is a further important distinction between the positions of Plato and Whitehead with reference to God. In the thought of Plato, God "looks to" the "ideas", arranged and inter-related, ready for use. Whitehead believes that it is God's primordial function to take an otherwise chaotic useless mass of eternal objects within his conceptual envisagement and thereby establish their relational essence. The "ideas" are for Plato's God, external data to be used as required. Whitehead's eternal objects are essential components of God's primordial nature. It is formed by God's conceptualprehension and evaluation of these eternal

objects, which he absorbs into the immediacy of his life.

Thus, it is true that Whitehead stands in the "Platonic tradition", if that term is so defined as to be elastic enough. Actually, in particular doctrines there is little in common. Plato and Whitehead share many of the fundamental insights of mankind. However, the mode of expression is so different, the point of view so divergent that even in the most favorable cases, apparent similarities, on closer examination, are discovered to be rather nebulous.

Internal Objects

In answer to those who claim that the theory of eternal objects is difficult, dangerous and unnecessary, Whitehead simply points to certain ordinary sorts of experience. He recalls of definite possibilities (intellectually apprehended) which do not seem to emerge from experience. "No explosion of any star can generate the multiplication table by any genetic-functioning." (1) There was a longer, in the case of Plato, that eternal objects might be set up as supreme reality, implying a denial of all reality to the temporal world. The way in which Whitehead avoids all this has been noted. (2)

(1) A. N. Whitehead, "Notes" Philosophical Review March, 1937 p. 179

(2) Cf. Incis., p. 21

Whitelock believes that a reference to eternal objects is necessary to explain the fact that a quality (intellectually apprehended) which is exemplified at one place (the exemplification being sensuously apprehended) may also be exemplified at another locus. Otherwise, the observed similarity cannot be accounted for. Two patches of red ~~must~~ have "redness" in common.

In discussing eternal objects, Whitelock notes a distinction between the "objective species" and the "subjective species". This differentiation is made on the basis of the mode of impression of eternal objects into actual entities. An eternal object is objective if it is an element in the definiteness of some actual entity (or nexus) which is (or provides) the data of a feeling. An eternal object is "subjective" if it is an element in the subjective form of some feeling. In its function as an ~~agent~~(factor) in the process of objectification (note the nature of this function, *ibidem* p. 32) an eternal object can only be an object, i.e. it is always exemplified in data. It is never exemplified in a subjective form, for the single reason that data are not subjective forms.

This simple, matter of fact, distinction has led critics to claim that Whitelock is setting up a hard and

fast distinction between two types of eternal objects. As a matter of fact the distinction is only functional, i.e. an eternal object is "objective" if it is exemplified in a datum; an eternal object is "subjective" if it is exemplified in a subjective form. It is strange to find Miss Immet suggesting that only the "objective species" "bear any possible analogy to the Platonic Ideas." (1) Her recoil from 'Whithead's unrestricted immigration policy' in allowing eternal objects for nodes or feeling (subjective forms) is hardly necessary. Surely a node of feeling can be the exemplification of an eternal object. Incidentally such eternal objects have as much right to be conceptually envisaged in God's primordial nature as the eternal object of "mud" or the eternal object of "beauty", - that is to say, they are all possibilities which are conceptuallyprehended by human minds.

Once again, it must be noted that the distinction between subjective and objective eternal objects is functional. As Whithead states it: "The (any) eternal object can function both subjectively and relatively (objectively). It can be a private element in a subjective form, and also an agent in the objectification." (2)

(1) Miss D. M. Immet, Whithead's Philosophy of Creation I. 163

(2) A. N. Whithead, Process and Reality p. 446
Underlining and brackets mine.

Categories

It is sometimes said by Whitehead that his eight Categories of existence; twenty seven Categories of valuation; and nine Categories of obligations. His answer is delightfully simple. He believes that the entities referred to and the functions described are discoverable in experience. These categories are simply statements of the observed facts. Miss Immet aptly expresses the matter: "It (the table of Categories) is not a dictatorial or a priori assertion of first principles, but a formulation of general ideas which have been wrought out of a long series of critical inquiries." (1)

It will have been noted that in the course of this thesis no separate discussion has been accorded to the various categories. Illustrations of some of them have been noted. After all, the special names and numbers which Whitehead applies to the principles exemplified in the behavior of the universe are of minor importance. The basic matter is to note and evaluate these basic principles, in terms of which Whitehead seeks to do justice to every event which occurs.

(1) Miss D. M. Immet, Whitehead's Philosophy of Creation p. 145-146
Macmillan.

Chapter V
Societies of Actual Entities:
The World of "Every Day"
Persons and Things

Societies of Actual Entities

The preceding discussion has apparently had little bearing on the ordinary "physical" objects of everyday experience. Considerable reference has been made to human experience, accompanied by the claim that a moment of so-called "mental" experience (e.g. feeling of "anger" content, or apprehension of a possibility i.e. an eternal object) might be regarded in its structure of experience, as a typical actual entity.

Yet this difficulty presents itself: actual entities incessantly rise and pass away. How can one explain the evident permanence of observed physical objects and the apparent continuity of our felt self-identity. In order to meet such questions, Whitehead formulates his theory of "societies". In this way he explains how the everyday world of common sense can be accounted for in terms of really real things, - actual entities.

The fact that societies arise is due to the

fundamental metaphysical situation of the interence of all actual entities in each other, in the sense described in the theory of prehensions. When the actual entities in any selected group are interrelated, only in this general sense, - the group is called a 'nexus'. A "society" is the result of a more specific, intimate sort of interrelationship called "social order". This situation is described thus: "A nexus enjoys 'social order' when there is a common element of form illustrated in the definiteness of each of its included actual entities, and this common element of form arises in each member of the nexus by reason of the conditions imposed upon it by its prehensions of some other members of the nexus, and those prehensions impose that condition of reproduction by reason of their inclusion of positive feelings involving that common form. Such a nexus is called a 'society', and the common form is the 'defining characteristic' of that society." (1)

In order that these qualifications be met, it is evident that a society must involve "antecedents and subsequents" (2), or temporal contiguity. A purely "contemporary" group of actual entities could not form a society since as such they could have no direct

(1) A. I. Hitchcock, Adventures of Ideas p. 261
 (2) Ibid p. 261

interrelations. However, (as has been noted) there is an indirect type of relationship enjoyed by contemporary occasions, which is based on the fact that the rests of the actual entities in question have something in common. Hence each inherits from its past similar elements. In this sense "the interrelations of the present are derived from a reference to the past." (1) This state of affairs is called spatial contiguity.

"Endurance" in the universe is accounted for by the function of societies. An actual entity only becomes, and perishes; but a temporal or linear succession of actual entities, in a sense, 'carries on': (A) The same defining characteristic continues to be exemplified; (B) There is a mutual immanence (objectification) of the successive occasions. Such a temporal serial succession of occasions of experience is called a "personal society". Roughly speaking, a molecule,- a single historic route of occasions- is an example of such a personal society. It is of course evident that some other type of society must exist to account for the more complex interrelations of actual entities. For example, an animal body can only be

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas p. 260

thought of as a society involving, not a simple linear temporal sequence of occasions, but rather a vast number of occasions spatially and temporally coordinated. Here (in an animal body) the emphasis is specifically on spatial coordination, in a present moment, and extending back to the past and forward to a prospective future. An animal body, at any moment is composed of a vast group of contemporary occasions, co-ordinated by the extremely tenuous linkage which is all that is available for contemporary actual entities. (1)

It is evident that "each living body is a society, which is not person 1." (2) "But most of the animals, including all the vertebrates, seem to have their social system dominated by a subordinate society which is 'personal'. -----but the lower forms of animal life, and all vegetation, seem to lack the dominance of any included personal society. A tree is a democracy." (3)

The nature of the "dominance" exercised by the personal society is worthy of note. The "personal society", or more accurately, the component actual

(1) Cf. A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas p. 252

(2) Ibid p. 264

(3) Ibid p. 264

entities (1) cannot force any line of activity on the spatial society in which it finds itself. It can only provide data and trust that this data will be taken into the being of the actual entities forming the society called the animal body (or at least some parts of it). (2)

Whithead has much of interest to point out, with reference to the human personality. The "ego" set on a pedestal by Descartes turns out, in Whithead's opinion, to be, not an enduring entity but a series of occasions. (3) The ego or mind is the final route of presiding 'percipient' ----occasions ----perhaps so c thread of happenings wandering in 'empty' space amid the interstices of the brain. ----ly reason of the body, with its miracle, of order, the treasures of the past environment are poured into the living occasion. -----In its turn, this culmination of bodily life,

(1) The society is not itself a distinct entity, being only the name for a series of actual entities. To put it more bluntly, - at any one moment a personal society, so far as present existence is concerned, is one actual entity, which has arisen, chiefly byprehending another actual entity, quite similar in nature, having shared a common eternal object as defining characteristic.
 (2) Cf. ... H. Whithead, Process and Reality p. 166
 (3) Cf. Ibid p. 116

transmits itself, as an element of novelty throughout the avenues of the body. Its sole use to the body is its vivid originality: it is the organ of novelty." (1)

Concerning the ancient hope of "immortality", Whitehead says: "How far this soul (a personal society of occasions) finds a support for its existence beyond the body is another question. The everlasting nature of God, which in a sense is non-temporal and in another sense is temporal, may establish with the soul a peculiarly intense relationship of mutual influence. Thus in some important sense the existence of the soul may be freed from its complete dependence upon the bodily organism. -----But it is to be noticed that the personality of an animal organism may be more or less. It is not a mere question of having a soul or of not having a soul. The question is, how much, if any?" (2)

Finally, (and this justifies the procedure in focusing attention on actual entities and paying relatively little attention to so-called common sense objects of the physical world) any quality or characteristic manifested by an organism or society, must be, without remainder, based on the experiences of (i.e. be found in) a component actual entity of that society or

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 516
 (2) A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas p. 267
 Lecture nine.

organism. Thus NO novel qualities emerge, applicable to the organism or society as such, i.e. which are not found in some of the component actual entities. Thus, it is evident that a "society" (as was emphasized previously, *Aesop*, p 171-) is not a distinct entity with autonomous powers equal or greater than an actual entity. All that a society is or can do is explicable, without remainder in terms of the component actual entities.

Chapter VI

Criticism

In the course of this exposition of Whitehead's philosophy, certain "apparent" inadequacies of expression have been noted. It was also pointed out that the various, rather striking, differences between ordinary actual entities and God (1), raise at least the shadow of a doubt, in one's mind as to the justice of Whitehead's claim that: "God is not an exception to all categories." (2) However, the sense in which this is true was noted. (i.e. God may not be exactly like all other actual entities, but concepts applicable to our experience can be applied to God's.)

It is also surprising to find Whitehead apparently opposing his usual view of actual entities in the following quotation: "It is evident that-----no single occasion can be called living. Life is the coordination of the mental spontaneities throughout the occasions of a society." (3) As has been very evident, Whitehead habitually ascribes life to any actual entity, as such. For example, "The notion of life implies a certain

(1) Cf. Thesis, p. 98

(2) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 521

(3) A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas p. 266
Underlining mine.

absoluteness of self-enjoyment, ---rising out of this process of appropriation. I have termed each individual act of immediate self-enjoyment, an 'occurrence of experience' (actual entity). I hold that these---- are the really real things." (1) Apparently Whitehead is using the term in two senses.

All this criticism moves in the circle of Whitehead's formulated principles, - those stated in the 'Category of the Ultimate'; the eight Categories of Existence; twenty seven Categories of Explanation; and the nine Categorical Obligations. Whitehead, himself, would be the last one to claim that there was any "categorical obligation" to accept all these categories. He, of course, believes, in Platonic language, that his position is the "most likely story" (i.e. has a greater proportion of truth).

Since Whitehead's philosophy is (or has many elements in common) a form of panpsychism (2), the type of criticism now to be attempted, falls in somewhat conventional lines.

However, before proceeding to this writer, it might be well to gather together Whitehead's various

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Nature and Life p. 25-26
 underlining and brackets mine.

(2) As defined, Cf. Thesis, p. 147

theories which indicate his "panpsychistic" basis. There is for example, his analysis of the nature of an actual entity. It is composed of feelings (prehensions, or acts of awareness) of data (which are also called (a) feelings). This latter point is to be particularly noted. Data, for example the so-called "sense data", are ultimately "emotional". Charles Hartshorne (1) expresses the matter thus,-- the experienced qualities of color, sound, or smell, are properly describable as (b) feeling. These data are presented with a certain subjective form which is also called a (c) feeling. This is a third use of the term,-- incidentally, the most usual one. Feeling in this sense means, emotional response, such as pleasure, pain, acceptance, rejection, disgust and consciousness. It is to be noted that Whitehead does not claim that all actual entities have consciousness. The essential "psychic" element is for him not "consciousness" but "feeling".

In Whitehead's discussion of various problems, we find further evidences of the panpsychistic point of view:

1. He refers to the fact that recent developments have shown us that matter can no longer be regarded as

(1) Cf. C. Hartshorne, 'On Some Criticisms of Whitehead's Philosophy' Philosophical Review July, 1975 p. 329

static and lifeless. The emphasis is now on energy and life.

2. Mitchell also points to the so-called 'Principle of Continuity'. This theory stresses the fact that it is difficult, if not impossible to discover a level of existence in which life, or feeling, is not found, at least in some tenuous or vague form.

3. There is reference to the claim that, - since we are in closest touch with reality in our own inner experience, this provides the best, indeed the only, legitimate key to the nature of all reality. Mitchell is able to substantiate this theory more fully than most panpsychists. This is due to the careful way in which he works out the details of his claim that there is a literal presence of (phases of) other actual entities in the experience of any actual entity. Thus it is possible to know other things directly, in a sense, and so assess their natures.

4. One of Mitchell's chief pluses is the fact that his theory of actual entities makes possible a solution of the old problem of interaction between entities. By the abandonment of the traditional doctrine of substance, the way is cleared for a formulation by which interaction is accounted for in

terms of the transfer of feelings from one feeler to another. This process is not a mystery, but a condition of the being and existence of the entities concerned. In this way the ground work for a solution of the problems of Dualism, - body-mind and mind-object, - is laid.

5. The usual panpsychistic emphasis on the freedom of entities from absolute determination in accordance with fixed laws, - is evident in Whitehead's theory of the autonomy of actual entities. This is even more strongly apparent in his claim that particular laws depend on the self-creative activity of societies.

6. The "problem" as to how consciousness arises from lower levels, is explained without difficulty. It is not stated that it is a "function of sensations" (1); rather, "consciousness" is a possible subjective form (selected from the realms of eternal objects) which is actualized by a certain complex type of actual entity.

This reference to eternal objects and their exemplification, indicates a characteristic of Whitehead's position which is not very evident, if

(1) Cf. C. S. Strong, The Origin of Consciousness

at all, in the thought of most psychists. One gets the general impression that since feelings are the ultimate moments in the universe, the laws said about "essences" and "eternal objects", the latter. (1) Whitcher, however, stresses the importance of eternal objects. He claims that every actual entity has conceptual intensions (of eternal objects). Thus, for Whitcher, "feelings" (in one of the three senses, Cf. Thesis, p. 177) are not the ultimate components. There are eternal objects AND feelings (constitutive of actual entities).

With reference to the eternal objects, it is to be noted that their primordial divisement, in God, provides a fixed pattern, which in general outline, all feelers must follow. Thus, while any "feeler" may choose various particular activities, certain general, basic, types are necessary. They are "necessary" because they are the only available pattern to guide the activity of an actual entity. In this way Whitcher avoids the claim that laws (i.e. uniformities in nature) are the mere arbitrary wills of fluxes of feeling.

(1) Cf. C. Hartshorne, "On Some Criticisms of Whitcher's Philosophy" Philosophical Review July, 1935

For Whitehead, the ultimate constituents of the universe (apart from the eternal objects) are not bits of feeling or "mind stuff" careening about in a haphazard fashion. All feelings are feelings of (or by) a feeler, in accordance with a certain pattern (eternal object). An actual entity must follow some pattern. Only certain patterns are provided, for choice, by God's primordial nature. Therefore, there is no purely accidental order manifest in the world.

This emphasis on the fact that the basic real things in the universe are actual entities (selves, in the sense indicated) differentiates Whitehead from those who, while claiming to account for selves, believe that the ultimate elements are "feelings" (sentience) which somehow compound the selves. (It is to be noted that the outcome of this process would be a mere aggregation, not a genuine unity.)

There is the further difference, that while most panpsychists regard the data of sense, as the "external appearance" (1) of feelings, which are the real things; Whitehead regards sense data as feelings- genuine components of actual entities- not to be relegated to

(1) Cf. C. L. Strong, The Origin of Consciousness

the limbo of mere appearance.

This is however, a difficulty connected with Whitehead's theory, that: the "feeler" is an agent from its process of feeling. This would seem to imply that while, during most of the process of feeling, a subject as a center of feeling, is adding data to itself (thereby creating itself), yet in the initial stages of the development of an actual entity there is no subject prehending. There are only prehensions (by no subject), which somehow generate a subject; and then, as the process goes on, this subject adds to itself (or as Whitehead says 'creates itself'). On the basis of this interpretation it might be objected that Whitehead, like Strong is apparently assuming that ultimately the self is generated by the compounding of feelings. In this process, at one stage, there is as yet no self--acting as agent (or unifier). It seems then that one might object that Whitehead's analysis of an actual entity into, self, subjective form, and data should be enlarged to note this detail of the process.

Whitehead's probable answer to criticism of this sort might well be expressed thus: At any moment of observation we find an actual entity to be composed of a self in process of self-creation.-- Now the self could

arise out of "selfless" feelings is a dialectical question which need not concern us anymore than we need worry about the origin of the world (in the old "first moment of creation" sense). Actual entities always seem to have the 'subject' phase. There it is.----It is not worth while rocking one's brains trying to figure out, how,--what actually is, --is possible (i.e. in the sense of trying to convince ourselves that it is logically or metaphysically possible). After all, metaphysics for Whitehead, and most of us in our non-'pseudo-rationalistic' moments, is a matter of descriptive generalities. We observe and describe the universe. Only in our dogmatic moments, do we try to claim that because a bit of experience doesn't fit our categories, therefore, it must be denied reality.

It is now necessary to turn to the usual criticisms of panpsychism. They are reducible to the distressingly simple statement: "panpsychism simply isn't so." Its expositon is attractive; it apparently solves many problems, yet it has an air of charming hubris about it which renders the position incredible. The theory is not validated by experience.

Exponents of any form of epistemological dualism, object that we do not have exact knowledge of other

things in the direct way (i.e. transfer of content) which Whitehead claims.

Other objectors to panpsychism might suggest that since (for various reasons) we do not have real knowledge of what we call our "selves" (like: I never ~~see~~ my self - only sensations), it is absurd to interpret other entities in these supposedly valid terms, which in reality are only ~~suppositions~~ assumptions. However, most critics would admit that the "so-called" self has, or is composed of, feelings.

It seems to the writer that the crux of the discussion as to the validity of panpsychism centers about the legitimacy of arguing in a logical fashion; since I am a real entity and my nature is of a certain sort, therefore, all other real entities must have the same general sort of nature. If this principle be accepted, any doubt as to how we shall interpret the evidently non-mechanical behavior of the ultimate elements of so-called matter, will be set at rest. (1) Whitehead, on occasion, uses the argument under discussion. However, the essential spirit of his philosophy is on the side of an appeal to common sense experience.

(1) One would not even need to appeal to Whitehead's claim that by objectification, other entities are present in our experience and available for direct observation.

It must be remembered that, ultimately, Whitehead believed all principles (categories) are only 'descriptive generalities', descriptions of the general characteristics manifested by components of the universe, as noted and recorded by ordinary men, uncorrupted by metaphysics.

An appeal to 'common sense' is dangerous. Some of its content changes from age to age. However, its enduring data, methods and universe of discourse are accepted, recognized and used by all normal individuals. This then is the basis for any criticism which may be offered of Whitehead's or any other philosophy.

In the view of ordinary common sense experience, there is much that cannot be described in terms of panpsychism. Perhaps this is due to the thorough-going indoctrination by the physicists of the past three centuries. It seems very natural to believe that: (a) matter is not living, i.e. the possessor of feelings (however the term may be stretched beyond its usual meaning); (b) therefore, there is no justification for the claim that all real things, since they are real must have the same essential characteristics.

It must, however, be remembered that progress in many fields has been hindered by a dogmatic appeal to

"common sense". In the face of the legitimate pan-psychistic objections that (A) we are apt to be influenced by past prejudices and (B) using an intellectual short cut we consider only "mass effect", (C) that so-called physical atoms may be more psychic than we suppose, - one may be forced to give a provisional assent. One may admit that as far as we can judge, the interaction of the ultimate so-called "physical" components may be better interpreted in terms of felt contact and transfer of energy, - than by assuming that they are miniature billiard balls coming together, for no good reason, under the inexplicable influence of the law of gravitation. It is to be noted that this conclusion would be reached as a result of observation and reflection on it.

Suppose, then, it is granted that psychic, interrelated entities can explain far more phenomena than the familiar dead physical atoms. Suppose that there is no question of the fact that entities manifest "concern". This does not mean that such a state of mind would constitute complete acceptance of panpsychism, (as formulated by Whitehead). The "naïve" exponent of "common sense" wisdom may well point out that there are still many events in the universe which are not describable in Whitehead's categories, - as considered to date.

hen I look at a table, I am not aware of a section or component phase of the table becoming a component datum of my presiding occasion (i.e. my ego at the moment). By the act of perception, I see a table over there. There is no experienced transfer of content from the table to me. Thus my immediate experience of the table cannot be described in the panpsychistic terms of Whitehead's doctrine of "objectification". It is true that Whitehead has formulated a careful and exacting delineation of the process by which, over a brief duration, data come from the component actual entities of the society which is the table, through the medium of successive objectifications, along a "personal" social strand of actual entities from my skin to my presiding occasion. (1)

One might accept all this as being an adequate description of certain phases of a very complex situation. This process makes possible the act which we call "seeing the table". But the point is this: the actual

(1) Thus it seems that though every actual entity spreads out over the universe, it exerts only a vague influence in regions distant from the center of its life. If rich, "definite" content is to be transferred from one actual entity to another, this is best accomplished when the centers of these actual entities are adjacent.

event (of seeing the table), ~~as experienced~~ (not as analyzed to show how certain conditioning factors occurred) cannot be described as the transfer of part of the table (i.e. a brown feeling and a "shape" feeling), into the life of the perceiving subject (the observing ego). True the table comes within the focus of the ego's attention. However, contrary to the theory of objectification,--the table does not, in the perceptive act, ~~as experienced~~, cease to be an object out there and become only data within the life of the perceiving ego. In other words, the act of perception as we experience it, cannot be analyzed, without residue, into the infinite complex of minute actualities which we find to be conditioning factors.

No doubt an appeal to "common sense" in the realm of perceptual experience is about the most efficient method of raising a metaphysical hornet's nest, yet discovered. However, there is a common type of perceptual experience and a common, understandable, non-metaphysical way of describing that experience. Within this context, I think that it is correct to say, the simple act of perception is not, ~~as naively experienced~~,--an exemplification of the doctrine of 'objectification'. It is true that the act (process)

of perception may be made possible (or conditioned) by a complex process of objectification, on the part of minute actual entities stretching from the no-called object to the ego. In other words, Hitchcock's concepts, so far considered, do not seem to apply to certain "mass effects", as such, - of what conceivably may be the result of, or conditioned by, the activities of actual entities.

In view of this discussion of perception, might it not be wise to admit that there is a type of relationship which is not describable in terms of "objectification". (1) There is apparently, to say the least, a distinct difference between the experience of the transfer of a feeling of anger from moment to moment in one's ego experience (i.e. objectification) and the perception of a table, at a moment of experience. As a matter of fact, Hitchcock is well aware of this difficulty. His doctrine of "presentational immediacy" is formulated to meet this problem.

Hitchcock emphasizes the fact that, in the act of perception, the presence of a sense datum in "the

(1) i.e. 'objectification' in its usual sense. It is however, to be noted that the term is given a different implication when it is applied to the process of 'presentational immediacy'. See following discussion and A. N. Hitchcock, Process and Reality p. 100.

experience of a subject cannot be construed as the simple objectification of the actual entity to which in ordinary speech we ascribe that sense datum as a quality." (1) Indeed, something more complicated and quite different, actually happens.

An analysis of an experience of tactile sensation, reveals the various factors which Whitehead discovers in the act of perception (of any sort)---the factors and functions which he "describes" in his theory of "presentational immediacy". In feeling a stone, the sense "datum transmitted from the stone becomes the touch-feeling in the hand, but it preserves the vector character of its origin from the stone. The touch-feeling in the hand with this vector origin from the stone is transmitted to the percipient in the brain. Thus the final perception is the perception of the stone through the touch in the hand." (2)

In the terms of a more technical analysis, what takes place is this: "Sensations derived from bodily activities in the past are precipitated upon regions in the contemporary world." (3)

It is of course evident, from Whitehead's previous

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 100

(2) Ibid p. 185

(3) A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas p. 314

exposition, that there is nothing arbitrary about this precipitation (or "symbolic reference" to the external world by the medium of experienced data (1)). The sense which a "residing occasion" (subject or ego) experiences at the present moment, is derived directly (by objectification, i.e. "causal efficacy") from a past bodily occasion. This past bodily occasion derived this identical sense from one of the now past entities which formed a part of the enduring society to which the sense is now attributed. This is all based, of course, on the assumption that the contemporary entity to which the datum is now projected, has retained the common character of the society of which it is one member. (The entity which provided data for my past bodily entity is another member of this same society, which endures through time.) In this sense, according to Whitehead, there is nothing arbitrary or presumptuous in projecting the subject's experienced datum into the contemporary world.

Further details of this situation must now be noted. Whitehead takes great pains to emphasize the "sense of derivation from the body" which accompanies all our data. (2)

(1) Cf. Miss D. M. Emot, Whitehead's Philosophy of Causation, p. 175-7

(2) Cf. A. N. Whitehead, Nature and Life p. 34-5

He notes with approval, ~~passages~~ in Descartes and Leibniz in which this fact is noted (but then, unfortunately, disregarded). (1) In other words, Whitehead stresses the claim that in our ordinary experience we are aware of data as derived from our bodies, not from the external (contemporary) world to which these data are imputed or projected, or "transmuted" (2). The "feeling of efficacy" which seems to indicate the direct initiative of the environment in the perceptive act, is likewise projected, just as *sensa* are.

This theory that data are "projected" is supported, in Whitehead's opinion, by reference to the feeling of uncertainty as to the validity of our own perceptual experience. There is always the vague sense that our experience of contemporary events may be illusory, due to the activity of the subject. Whitehead's attitude to this general situation may be summarized thus: "Double vision, and images due to reflexion and refraction of light, show that the appearance of regions may be quite irrelevant to the happenings within regions. Appearances (data) are finally controlled by the functionings of the animal body. These functionings

(1) Cf. A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 125

(2) Cf. *Ibid* p. 40

and the happenings within the contemporary regions are both derived from a common past, highly relevant to both. It is thereby pertinent to ask, whether the animal body and the external regions are not situated together, so that under normal circumstances the appearances conform to natures within the regions."(1)

It is to be noted that the imputation or projection of data is directed by the "strain feelings" of the "focal regions". In other words, in the terms of the stone perception analogy, - the vector reference to the source of the touch-feeling, might be translated, - "strain feeling" (vector reference to) of focal region (locus of stone). Whitehead also applies a special term to the bodily occasions which provide data for the presiding occasion. He terms such an occasion the "seat" of the perceived "feelings" (sense data).

It must be remembered that this complicated process of "presentational immediacy" is required by Whitehead in his description of the act of perception, because of his belief that the contemporary world cannot be directly perceived. In short an actual entity can only be aware of its own component data (2) as such, or as referring to some external region.

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas p. 322
Brackets mine.

(2) Cf. Thesis p. 33

Whithead's doctrine of "presentational immediacy" does seem to find support (in the cases indicated) in the ordinary experience of men, who are uncorrupted by metaphysical bias. However, there are certain objections which may be brought against it- also on the basis of ordinary experience.

There are those who find it difficult to accept Whithead's claim that sensa data are appropriated as "feelings" from the life of the actual entities composing the physiological structure of the body. There is also some justification for the belief that we are directly aware of external objects, and that this act of awareness is not explicable in terms of presentational immediacy. That is to say,- there are not the factors of 'projection' and 'uncertainty as to results', which Whithead sees to discover in all perceptual experience.

It might be pointed out that in perception, we perceive through the medium of the body. However, what we perceive (data) are not derived from the body as appropriated content. Through the medium of the body we directly perceive the contemporary world. (The average intelligent human being can distinguish between genuine apprehensions of the external world and awareness of sensa which might be interpreted falsely,

as being external objects)

It will be remembered that Whitehead's objection to the possibility of perceiving the contemporary world was based on the claim that the entities forming the contemporary world could not provide data until they had passed on; that is to say no contemporary entity could be an object of awareness, since only a past entity could qualify. This may be true of the minute components, e.g. of a table; but the table, in its gross, enduring aspect, does not in ordinary experience undergo the drastic changes which characterize the life of actual entities. Thus, there sees no reason why a contemporary table might not be almost immediately perceived (allowing for a short time gap), since it doesn't as such, perish in an instant. On a certain level of being, i.e. that of our ordinary experience, a table endures for many years. It can be directly perceived, even though it requires a brief moment for the neural currents to pass from eye to brain. The table doesn't change in a moment of time nor need it pass out of existence as a condition of its perception. Further, while on occasion we may be aware of an uncertainty as to the validity of a perceptive act, generally speaking there is a sense of direct awareness of an external object.

The inaccurate form of expression, noted and discussed on page 21, Thesis, in which Whitehead refers to "sense data" as eternal objects, is repeated in his description of "presentational immediacy". (1) The same contention there are also applicable here.

One might also question Whitehead's doctrine of the human self (ego), i.e. as being a personal society of successive actual entities. To some, the felt identity of selfhood in the midst of changing experiences, is not adequately dealt with by Whitehead. While it is true that a person may change drastically from moment to moment, and that my experience of "now" is at least numerically different from that of a minute ago; yet it really does seem that there is a more profound sort of identity, over a longer period of time (i.e. over many successive durations, rather than merely over the one) than Whitehead would admit. (This point is brought out, in extreme form by P. Weiss.) (2) The same general sort of objection might be applied to his analysis of the so-called enduring physical object.

A Platonist might make objection to Whitehead's treatment of "Ideas" (eternal objects). It is at least conceivable that they might exist (or subsist), with

(1) Cf. A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 100; 475

(2) P. Weiss in Philosophical Essays for A. N. Whitehead p. 172-3

determined relational essence, apart from the action of God. There also seems no a priori reason why they could not ingress in particular actual entities, without being necessarily included in God's primordial nature. In other words, is it necessary, on the basis of experience, to claim that eternal objects must be sheltered under the wing of the "ontological principle"?

There is a further problem as to the nature of data. Aesthetically inclined individuals are sure us that these qualities are "properly describable as feelings". It seems to be the deliverance of common sense that we feel (prehend) objects, but these objects (sense data) are not feelings. When I look at a red table, I am prehending not a red feeling (projected) but a red piece of wood (or more specifically red paint). That is the report based on "common sense" experience.

As we observe the most minute real entities, they seem to manifest a certain vague individuality of action. Each "behaves" in one way, rather than another. At the present moment, at least, such activity can not be explained in terms of purely mechanical laws. One hesitates to ascribe subject animus and subjective form to conceptual feelings enjoyed by such actual entities. Yet these terms seem to do more justice to what

actually appears to be happening, than the more mechanical concepts of traditional physics.

However, it is still an open question as to whether it might not be wiser to retain "psychic" terms for definitely psychic phenomena. Thus, while we note the spontaneity and interaction manifest in the most minute "physical entities", might it not be wise to apply different categories to such activity.

The question seems to reduce itself to a decision as to whether or not the term "feeling" is to be used in a restricted or extended sense. Shall its usage be limited to the: (1) "tone of emotional response", or (2) "mode of awareness" in the experience of men and lower animals; or should the term be applied to all real entities.

Personally, I prefer a restricted use. On that basis, I find it difficult to regard all the data of my experience as "feelings". The table (data) which I sensuously perceive ((I) feel) seems to be entirely different in nature from the (the) feelings of anger ("anger" feelings) which I have when I bump into it in the dark. It is true that the table is composed, as far as we can judge, of minute entities which manifest certain, but not all, activities which are

vaguely similar to those produced by "sacred" activities. However, this apparent similarity may be deceptive. In any case, I hesitate to argue from similar effects to similar causes.

It is at least possible to question the validity of Whitehead's doctrine of "objectification", - even as supposedly descriptive of the experience of the actual entity "myself". According to Whitehead's analysis, a feeling is "transferred" from one actual entity (moment of experience) to the next moment of experience (actual entity). It is not simply a case of successive actual entities exemplifying a common eternal object. In the writer's opinion, a more correct analysis of the situation would be that, - in the case, e.g. of an "anger feeling" "comfortably appropriated", it would be more accurate to say that the same sort of feeling, continues to "well up" in the experience of an enduring person.

An examination of one's own "ego" experience might also lead to a doubt of the absolute exactitude of Whitehead's discussion of the process of prehension. In his opinion, the self-creating subject prehends only such data as it chooses to absorb within the sphere of its life. Yet it is painfully evident, at times, that certain data are forced upon us, - whether we choose it

or not.

It is interesting to note that apparently, in a sense, Whitehead is driven by the principles of his metaphysics to postulate that an actual entity is restricted to the experience of its own being (i.e. its own component electrons). The datum which an actual entity receives comes from other outside entities; yet when experienced, this datum is part of the constituent content of the prehending actual entity. It will be remembered that the entity which provided a datum must pass out of existence before the datum is available. This point of view is also emphasized in Whitehead's doctrine that an actual entity never has direct experience of the contemporary world (because the contemporary world has not yet died and provided a datum which is used by the new entity as part of its constitutive content). This general position seems to contradict one of our basic intuitions. We believe that we are directly aware of other things (despite the "time lag" element in perception, and the physiological structure which as a conditioning factor, helps make the perceptual act possible); it is our experience of other things. What we experience is not merely our own self-constitutive content, which may be uncertainly

referred to a contemporary region that is not directly experienced.

Another aspect of the general problem, - as to whether or not all events of experience can be described in terms of actual entities, or by means of categories applicable to actual entities, - comes to the fore in Whitehead's treatment of the nature of "societies" or 'organisms'.

According to Whitehead, an organism possesses only those qualities and characteristics which are to be found in the majority (or the most prominent) of its component actual entities. If this theory is to be taken with absolute literalness, certain rather strange consequences will apparently follow. It will be necessary to claim that the table is square because its component actual entities manifest or exemplify "squareness".

Judging by Whitehead's preceding analysis, any actual entity becomes square because it conceptually envisages the eternal object "squareness" and then exemplifies it. An enduring society of square actual entities constitutes the square table top (supposing the actual entities concerned had at the same time "decided" to exemplify the eternal object "wood"). It is difficult to see just how this description fits the

usual empirical description, namely, - a man takes several boards and nails them together to form a square table top. One could say that the component actual entities might have been persuaded by the man's act to become square. However, as far as one can determine, the component actual entities of the oblong boards do not change their minds (subjective acts) when they become constituent members of the square table top. ---- This may seem to be a too dogmatic criticism. For, the component actual entities do introduce new decisions into the life of the members of the 'table constituting' societies.

However, it really is somewhat difficult to conceive how, on the basis of Whitehead's postulates (categories), one could account for a situation in which various entities composing a society, come together in a patterned unity. The pattern may be the distinguishing feature of the society. Yet, it (the pattern) may be of the sort that it is not, as such, exemplified in the life of each or any of the component actual entities. Each might contribute its share to the realization of the pattern, but the pattern is not exemplified in any one actual entity. Since any society can only have characteristics found

in some component actual entity, - it is evident that a difficulty arises at this point.

It is to be noted that all those objections do not touch the basic insights on which Whitehead's philosophy is reared. An exception is taken, merely, to the way in which he has attempted to justify these insights.

Whitehead has stressed the ultimate plurality of concrete real interrelated persons and things, existing in a changing world where choice makes a difference, where ideals lure and good comes out of evil. In this he expresses the profoundest convictions of men when they are not befuddling themselves with the "pipe dreams" of ultrasophisticated metaphysics. Whitehead champions poor maligned 'common sense' (by which we live) against those who find sole reality in a changeless world of essence, or within the all engulfing glow of the absolute. He explodes the decadent bubble of the self-encountered abstractionism, which would force reality into the procrustean bed of life-denying categories. He denies that distinctions in thought (i.e. one concept is not another concept) constitute an absolute separation of things. Whitehead refuses to believe that a "logical" contradiction is a calamity in the universe.

Despite his recognition of the blind alleys into which a pseudo-rational line has led its benighted devotees, Whitehead is prepared to use a chartered reason, enlightened by examination of matters of fact, - in the formulation of a "logical coherent necessary system of general ideas which express the principles exemplified in all the activities of the universe.

The writer has found it necessary, on the basis of an examination of his own "self" experience and his experience of physical objects and other persons, to question certain of the details of Whitehead's ex~~position~~. It seems that Whitehead, in his effort to prove the validity of the principles which he has discovered in certain realities, has been too generous in his ascription of them to all realities. His basic insight that persons and things are existent independently of each other (in a certain sense), yet are mutually interrelated (in an equally important sense) may be granted. Yet, it is not necessary to justify this insight (based on observed matter of fact) by the theory that the interaction is in terms of the transfer of feeling (content) and that the internal nature of all real entities is subject, data, subjective form and aim (just as the internal nature of the "ego" is).

In his refusal to attribute all "brute" (or ~~any~~
 at all in the case of God's "primordial nature") power
 to God, a power directed by a detailed law of action,-
 Whitehead is upholding the judgment of religious men
 who survey the ~~amazing~~ miracle of good and evil events
 which go to make up a day of the world's history. In
 refusing to read God out of the ~~universe~~, or to assign
 him to a merely emritis position (as did Incretius),-
 Whitehead is once again voicing the deepest insights
 of mankind. He does this in the face of a generation
 which espoused Humeism, found it shallow (or hasn't
 yet) and turned to the "mysterium tremendum" of Otto
 and Barth. In Whitehead's case, God is not an exception
 to all categories, nor is he the all-powerful "fount
 of grace". God needs man (and other actual entities)
 and man needs God. Indeed Whitehead might have said,-
 I am what I am through the grace of God and every
 other actual entity, in so far as it had done, required
 to meet the needs of my subjective aim, and it was
 recognized and appropriated by me (i.e. the actual
 entities composing me).

Whitehead does not "fritter" away his time with
 a discussion of what occurred in the distant past or
 what will be in the distant future. In so far as such

Writers have relevance, they are considered. But the chief concern is with the universe, of actual entities, as it is now. It is a world of many actual entities, growing, changing, dying, influencing. It is a universe in which ideals "lure", and wreckage is "transmuted". This is the world we know, live in and enjoy. Unlike many philosophers, Mitchell does not seek to deny its reality. He strives to enable his fellows to understand it, see it as it is. Not until philosophers remove the self-imposed bandages from the eyes of their reason, and view the world as it presents itself to the man who must live in it twenty-four hours a day, - will they be able to discover the basic principles manifest in the universe. It is true that the "common sense" of practical man is often mistaken. At the same time he frequently is aware of insights which escape dialectically blinded eyes.

In his address to the American Philosophical Association, meeting at Harvard, December, 1930, - Mitchell declined exclusively to, perch on the stool of Materialism, lounge in the arm chair of Metaphysics or hover in nebulousity above them. He placed due weight upon both.

This is the secret of the Philosophy of Organism. This is the basis of the critical, corrective, constructive influence which Alfred North Whitehead is exerting on all living thinkers.

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